Narrative:

Morning of incident, another pilot taxied to loading ramp and later could not restart engines. I arrived with replacement aircraft. Engines on first aircraft were eventually started by a mechanic. Since no maintenance work was done by the mechanic (only normal cockpit procedures) no squawk or return to service signature was entered in the aircraft's discrepancy log. Mechanic informed me that engines were severely flooded and that thee should be no further problem with starting. As I completed prestart cockpit checks, I noticed the outboard tanks had been selected and I reset to inboard tanks per checklist. Engines started normally and I taxied to the runway where a complete engine runup was completed, also normal. No delay in obtaining takeoff clearance. Takeoff roll was normal except for a very brief slowing in acceleration through 80 KIAS. Engine gauges checked, indications normal, no direction control problem, takeoff roll continued (runway 10R). Immediately after gear retraction, aircraft began a shudder-type vibration and 'mush' as rate of climb deteriorates. Engine gauges then revealed both fuel flows down to 38 gph and left cylinder head temperature abnormally high. I performed standard engine-out drill in preparation for complete engine failure and called tower for a precautionary landing. Landing clearance to runway 28R was issued immediately and acknowledged. Immediate turn for runway was begun. Maintaining altitude was then nearly impossible and aircraft was slowed to 90 KTS (16 KTS below vyse) to minimize altitude loss in the turn. Once over runway, gear selected down, flaps (up until then) selected full and remaining power reduced for landing. This was the only adjustment to power since beginning the takeoff roll. Exiting the runway, both left and right cht were noted above red line (500 degree C). Upon shutdown, samples of all fuel tanks revealed jet-a/AVGAS mixture inboards, AVGAS outboards. Important notes: 1) mixture of jet-a and AVGAS was about 70% and 30% respectively. Fuel mixture still had bluish color (though not as blue as pure AVGAS) and smelled like AVGAS. 2) thanks to my company's efforts in recurrent training and dissemination of critical information, I was able to instantly recognize what the problem was, formulate and execute a plan to get down. Without this training, I might have spent precious time trying to figure out my problem and elected a different course of action, not realizing that I only had seconds left of engine power. (As it was, un-stick to touchdown was only about 90 seconds.) 3) sharp, professional effort by the local controller to clear me to the nearest runway. In retrospect: 1) any abnormality in the takeoff roll is good enough reason to abort while you're still on the ground. 2) I would like to recommend continued (renewed?) industry effort to differentiate between fuel types/grades as this scenario proves present methods and techniques are not foolproof. Supplemental information from acn 113675: parked aircraft at portland. A fuel truck pulled up and I ordered full inboards with 100LL. Placed order with office and went home. The next day I picked up fuel receipt, fuel samples appeared normal (no water or sediment and slight blue color). Taxied to ramp and loaded aircraft. Aircraft would not start and appeared flooded. The company sent another airplane and I completed the run.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATX SMT LOST POWER AFTER TKOF MADE IMMEDIATE RETURN LAND.

