Narrative:

We departed bwi for sby at a cruising altitude of 3000'. We proceeded to penetrate a line of WX that appeared to be light to mod rain. Passenger river approach indicated that the WX ended approximately 15 mi west of sby and that we could expect a visual approach to runway 14. About half way to sby we encountered mod rain and cloud to cloud lightning, however the ride was relatively smooth. We were in instrument conditions. We requested and were cleared to 2000'. At approximately 10 mi out I asked approach what instrument approach that they wanted us to use if we should not become visual before the airport. They said the VOR 14 approach right now if we wanted it. We declined and said we would like the ILS 32 to circle if we missed the visual. We broke out of the front of the line about 3 mi west of sby and started to come straight in to 14, however, the flight service person was talking with another aircraft and we feared he was in the pattern. Due to the frequency congestion we could not find out until a straight in approach was not practical. When we did get to talk to FSS the wind had shifted from 140 degree at 4 KTS to approximately 210 degree at 15 KTS. We elected to come overhead and enter downwind to runway 23. The initial checklist and the final checklist were completed. At around 700' the captain stated that he was glad we had made. It I noticed that the approach was left of centerline but we would be on centerline at the runway. Around 300' I notified a dust devil on the airport near the hangars, I pointed it out to the captain. The approach remained normal until the right main tires touched the runway. At that point the aircraft yawed about 30 degree right and popped back into the air. We also moved laterally left of the runway at about 10' of height. The captain applied maximum power, called flaps 25, gear up. We climbed out somewhat higher than the normal profile before retracting the flaps and resuming normal flight. We circled east of the line looking at it with radar. We decided to fly north looking for a hole to go back to bwi. The first hole we saw closed before we could get to it, at that time we decided to divert to acy which we did. Flight control was kept advised at all times. Contributing factors: captain had been delayed the night before and had been on duty from XA00 to XC00 the previous night and had been given reduced rest and on duty again at about XB00. He had complained about being sleepy and hardly able to stay awake. I had flown 5 days, then had been in labor contract negotiations for 3 days (which had been stressful), but I had been resting about 18 hours. Labor relations on the property were tense and the captain was a management pilot. This was only the third leg I had ever flown with this captain. Perceptions, judgements, decisions: the important perceptions that I recognized was the initial wind shift, the captain's statement that he was glad we made it, and the dust devil. The implications of the wind shift are obvious, however, the captain's statement made me make a conscious note that the biggest obstacle was at hand and he did not recognize it. The appearance of the dust devil was a perfect windshear alert (gust front) given by mother nature. I feel that I was prepared for the go around, however, in retrospect, based on the apparent experience level of the captain, I think that I should have demanded a go around prior to touchdown. This judgement is complicated because I believe that a safe and successful landing could have been made had the actual touchdown been hard rather than smooth. This would have deployed 3 sets of spoilers and precluded any further flight. Also, touching down closer to the end of the runway would have given added seconds to allow the spoilers to work. The thing to remember is that the actual gust front was almost as visible as if someone had drawn a line across the runway. If the aircraft had been a jet or a propjet without the induced life created by the turbo propeller engines I do not think we could have flown the aircraft out of the situation. After the go around as first officer, I became dominant in the decision making for the rest of the flight. Refusing to try toland at sby again and preventing a second penetration of the line of WX. Flight control was clearly promoting completion of the flight at the intended destination instead of retreat. To prevent a recurrence the FAA should make rest requirements tighter for the regional airlines than anyone else. The reason being that the regional airlines tend to operate with fewer personnel either due to economic reasons or to availability. Cockpit resource training that promotes some sort of parallel decision making process instead of servitude of the first officer to the captain. Communications between the company dispatchers and aircraft should be recorded.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER ACFT ENCOUNTERS WIND SHEAR AT LNDG, EXECUTES GO AROUND, REPORTER CITES CREW REST PROBLEM AS CONTRIBUTING FACTOR.