Narrative:

I was assigned as PIC on an out and back. I was informed by dispatch that the aircraft was fueled to 1;000 pounds per side. I arrived at the aircraft before sunrise. I conducted a preflight of the aircraft including fuel load. The fuel gauges were reading approximately 1;000 pounds per side. Required fuel load for the round trip was 1;511 pounds which included enroute; alternate; IFR reserve and two approaches. I taxied over to the cargo ramp; uploaded freight; and blocked out of the ramp at sunrise. I blocked into my destination 55 minutes later; off loaded freight; and performed a post flight inspection. The fuel gauges were reading approximately 700 pounds per side +/- 25 pounds; consistent with my fuel planning. Required fuel load for the return leg was 1;334 pounds which included enroute; alternate; IFR reserve and two approaches. I departed 35 minutes after arrival on runway 26 and I cruised to my destination at 11;000 MSL.at approximately 20 minutes out from the airport I received the right nac not full annunciator. It is quite normal for this to occur at this time; however I was expecting it a little later; approximately 5 to 10 minutes from the destination airport. I checked the fuel gauges and both gauges were reading approximately 600 pounds total on each wing fuel system; consistent with my fuel planning. In addition I checked the nacelle tank fuel load and it was reading approximately 400 on the left and 300 on the right. Required fuel load at this time was approximately 230 pounds or 115 pounds per side; and the weather was VFR. I was vectored and cleared for the ILS 19R approach. On an approximately 1-2 mile final I observed a strong surge in the right engine. Fuel flow was swinging between 350 to 100 pounds per hour. This was immediately followed by a right fuel pressure annunciator. I selected the right primary auxiliary fuel pump to the on position as the right secondary auxiliary fuel pump was already on. This did not extinguish the right fuel pressure annunciator. The right engine than proceeded to shutdown and the prop feathered; immediately followed by the engine restarting and the prop un-feathering; and then again surging. It seemed prudent at this time; considering the proximity to the airport and the unreliable nature of the engine; to shutdown and secure the right engine. I proceeded to bring the right condition lever to idle-cutoff; feather the right propeller manually; turn off both the right primary and secondary auxiliary fuel pumps; and close the right firewall fuel valve. I then contacted tower and declared an emergency. I landed uneventfully and exited runway. I came to a stop clear of the active runway and I shutdown the left engine as airfield rescue and fire fighters (arff) inspected the airplane. Fuel gauges at this time were reading approximately 400 pounds on the left and 600 pounds on the right. The right nacelle tank was reading approximately 200 pounds. After arff inspected the aircraft; I arranged for the aircraft to be towed to the company maintenance facility.after inspection of the fuel system by maintenance; it was discovered that the right wing and nacelle fuel system had approximately 1/2 gallon of fuel and that a 400 pounds fuel imbalance existed between the left and right fuel systems. In addition; it was discovered that the aircraft had only received 128 gallons of fuel; 857 pounds of fuel the night before the event. The aircraft last flew four days previously and that pilot reported fuel remaining to dispatch as 275 pounds per side. Contributing factors: 1) inability to manually determine fuel on board with this particular make and model of aircraft. 2) lack of any consistent procedures by dispatch for tracking and monitoring fuel loads on company aircraft. Dispatcher in question asked company fueler to check the fuel gauges in order to determine fuel on board instead of using previously reported ending fuel status that was consistent with the trip planning for the flight on this day. 3) inadequate training of fueler in question. Fueler dispensed approximately 3 times more fuel into the left wing fuel system than the right. This did not raise any red flags and went unreported. 4) mechanical irregularity with the entire fuel gauging system. As a result of this and poor dispatch procedures the aircraft was shorted approximately 600 pounds of fuel. Maintenance was performed and components repaired and replaced. 5) limitation on conducting a crossfeed. Can only be performed during single engine operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE99's right engine autofeathered on final because of fuel starvation; the result of fuel system inaccuracy; Fueler training and Dispatch's failure to track fuel used.