Narrative: MORNING OF INCIDENT, ANOTHER PLT TAXIED TO LOADING RAMP AND LATER COULD NOT RESTART ENGINES. I ARRIVED WITH REPLACEMENT ACFT. ENGINES ON FIRST ACFT WERE EVENTUALLY STARTED BY A MECHANIC. SINCE NO MAINT WORK WAS DONE BY THE MECHANIC (ONLY NORMAL COCKPIT PROCS) NO SQUAWK OR RETURN TO SERVICE SIGNATURE WAS ENTERED IN THE ACFT'S DISCREPANCY LOG. MECHANIC INFORMED ME THAT ENGINES WERE SEVERELY FLOODED AND THAT THEE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER PROBLEM WITH STARTING. AS I COMPLETED PRESTART COCKPIT CHECKS, I NOTICED THE OUTBOARD TANKS HAD BEEN SELECTED AND I RESET TO INBOARD TANKS PER CHECKLIST. ENGINES STARTED NORMALLY AND I TAXIED TO THE RWY WHERE A COMPLETE ENGINE RUNUP WAS COMPLETED, ALSO NORMAL. NO DELAY IN OBTAINING TKOF CLRNC. TKOF ROLL WAS NORMAL EXCEPT FOR A VERY BRIEF SLOWING IN ACCELERATION THROUGH 80 KIAS. ENGINE GAUGES CHECKED, INDICATIONS NORMAL, NO DIRECTION CONTROL PROBLEM, TKOF ROLL CONTINUED (RWY 10R). IMMEDIATELY AFTER GEAR RETRACTION, ACFT BEGAN A SHUDDER-TYPE VIBRATION AND 'MUSH' AS RATE OF CLIMB DETERIORATES. ENGINE GAUGES THEN REVEALED BOTH FUEL FLOWS DOWN TO 38 GPH AND LEFT CYLINDER HEAD TEMP ABNORMALLY HIGH. I PERFORMED STANDARD ENGINE-OUT DRILL IN PREPARATION FOR COMPLETE ENGINE FAILURE AND CALLED TWR FOR A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG. LNDG CLRNC TO RWY 28R WAS ISSUED IMMEDIATELY AND ACKNOWLEDGED. IMMEDIATE TURN FOR RWY WAS BEGUN. MAINTAINING ALT WAS THEN NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE AND ACFT WAS SLOWED TO 90 KTS (16 KTS BELOW VYSE) TO MINIMIZE ALT LOSS IN THE TURN. ONCE OVER RWY, GEAR SELECTED DOWN, FLAPS (UP UNTIL THEN) SELECTED FULL AND REMAINING POWER REDUCED FOR LNDG. THIS WAS THE ONLY ADJUSTMENT TO POWER SINCE BEGINNING THE TKOF ROLL. EXITING THE RWY, BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT CHT WERE NOTED ABOVE RED LINE (500 DEG C). UPON SHUTDOWN, SAMPLES OF ALL FUEL TANKS REVEALED JET-A/AVGAS MIXTURE INBOARDS, AVGAS OUTBOARDS. IMPORTANT NOTES: 1) MIXTURE OF JET-A AND AVGAS WAS ABOUT 70% AND 30% RESPECTIVELY. FUEL MIXTURE STILL HAD BLUISH COLOR (THOUGH NOT AS BLUE AS PURE AVGAS) AND SMELLED LIKE AVGAS. 2) THANKS TO MY COMPANY'S EFFORTS IN RECURRENT TRAINING AND DISSEMINATION OF CRITICAL INFO, I WAS ABLE TO INSTANTLY RECOGNIZE WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS, FORMULATE AND EXECUTE A PLAN TO GET DOWN. WITHOUT THIS TRAINING, I MIGHT HAVE SPENT PRECIOUS TIME TRYING TO FIGURE OUT MY PROBLEM AND ELECTED A DIFFERENT COURSE OF ACTION, NOT REALIZING THAT I ONLY HAD SECONDS LEFT OF ENGINE POWER. (AS IT WAS, UN-STICK TO TOUCHDOWN WAS ONLY ABOUT 90 SECONDS.) 3) SHARP, PROFESSIONAL EFFORT BY THE LCL CTLR TO CLEAR ME TO THE NEAREST RWY. IN RETROSPECT: 1) ANY ABNORMALITY IN THE TKOF ROLL IS GOOD ENOUGH REASON TO ABORT WHILE YOU'RE STILL ON THE GND. 2) I WOULD LIKE TO RECOMMEND CONTINUED (RENEWED?) INDUSTRY EFFORT TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN FUEL TYPES/GRADES AS THIS SCENARIO PROVES PRESENT METHODS AND TECHNIQUES ARE NOT FOOLPROOF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 113675: PARKED ACFT AT PORTLAND. A FUEL TRUCK PULLED UP AND I ORDERED FULL INBOARDS WITH 100LL. PLACED ORDER WITH OFFICE AND WENT HOME. THE NEXT DAY I PICKED UP FUEL RECEIPT, FUEL SAMPLES APPEARED NORMAL (NO WATER OR SEDIMENT AND SLIGHT BLUE COLOR). TAXIED TO RAMP AND LOADED ACFT. ACFT WOULD NOT START AND APPEARED FLOODED. THE COMPANY SENT ANOTHER AIRPLANE AND I COMPLETED THE RUN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.