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED BWI FOR SBY AT A CRUISING ALT OF 3000'. WE PROCEEDED TO PENETRATE A LINE OF WX THAT APPEARED TO BE LIGHT TO MOD RAIN. PAX RIVER APCH INDICATED THAT THE WX ENDED APPROX 15 MI W OF SBY AND THAT WE COULD EXPECT A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 14. ABOUT HALF WAY TO SBY WE ENCOUNTERED MOD RAIN AND CLOUD TO CLOUD LIGHTNING, HOWEVER THE RIDE WAS RELATIVELY SMOOTH. WE WERE IN INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS. WE REQUESTED AND WERE CLRED TO 2000'. AT APPROX 10 MI OUT I ASKED APCH WHAT INSTRUMENT APCH THAT THEY WANTED US TO USE IF WE SHOULD NOT BECOME VISUAL BEFORE THE ARPT. THEY SAID THE VOR 14 APCH RIGHT NOW IF WE WANTED IT. WE DECLINED AND SAID WE WOULD LIKE THE ILS 32 TO CIRCLE IF WE MISSED THE VISUAL. WE BROKE OUT OF THE FRONT OF THE LINE ABOUT 3 MI W OF SBY AND STARTED TO COME STRAIGHT IN TO 14, HOWEVER, THE FLT SERVICE PERSON WAS TALKING WITH ANOTHER ACFT AND WE FEARED HE WAS IN THE PATTERN. DUE TO THE FREQ CONGESTION WE COULD NOT FIND OUT UNTIL A STRAIGHT IN APCH WAS NOT PRACTICAL. WHEN WE DID GET TO TALK TO FSS THE WIND HAD SHIFTED FROM 140 DEG AT 4 KTS TO APPROX 210 DEG AT 15 KTS. WE ELECTED TO COME OVERHEAD AND ENTER DOWNWIND TO RWY 23. THE INITIAL CHECKLIST AND THE FINAL CHECKLIST WERE COMPLETED. AT AROUND 700' THE CAPT STATED THAT HE WAS GLAD WE HAD MADE. IT I NOTICED THAT THE APCH WAS LEFT OF CENTERLINE BUT WE WOULD BE ON CENTERLINE AT THE RWY. AROUND 300' I NOTIFIED A DUST DEVIL ON THE ARPT NEAR THE HANGARS, I POINTED IT OUT TO THE CAPT. THE APCH REMAINED NORMAL UNTIL THE RIGHT MAIN TIRES TOUCHED THE RWY. AT THAT POINT THE ACFT YAWED ABOUT 30 DEG RIGHT AND POPPED BACK INTO THE AIR. WE ALSO MOVED LATERALLY LEFT OF THE RWY AT ABOUT 10' OF HEIGHT. THE CAPT APPLIED MAX POWER, CALLED FLAPS 25, GEAR UP. WE CLIMBED OUT SOMEWHAT HIGHER THAN THE NORMAL PROFILE BEFORE RETRACTING THE FLAPS AND RESUMING NORMAL FLT. WE CIRCLED E OF THE LINE LOOKING AT IT WITH RADAR. WE DECIDED TO FLY N LOOKING FOR A HOLE TO GO BACK TO BWI. THE FIRST HOLE WE SAW CLOSED BEFORE WE COULD GET TO IT, AT THAT TIME WE DECIDED TO DIVERT TO ACY WHICH WE DID. FLT CTL WAS KEPT ADVISED AT ALL TIMES. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: CAPT HAD BEEN DELAYED THE NIGHT BEFORE AND HAD BEEN ON DUTY FROM XA00 TO XC00 THE PREVIOUS NIGHT AND HAD BEEN GIVEN REDUCED REST AND ON DUTY AGAIN AT ABOUT XB00. HE HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT BEING SLEEPY AND HARDLY ABLE TO STAY AWAKE. I HAD FLOWN 5 DAYS, THEN HAD BEEN IN LABOR CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS FOR 3 DAYS (WHICH HAD BEEN STRESSFUL), BUT I HAD BEEN RESTING ABOUT 18 HRS. LABOR RELATIONS ON THE PROPERTY WERE TENSE AND THE CAPT WAS A MGMNT PLT. THIS WAS ONLY THE THIRD LEG I HAD EVER FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT. PERCEPTIONS, JUDGEMENTS, DECISIONS: THE IMPORTANT PERCEPTIONS THAT I RECOGNIZED WAS THE INITIAL WIND SHIFT, THE CAPT'S STATEMENT THAT HE WAS GLAD WE MADE IT, AND THE DUST DEVIL. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WIND SHIFT ARE OBVIOUS, HOWEVER, THE CAPT'S STATEMENT MADE ME MAKE A CONSCIOUS NOTE THAT THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE WAS AT HAND AND HE DID NOT RECOGNIZE IT. THE APPEARANCE OF THE DUST DEVIL WAS A PERFECT WINDSHEAR ALERT (GUST FRONT) GIVEN BY MOTHER NATURE. I FEEL THAT I WAS PREPARED FOR THE GO AROUND, HOWEVER, IN RETROSPECT, BASED ON THE APPARENT EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF THE CAPT, I THINK THAT I SHOULD HAVE DEMANDED A GO AROUND PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN. THIS JUDGEMENT IS COMPLICATED BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT A SAFE AND SUCCESSFUL LNDG COULD HAVE BEEN MADE HAD THE ACTUAL TOUCHDOWN BEEN HARD RATHER THAN SMOOTH. THIS WOULD HAVE DEPLOYED 3 SETS OF SPOILERS AND PRECLUDED ANY FURTHER FLT. ALSO, TOUCHING DOWN CLOSER TO THE END OF THE RWY WOULD HAVE GIVEN ADDED SECONDS TO ALLOW THE SPOILERS TO WORK. THE THING TO REMEMBER IS THAT THE ACTUAL GUST FRONT WAS ALMOST AS VISIBLE AS IF SOMEONE HAD DRAWN A LINE ACROSS THE RWY. IF THE ACFT HAD BEEN A JET OR A PROPJET WITHOUT THE INDUCED LIFE CREATED BY THE TURBO PROP ENGINES I DO NOT THINK WE COULD HAVE FLOWN THE ACFT OUT OF THE SITUATION. AFTER THE GO AROUND AS F/O, I BECAME DOMINANT IN THE DECISION MAKING FOR THE REST OF THE FLT. REFUSING TO TRY TOLAND AT SBY AGAIN AND PREVENTING A SECOND PENETRATION OF THE LINE OF WX. FLT CONTROL WAS CLEARLY PROMOTING COMPLETION OF THE FLT AT THE INTENDED DEST INSTEAD OF RETREAT. TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE THE FAA SHOULD MAKE REST REQUIREMENTS TIGHTER FOR THE REGIONAL AIRLINES THAN ANYONE ELSE. THE REASON BEING THAT THE REGIONAL AIRLINES TEND TO OPERATE WITH FEWER PERSONNEL EITHER DUE TO ECONOMIC REASONS OR TO AVAILABILITY. COCKPIT RESOURCE TRAINING THAT PROMOTES SOME SORT OF PARALLEL DECISION MAKING PROCESS INSTEAD OF SERVITUDE OF THE F/O TO THE CAPT. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE COMPANY DISPATCHERS AND ACFT SHOULD BE RECORDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.