Narrative:

Mh-65C operating in VMC conditions on an IFR flight plan accepted a best speed approach at 120 KIAS from ATC due to converging fixed wing traffic in trail on VOR/DME runway 15 approach. At approximately 8 NM north of the field; ATC cleared mh-65C to switch to CTAF and canceled radar services. In error; pilot not flying tuned incorrect CTAF in comm 1 and announced position and intentions to perform a go-around at the approach end of runway 15 followed by a departure to the south. At an estimated 2 NM north of the field at 880 ft MSL; the flight mechanic noticed and announced a shadow of an aircraft projected on the ground in the vicinity of the departure end of runway 33. As the pilot not flying and pilot flying began searching for traffic; the flight mechanic announced 'break left.' the pilot flying immediately performed a descending left turn at an estimated 30 degrees angle of bank to avoid the oncoming traffic. The single engine; general aviation aircraft passed left to right at an estimated distance of 400 ft. The pilot not flying immediately realized the wrong frequency had been entered into comm 1; tuned the correct CTAF; and announced intentions. The mh-65 continued flight on its original IFR flight plan...without further incident. The pilot not flying reported developing a habit pattern of not utilizing the preset frequency when in the left seat since that practice requires reaching across the cockpit and putting the flight helmet in close proximity to the fadec control switches. Prior to tuning the CTAF; the pilot not flying verified that the pilot flying had tuned the proper frequency in the preset position. When instructed by ATC; and in an attempt to quickly change to the CTAF frequency; the pilot not flying reverted back to an old habit pattern and selected the COMM1 right line select key (instead of the preset button) which made the CDU 'buried' frequency the new COMM1 active frequency. The pilot not flying admittedly felt rushed due to accepting the best speed approach at 120 KIAS and failed to verify the correct frequency had been entered into comm 1 after depressing the right line select on the CDU. No aural TCAS alert was heard by the crew prior to the mishap. The TCAS tested properly on deck and exhibited normal operation throughout the flight. It is suspected that the general aviation aircraft was either not equipped or not operating with a transponder. The crew was unable to establish good communications with the general aviation aircraft due to a heavy workload immediately following the mishap. After the flight; it was noted that the field is utilized heavily by a local flight school. It is unusual for [our] unit aircraft to operate in and out of this area. This was the first time the crew had been to [this field].there are two valuable lessons we can learn from this mishap. The first is the utmost importance of the flight mechanic maintaining a good outside visual scan during IFR training flights. Had the flight mechanic not seen the oncoming aircraft and had the flight mechanic not been accurate; bold; and concise while commanding the pilot flying to 'break left'; we could have had lost an aircraft and crew. The second lesson is that we had a crew experience a loss of situational awareness because they were rushing an instrument approach. Often times; you'll find yourself slowing down the pattern as a helicopter while operating in the IFR environment. This is a situation that can be stressful if you unnecessarily impose pressure on yourself to comply with optional ATC requests. Don't accept more risk than you should for the convenience of ATC or the aircraft behind you. If you are uncomfortable with the request; simply state that you are 'unable'. ATC is not always fully aware of your capabilities and it's your responsibility as an aviator to prevent ATC from getting you in a bad situation behind the aircraft.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MH-65 on a practice approach to Runway 15 at an uncontrolled airport; maneuvered to avoid a C172 departing Runway 33. MH-65 crew was on the wrong CTAF.

Narrative: MH-65C operating in VMC conditions on an IFR flight plan accepted a best speed approach at 120 KIAS from ATC due to converging fixed wing traffic in trail on VOR/DME Runway 15 approach. At approximately 8 NM north of the field; ATC cleared MH-65C to switch to CTAF and canceled radar services. In error; pilot not flying tuned incorrect CTAF in COMM 1 and announced position and intentions to perform a go-around at the approach end of Runway 15 followed by a departure to the south. At an estimated 2 NM north of the field at 880 FT MSL; the Flight Mechanic noticed and announced a shadow of an aircraft projected on the ground in the vicinity of the departure end of Runway 33. As the pilot not flying and pilot flying began searching for traffic; the Flight Mechanic announced 'break left.' The pilot flying immediately performed a descending left turn at an estimated 30 degrees angle of bank to avoid the oncoming traffic. The single engine; general aviation aircraft passed left to right at an estimated distance of 400 FT. The pilot not flying immediately realized the wrong frequency had been entered into COMM 1; tuned the correct CTAF; and announced intentions. The MH-65 continued flight on its original IFR flight plan...without further incident. The pilot not flying reported developing a habit pattern of not utilizing the Preset frequency when in the left seat since that practice requires reaching across the cockpit and putting the flight helmet in close proximity to the FADEC control switches. Prior to tuning the CTAF; the pilot not flying verified that the pilot flying had tuned the proper frequency in the Preset position. When instructed by ATC; and in an attempt to quickly change to the CTAF frequency; the pilot not flying reverted back to an old habit pattern and selected the COMM1 right line select key (instead of the Preset button) which made the CDU 'buried' frequency the new COMM1 active frequency. The pilot not flying admittedly felt rushed due to accepting the best speed approach at 120 KIAS and failed to verify the correct frequency had been entered into COMM 1 after depressing the right line select on the CDU. No aural TCAS alert was heard by the crew prior to the mishap. The TCAS tested properly on deck and exhibited normal operation throughout the flight. It is suspected that the general aviation aircraft was either not equipped or not operating with a transponder. The crew was unable to establish good communications with the general aviation aircraft due to a heavy workload immediately following the mishap. After the flight; it was noted that the field is utilized heavily by a local flight school. It is unusual for [our] unit aircraft to operate in and out of this area. This was the first time the crew had been to [this field].There are two valuable lessons we can learn from this mishap. The first is the utmost importance of the Flight Mechanic maintaining a good outside visual scan during IFR training flights. Had the Flight Mechanic not seen the oncoming aircraft and had the Flight Mechanic not been accurate; bold; and concise while commanding the pilot flying to 'break left'; we could have had lost an aircraft and crew. The second lesson is that we had a crew experience a loss of situational awareness because they were rushing an instrument approach. Often times; you'll find yourself slowing down the pattern as a helicopter while operating in the IFR environment. This is a situation that can be stressful if you unnecessarily impose pressure on yourself to comply with optional ATC requests. Don't accept more risk than you should for the convenience of ATC or the aircraft behind you. If you are uncomfortable with the request; simply state that you are 'unable'. ATC is not always fully aware of your capabilities and it's your responsibility as an aviator to prevent ATC from getting you in a bad situation behind the aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.