Narrative:

Winter weather plaguing the south. Worked with operations extensively throughout the day; flight was initially delayed two hours due to unfavorable weather at pgv; -RA; sn; fzrn; low vis; low ceilings. Arrived at gate nearly 45 minutes prior to departure. Took almost an hour to obtain releases and get pushed from gate; during this time talked with dispatch regarding pgv weather and runway conditions. The taf was showing warming temperatures and nothing worse than -RA; reported mu's were all well above 40. Enroute contacted dispatch to verify conditions; first message stated everything well above 40; and that he would have another update in a few minutes. With approximately 20-30 minutes of flight time remaining we received mu's; with the lowest being 56 averaging 61; leaving us no room for concern. Winds (050/6) were favoring runway 2; so we planned/briefed the GPS 2; knowing the ceiling was marginal. We crmed the situation extensively; and planned to treat the airport as a special 'winter ops' airport due to the 6;500 foot runway; unfamiliar station; and night operations. We also planned to treat the runway as it was contaminated; even though we had nothing to suggest it was anything different than wet. After getting established on the GPS 2; the ceiling was holding steady at 500; lower than required. We CRM'd the situation and decided to utilize ILS 20. The winds were showing a slight quartering tailwind; within limits for a wet runway. Again; we CRM'd the decision extensively and determined we could safely utilize this approach; knowing we had sufficient fuel and two alternates if we needed to go-around and divert. The approach itself was light/moderate turbulence; winds at 1;000 ft were over 40 KTS (crosswind). We monitored the winds; and they remained primarily as a crosswind; not much of a tailwind; and subsided as we approached the runway; although still bumpy. At approximately 40 ft it was evident the runway was worse than wet; but thrust was at idle and we were committed to landing. The airplane being light; I applied forward pressure to get the airplane on the runway. The mains touched on/near the 1;000 foot markers; and the nose touched one second later. I immediately applied max (pedals to the floor) braking and max reverse; and full forward control column pressure. It was immediately evident the airplane was sliding; I didn't really feel the antiskid cycling because the tires weren't gripping any pavement. As the airplane began to slow (below 40 KTS); the nose drifted slightly right of center; and I was unable to correct. I utilized max reverse until the airplane came to a complete stop; with approximately 750 ft of runway remaining. Braking action poor. The runways/taxiways/ramp all had at least two inches of slush covering every surface. Not wet as reported; and there is no possible way the mu's were accurate; or even close. Talked with station personnel and mu readings; and they seemed generally unaware of the purpose of the reading; or what the numbers meant. They said they were out approximately 10 minutes to our arrival obtaining readings. When asked how they could report the runway as wet; they didn't have an answer or seem to understand the difference between wet and slush. After this situation; the first officer and I worked extensively with the duty pilot/dispatch/operations to make a plan to depart safely. Bottom line; had we had accurate conditions and runway conditions we would have never attempted a landing at pgv. The situation was completely unsafe; and we were approximately 750 ft from departing a paved surface. My crew was set up for failure. Suggestions; must have accurate weather and field conditions. Dispatch/operations/duty pilot were extremely helpful throughout the entire day; and we were never once pressured into taking that flight. However; the conditions provided to everyone led us to believe that operating the flight would be routine and safe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Medium Transport flight crew landing PGV reported a near runway excursion event when the reported runway conditions were inaccurate.

Narrative: Winter weather plaguing the South. Worked with Operations extensively throughout the day; flight was initially delayed two hours due to unfavorable weather at PGV; -RA; SN; FZRN; low vis; low ceilings. Arrived at gate nearly 45 minutes prior to departure. Took almost an hour to obtain releases and get pushed from gate; during this time talked with Dispatch regarding PGV weather and runway conditions. The TAF was showing warming temperatures and nothing worse than -RA; reported MU's were all well above 40. Enroute contacted Dispatch to verify conditions; first message stated everything well above 40; and that he would have another update in a few minutes. With approximately 20-30 minutes of flight time remaining we received MU's; with the lowest being 56 averaging 61; leaving us no room for concern. Winds (050/6) were favoring Runway 2; so we planned/briefed the GPS 2; knowing the ceiling was marginal. We CRMed the situation extensively; and planned to treat the airport as a special 'winter ops' airport due to the 6;500 foot runway; unfamiliar station; and night operations. We also planned to treat the runway as it was contaminated; even though we had nothing to suggest it was anything different than wet. After getting established on the GPS 2; the ceiling was holding steady at 500; lower than required. We CRM'd the situation and decided to utilize ILS 20. The winds were showing a slight quartering tailwind; within limits for a wet runway. Again; we CRM'd the decision extensively and determined we could safely utilize this approach; knowing we had sufficient fuel and two alternates if we needed to go-around and divert. The approach itself was light/moderate turbulence; winds at 1;000 FT were over 40 KTS (crosswind). We monitored the winds; and they remained primarily as a crosswind; not much of a tailwind; and subsided as we approached the runway; although still bumpy. At approximately 40 FT it was evident the runway was worse than wet; but thrust was at idle and we were committed to landing. The airplane being light; I applied forward pressure to get the airplane on the runway. The mains touched on/near the 1;000 foot markers; and the nose touched one second later. I immediately applied max (pedals to the floor) braking and max reverse; and full forward control column pressure. It was immediately evident the airplane was sliding; I didn't really feel the antiskid cycling because the tires weren't gripping any pavement. As the airplane began to slow (below 40 KTS); the nose drifted slightly right of center; and I was unable to correct. I utilized max reverse until the airplane came to a complete stop; with approximately 750 FT of runway remaining. Braking action poor. The runways/taxiways/ramp all had at least two inches of slush covering every surface. Not wet as reported; and there is no possible way the MU's were accurate; or even close. Talked with station personnel and MU readings; and they seemed generally unaware of the purpose of the reading; or what the numbers meant. They said they were out approximately 10 minutes to our arrival obtaining readings. When asked how they could report the runway as wet; they didn't have an answer or seem to understand the difference between wet and slush. After this situation; the First Officer and I worked extensively with the Duty Pilot/Dispatch/Operations to make a plan to depart safely. Bottom line; had we had accurate conditions and runway conditions we would have never attempted a landing at PGV. The situation was completely unsafe; and we were approximately 750 FT from departing a paved surface. My crew was set up for failure. Suggestions; must have accurate weather and field conditions. Dispatch/Operations/Duty Pilot were extremely helpful throughout the entire day; and we were never once pressured into taking that flight. However; the conditions provided to everyone led us to believe that operating the flight would be routine and safe.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.