Narrative:

1) air carrier X heading 360 at 4000', talking to ny approach 126.95. We were radar vectors for VOR 24 approach at bdr. We were following our company traffic and were second for the approach. Company was cleared for approach and handed over to tower. First officer was flying. 2) we called airport in sight. Controller issued 270 degree heading maintain 4000'. 3) on heading 270 at 4000', controller said as soon as we passed traffic he'd have lower and approach clearance. Controller came back momentarily and issued us a visual approach runway 11R, traffic at bdr. We accepted clearance and started descending. 4) controller cancelled approach clearance and told us to maintain 3000' and heading 250 degree. He said it was due to the traffic preceding us, that was overflying the field. 5) controller issued us a visual clearance to runway 11R traffic at bdr, and said confirm you still have airport in sight (we had airport in sight). Contacted tower frequency 120.9. 6) I contacted the tower and reported about 5 mi southwest of the field and that we were going to enter right downwind runway 11. Tower said to report mid downwind right traffic. 7) I asked the tower if I could talk her into a right base for runway 11. Tower said negative report right downwind. I acknowledged, ok right downwind. We started a right turn so that we could enter right downwind for runway 11 then a hard turn to the left. The tower frequency was saturated and everybody was walking all over each other. 8) at mid downwind we reported midfield on right downwind. 9) tower acknowledged and told us we were #3 and we were to follow an small aircraft aircraft on a left base, and we were to start our base turn at the tree line, advise traffic in sight. I said roger, we did not have the #1 traffic or #2 traffic in sight. We were both looking and trying to get our aircraft into approach confign. We crossed the tree line and started our right base turn to final. We advised that we did not have traffic in sight. We were about 2.5 mi out lined up on final, still no traffic in sight. I told first officer to add some power, we were starting to get slow in the turn, then I told him to start descending. Still no traffic in sight. 10) tower said that our traffic was 1/2 mi final and we were cleared to land. We acknowledged cleared to land and I started the before landing checklist. 11) tower asked us what our position was. I said we were 2 mi on final (I tried to keep xmissions as short as possible due to the congestion on the frequency). I heard tower clear traffic to back taxi into position and hold runway 29. 12) tower asked if we were on final for runway 24. I said no, we are short final for runway 11. After seeing traffic pull out onto runway from the left at alpha taxiway I advised first officer to prepare to go around. Tower started saying something but I really didn't hear, because at that instant I observed small aircraft Y climbing right at us off of runway 29. (About 1/4 mi and about 200'.) we were at about 1/2 mi final 500-400' descending. I said go around and turn right we have head on traffic. He applied full power and called for flaps ten. I retracted the flaps and put the gear up. Then I grabbed the yoke and turned aircraft to the left to avoid hitting an small aircraft Y. That was at the departure end of runway 24, about over the numbers, and 300-400' climbing. First officer did not see him, first officer pointed out traffic that appeared to be paralleling runway 11 on right downwind slightly above us heading nwbnd. I saw him then observed traffic at our 12 O'clock position. He was on close downwind for runway 24L traffic. I turned aircraft to the right to avoid hitting him. 13) tower told us to follow the high wing aircraft that was mid downwind left traffic for runway 24. We acknowledged. We passed behind that traffic, climbed up to 1500' and entered downwind. We lost sight of our traffic that was not behind us. We turned base about 3 mi out and landed on runway 24. 14) after landing I asked ground control if there was a supervisor on duty. Ground control said that was the supervisor. I believe that what happened at bridgeport on this day is a combination of things. #1 being the system that had failed, as a result mistakes were made under very stressful circumstances. I wrote this letter because this has been an ongoing problem at bridgeport. I, along with many of my co-workers, have previously witnessed and been involved in situations that were not safe. I know that our company has tried to work on this problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: APCH CTL ASSIGNED WRONG RWY FOR VISUAL APCH. PLT MADE APCH TO WRONG RWY AND HAD NMAC WITH AN ACFT DEPARTING OPPOSITE DIRECTION. NMAC. SYSTEM ERROR.

