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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1139864 |
Time | |
Date | 201401 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.ARTCC |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Hydraulic Main System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
During cruise flight; the master warning and EICAS stated that the hydraulic #1 failed and the hydraulic page showed zero quantity in hydraulic #1 system. The QRH was performed and I declared an emergency. The company and passengers were then notified. The QRH directed that hydraulic #1 be turned off when quantity indicated zero which was performed. I received via acrs that dispatch and maintenance requested that I continue flight to [destination]. I refused to continue and requested to divert to [a nearby suitable airport]. I notified ATC of our in intentions and ATC directed us to fly direct to [that airport]. The diversion report was sent and QRH completed. The first officer and I continued to discuss the approach and landing in detail. Since the first officer was to do an emergency landing gear extension; we switched and I became the pilot flying. After initiating descent; I received another request to continue flight to [original destination] which I again refused. The emergency (abnormal) landing gear extension checklist was performed in order to lower the gear with no hydraulics. During landing; and although half the brakes were missing; we were able to stop aircraft about half way down runway. Aircraft was then towed to the gate. A large amount of time was spent on waiting on response from dispatch/maintenance and about where to land. In this particular emergency; I do not think that convenience to passengers or maintenance was appropriate. During any emergency; and especially a very serious one; safety needs to be priority number one. During this emergency we were flying on hydraulic system #2. There was no backup in case the #2 hydraulic failed. There were numerous tasked to be performed and there just no time for long waits from the company or numerous acrs messages about where to land the aircraft. In this case I think the aircraft needed to land at the nearest suitable airport.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB-145XR Captain reported loss of Hydraulic System #1 during cruise flight. Captain declared an emergency; and contrary to the advice of the company; decided to divert to a nearby suitable airport.
Narrative: During cruise flight; the master warning and EICAS stated that the Hydraulic #1 failed and the Hydraulic page showed zero quantity in Hydraulic #1 System. The QRH was performed and I declared an emergency. The Company and passengers were then notified. The QRH directed that Hydraulic #1 be turned off when quantity indicated zero which was performed. I received via ACRS that Dispatch and Maintenance requested that I continue flight to [destination]. I refused to continue and requested to divert to [a nearby suitable airport]. I notified ATC of our in intentions and ATC directed us to fly direct to [that airport]. The diversion report was sent and QRH completed. The First Officer and I continued to discuss the approach and landing in detail. Since the First Officer was to do an emergency landing gear extension; we switched and I became the pilot flying. After initiating descent; I received another request to continue flight to [original destination] which I again refused. The Emergency (Abnormal) Landing Gear Extension Checklist was performed in order to lower the gear with no hydraulics. During landing; and although half the brakes were missing; we were able to stop aircraft about half way down runway. Aircraft was then towed to the gate. A large amount of time was spent on waiting on response from Dispatch/Maintenance and about where to land. In this particular emergency; I do not think that convenience to passengers or Maintenance was appropriate. During any emergency; and especially a very serious one; safety needs to be priority number one. During this emergency we were flying on Hydraulic System #2. There was no backup in case the #2 Hydraulic failed. There were numerous tasked to be performed and there just no time for long waits from the company or numerous ACRS messages about where to land the aircraft. In this case I think the aircraft needed to land at the nearest suitable airport.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.