Narrative:

In june 1989, while on a VFR flight from hnl to lihue, kauai, I may have inadvertently re-entered the hnl TCA, possibly resulting in a diversion of inbound traffic and loss of adequate separation. After departing the TCA on a red hill 3 departure, and clearing the barbers point NAS air traffic area to the west, I reported clear of the air traffic area when over the kahe power plant, and contacted FSS to open my island reporting VFR flight plan. At that time, I informed FSS that I would be climbing above my filed altitude, intending to cruise at 4500' MSL, versus a filed altitude of 2000'. I initiated a climb from 1500' MSL to my intended cruise altitude, believing I was well clear of the TCA. I had the #1 VOR on the hnl 270 degree radial to insure I was north of the TCA boundary, and the #2 VOR set to eventually intercept the lih 115 radial (preferred VFR arrival routing). As I was climbing through 2800' MSL, I noticed the #1 VOR was displaying the 'off' flag, and realized that I was south of the hnl 269 degree radial that defines the TCA boundary. At this point, I reversed the climb and initiated a descent. At this time, I noticed an medium large transport, opposite direction, and about 1000' above, taking apparent evasive action to the north. Estimated closest point of approach was 1 mi lateral separation and 1000' vertical separation. I continued the descent to 2500' and eventually resumed my climb when I was sure I was west of the TCA. I had been having problems with the #1 VOR, which would shut itself off after varying amounts of time, and had just had it reinstalled after sending it back to the factory for repairs. The unit had registered less than 1 degree variance on a vot check prior to takeoff, and I believed the unit to be fully operational. Contributing factors included not backing up VOR #1 with #2, having my head outside the cockpit looking for traffic constantly and not checking the accuracy of the #1 visual cue to identify precisely one's track -- just heading, VOR/DME indications. Winds were a quartering tailwind from the northeast. In the future, I will take greater pains to insure I am well clear of the TCA before initiating any climb by having both vors set to the hnl 275 degree radial until a DME indication of greater than 20 NM from hnl VOR (the TCA boundary). This is the first incident I have ever been involved with, and have made a point of attending the FAA safety seminars for general aviation pilots.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT INADVERTENTLY PENETRATES TCA ON CLIMB TO CRUISE DEP.

Narrative: IN JUNE 1989, WHILE ON A VFR FLT FROM HNL TO LIHUE, KAUAI, I MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY RE-ENTERED THE HNL TCA, POSSIBLY RESULTING IN A DIVERSION OF INBND TFC AND LOSS OF ADEQUATE SEPARATION. AFTER DEPARTING THE TCA ON A RED HILL 3 DEP, AND CLEARING THE BARBERS POINT NAS ATA TO THE WEST, I REPORTED CLEAR OF THE ATA WHEN OVER THE KAHE POWER PLANT, AND CONTACTED FSS TO OPEN MY ISLAND REPORTING VFR FLT PLAN. AT THAT TIME, I INFORMED FSS THAT I WOULD BE CLIMBING ABOVE MY FILED ALT, INTENDING TO CRUISE AT 4500' MSL, VERSUS A FILED ALT OF 2000'. I INITIATED A CLIMB FROM 1500' MSL TO MY INTENDED CRUISE ALT, BELIEVING I WAS WELL CLEAR OF THE TCA. I HAD THE #1 VOR ON THE HNL 270 DEG RADIAL TO INSURE I WAS NORTH OF THE TCA BOUNDARY, AND THE #2 VOR SET TO EVENTUALLY INTERCEPT THE LIH 115 RADIAL (PREFERRED VFR ARRIVAL ROUTING). AS I WAS CLIMBING THROUGH 2800' MSL, I NOTICED THE #1 VOR WAS DISPLAYING THE 'OFF' FLAG, AND REALIZED THAT I WAS SOUTH OF THE HNL 269 DEG RADIAL THAT DEFINES THE TCA BOUNDARY. AT THIS POINT, I REVERSED THE CLIMB AND INITIATED A DSCNT. AT THIS TIME, I NOTICED AN MLG, OPPOSITE DIRECTION, AND ABOUT 1000' ABOVE, TAKING APPARENT EVASIVE ACTION TO THE NORTH. ESTIMATED CLOSEST POINT OF APCH WAS 1 MI LATERAL SEPARATION AND 1000' VERTICAL SEPARATION. I CONTINUED THE DSCNT TO 2500' AND EVENTUALLY RESUMED MY CLIMB WHEN I WAS SURE I WAS WEST OF THE TCA. I HAD BEEN HAVING PROBLEMS WITH THE #1 VOR, WHICH WOULD SHUT ITSELF OFF AFTER VARYING AMOUNTS OF TIME, AND HAD JUST HAD IT REINSTALLED AFTER SENDING IT BACK TO THE FACTORY FOR REPAIRS. THE UNIT HAD REGISTERED LESS THAN 1 DEG VARIANCE ON A VOT CHECK PRIOR TO TKOF, AND I BELIEVED THE UNIT TO BE FULLY OPERATIONAL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED NOT BACKING UP VOR #1 WITH #2, HAVING MY HEAD OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT LOOKING FOR TFC CONSTANTLY AND NOT CHECKING THE ACCURACY OF THE #1 VISUAL CUE TO IDENTIFY PRECISELY ONE'S TRACK -- JUST HDG, VOR/DME INDICATIONS. WINDS WERE A QUARTERING TAILWIND FROM THE NE. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL TAKE GREATER PAINS TO INSURE I AM WELL CLEAR OF THE TCA BEFORE INITIATING ANY CLIMB BY HAVING BOTH VORS SET TO THE HNL 275 DEG RADIAL UNTIL A DME INDICATION OF GREATER THAN 20 NM FROM HNL VOR (THE TCA BOUNDARY). THIS IS THE FIRST INCIDENT I HAVE EVER BEEN INVOLVED WITH, AND HAVE MADE A POINT OF ATTENDING THE FAA SAFETY SEMINARS FOR GENERAL AVIATION PLTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.