Narrative: 1) ACR X HDG 360 AT 4000', TALKING TO NY APCH 126.95. WE WERE RADAR VECTORS FOR VOR 24 APCH AT BDR. WE WERE FOLLOWING OUR COMPANY TFC AND WERE SECOND FOR THE APCH. COMPANY WAS CLRED FOR APCH AND HANDED OVER TO TWR. F/O WAS FLYING. 2) WE CALLED ARPT IN SIGHT. CTLR ISSUED 270 DEG HDG MAINTAIN 4000'. 3) ON HDG 270 AT 4000', CTLR SAID AS SOON AS WE PASSED TFC HE'D HAVE LOWER AND APCH CLRNC. CTLR CAME BACK MOMENTARILY AND ISSUED US A VISUAL APCH RWY 11R, TFC AT BDR. WE ACCEPTED CLRNC AND STARTED DESCENDING. 4) CTLR CANCELLED APCH CLRNC AND TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 3000' AND HDG 250 DEG. HE SAID IT WAS DUE TO THE TFC PRECEDING US, THAT WAS OVERFLYING THE FIELD. 5) CTLR ISSUED US A VISUAL CLRNC TO RWY 11R TFC AT BDR, AND SAID CONFIRM YOU STILL HAVE ARPT IN SIGHT (WE HAD ARPT IN SIGHT). CONTACTED TWR FREQ 120.9. 6) I CONTACTED THE TWR AND REPORTED ABOUT 5 MI SW OF THE FIELD AND THAT WE WERE GOING TO ENTER RIGHT DOWNWIND RWY 11. TWR SAID TO REPORT MID DOWNWIND RIGHT TFC. 7) I ASKED THE TWR IF I COULD TALK HER INTO A RIGHT BASE FOR RWY 11. TWR SAID NEGATIVE REPORT RIGHT DOWNWIND. I ACKNOWLEDGED, OK RIGHT DOWNWIND. WE STARTED A RIGHT TURN SO THAT WE COULD ENTER RIGHT DOWNWIND FOR RWY 11 THEN A HARD TURN TO THE LEFT. THE TWR FREQ WAS SATURATED AND EVERYBODY WAS WALKING ALL OVER EACH OTHER. 8) AT MID DOWNWIND WE REPORTED MIDFIELD ON RIGHT DOWNWIND. 9) TWR ACKNOWLEDGED AND TOLD US WE WERE #3 AND WE WERE TO FOLLOW AN SMA ACFT ON A LEFT BASE, AND WE WERE TO START OUR BASE TURN AT THE TREE LINE, ADVISE TFC IN SIGHT. I SAID ROGER, WE DID NOT HAVE THE #1 TFC OR #2 TFC IN SIGHT. WE WERE BOTH LOOKING AND TRYING TO GET OUR ACFT INTO APCH CONFIGN. WE CROSSED THE TREE LINE AND STARTED OUR RIGHT BASE TURN TO FINAL. WE ADVISED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE TFC IN SIGHT. WE WERE ABOUT 2.5 MI OUT LINED UP ON FINAL, STILL NO TFC IN SIGHT. I TOLD F/O TO ADD SOME POWER, WE WERE STARTING TO GET SLOW IN THE TURN, THEN I TOLD HIM TO START DESCENDING. STILL NO TFC IN SIGHT. 10) TWR SAID THAT OUR TFC WAS 1/2 MI FINAL AND WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. WE ACKNOWLEDGED CLRED TO LAND AND I STARTED THE BEFORE LNDG CHECKLIST. 11) TWR ASKED US WHAT OUR POSITION WAS. I SAID WE WERE 2 MI ON FINAL (I TRIED TO KEEP XMISSIONS AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE DUE TO THE CONGESTION ON THE FREQ). I HEARD TWR CLEAR TFC TO BACK TAXI INTO POSITION AND HOLD RWY 29. 12) TWR ASKED IF WE WERE ON FINAL FOR RWY 24. I SAID NO, WE ARE SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 11. AFTER SEEING TFC PULL OUT ONTO RWY FROM THE LEFT AT ALPHA TXWY I ADVISED F/O TO PREPARE TO GO AROUND. TWR STARTED SAYING SOMETHING BUT I REALLY DIDN'T HEAR, BECAUSE AT THAT INSTANT I OBSERVED SMA Y CLIMBING RIGHT AT US OFF OF RWY 29. (ABOUT 1/4 MI AND ABOUT 200'.) WE WERE AT ABOUT 1/2 MI FINAL 500-400' DESCENDING. I SAID GO AROUND AND TURN RIGHT WE HAVE HEAD ON TFC. HE APPLIED FULL POWER AND CALLED FOR FLAPS TEN. I RETRACTED THE FLAPS AND PUT THE GEAR UP. THEN I GRABBED THE YOKE AND TURNED ACFT TO THE LEFT TO AVOID HITTING AN SMA Y. THAT WAS AT THE DEP END OF RWY 24, ABOUT OVER THE NUMBERS, AND 300-400' CLIMBING. F/O DID NOT SEE HIM, F/O POINTED OUT TFC THAT APPEARED TO BE PARALLELING RWY 11 ON RIGHT DOWNWIND SLIGHTLY ABOVE US HDG NWBND. I SAW HIM THEN OBSERVED TFC AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POSITION. HE WAS ON CLOSE DOWNWIND FOR RWY 24L TFC. I TURNED ACFT TO THE RIGHT TO AVOID HITTING HIM. 13) TWR TOLD US TO FOLLOW THE HIGH WING ACFT THAT WAS MID DOWNWIND LEFT TFC FOR RWY 24. WE ACKNOWLEDGED. WE PASSED BEHIND THAT TFC, CLIMBED UP TO 1500' AND ENTERED DOWNWIND. WE LOST SIGHT OF OUR TFC THAT WAS NOT BEHIND US. WE TURNED BASE ABOUT 3 MI OUT AND LANDED ON RWY 24. 14) AFTER LNDG I ASKED GND CTL IF THERE WAS A SUPVR ON DUTY. GND CTL SAID THAT WAS THE SUPVR. I BELIEVE THAT WHAT HAPPENED AT BRIDGEPORT ON THIS DAY IS A COMBINATION OF THINGS. #1 BEING THE SYSTEM THAT HAD FAILED, AS A RESULT MISTAKES WERE MADE UNDER VERY STRESSFUL CIRCUMSTANCES. I WROTE THIS LETTER BECAUSE THIS HAS BEEN AN ONGOING PROBLEM AT BRIDGEPORT. I, ALONG WITH MANY OF MY CO-WORKERS, HAVE PREVIOUSLY WITNESSED AND BEEN INVOLVED IN SITUATIONS THAT WERE NOT SAFE. I KNOW THAT OUR COMPANY HAS TRIED TO WORK ON THIS PROBLEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.