Narrative: I was assigned as PIC on an out and back. I was informed by Dispatch that the aircraft was fueled to 1;000 LBS per side. I arrived at the aircraft before sunrise. I conducted a preflight of the aircraft including fuel load. The fuel gauges were reading approximately 1;000 LBS per side. Required fuel load for the round trip was 1;511 LBS which included enroute; alternate; IFR reserve and two approaches. I taxied over to the cargo ramp; uploaded freight; and blocked out of the ramp at sunrise. I blocked into my destination 55 minutes later; off loaded freight; and performed a post flight inspection. The fuel gauges were reading approximately 700 LBS per side +/- 25 LBS; consistent with my fuel planning. Required fuel load for the return leg was 1;334 LBS which included enroute; alternate; IFR reserve and two approaches. I departed 35 minutes after arrival on Runway 26 and I cruised to my destination at 11;000 MSL.At approximately 20 minutes out from the airport I received the right NAC NOT FULL annunciator. It is quite normal for this to occur at this time; however I was expecting it a little later; approximately 5 to 10 minutes from the destination airport. I checked the fuel gauges and both gauges were reading approximately 600 LBS total on each wing fuel system; consistent with my fuel planning. In addition I checked the nacelle tank fuel load and it was reading approximately 400 on the left and 300 on the right. Required fuel load at this time was approximately 230 LBS or 115 LBS per side; and the weather was VFR. I was vectored and cleared for the ILS 19R approach. On an approximately 1-2 mile final I observed a strong surge in the right engine. Fuel flow was swinging between 350 to 100 LBS per hour. This was immediately followed by a right FUEL PRESSURE annunciator. I selected the right primary auxiliary fuel pump to the on position as the right secondary auxiliary fuel pump was already on. This did not extinguish the Right FUEL PRESSURE annunciator. The right engine than proceeded to shutdown and the prop feathered; immediately followed by the engine restarting and the prop un-feathering; and then again surging. It seemed prudent at this time; considering the proximity to the airport and the unreliable nature of the engine; to shutdown and secure the right engine. I proceeded to bring the right condition lever to idle-cutoff; feather the right propeller manually; turn off both the right primary and secondary auxiliary fuel pumps; and close the right firewall fuel valve. I thEn contacted Tower and declared an emergency. I landed uneventfully and exited Runway. I came to a stop clear of the active runway and I shutdown the left engine as Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters (ARFF) inspected the airplane. Fuel gauges at this time were reading approximately 400 LBS on the left and 600 LBS on the right. The right nacelle tank was reading approximately 200 LBS. After ARFF inspected the aircraft; I arranged for the aircraft to be towed to the Company Maintenance facility.After inspection of the fuel system by maintenance; it was discovered that the right wing and nacelle fuel system had approximately 1/2 gallon of fuel and that a 400 LBS fuel imbalance existed between the left and right fuel systems. In addition; it was discovered that the aircraft had only received 128 gallons of fuel; 857 LBS of fuel the night before the event. The aircraft last flew four days previously and that pilot reported fuel remaining to dispatch as 275 LBS per side. Contributing factors: 1) Inability to manually determine fuel on board with this particular make and model of aircraft. 2) Lack of any consistent procedures by Dispatch for tracking and monitoring fuel loads on company aircraft. Dispatcher in question asked company Fueler to check the fuel gauges in order to determine fuel on board instead of using previously reported ending fuel status that was consistent with the trip planning for the flight on this day. 3) Inadequate training of Fueler in question. Fueler dispensed approximately 3 times more fuel into the left wing fuel system than the right. This did not raise any red flags and went unreported. 4) Mechanical irregularity with the entire fuel gauging system. As a result of this and poor dispatch procedures the aircraft was shorted approximately 600 LBS of fuel. Maintenance was performed and components repaired and replaced. 5) Limitation on conducting a crossfeed. Can only be performed during single engine operations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.