Narrative:

After landing and waiting nearly 20 minutes to get to the gate; our half hour turn was under pressure to depart on time. The ground crew was trying to repair the nozzle on the de-ice truck to deice another flight that departed the gate waiting to deice. We were eventually able to use the gate in for our flight. Because there was some question as to the availability of deicing; I asked not to board until the operation of the deice truck could be verified. I planned to board while the other aircraft (a CRJ200) was being deiced minimizing our delay on the ground with our passengers on the aircraft. After boarding; with the weather conditions; our takeoff performance dictated a flaps 18 takeoff. After pushing and being deiced we taxied to the runway 9 for departure. Having type one and four applied to our aircraft; we had limited visibility out our windows except where the windshield wipers cleared the forward windows. While I; (captain; pilot not flying) focused on taxing via the correct route in very restricted visibility; I paid less attention to the first officer (pilot flying) during the taxi checklist. Approaching the runway end; the preceding crj flight was still holding short waiting [for] their departure and we were ready so the tower instructed us to use an intersection to back taxi full length. After making the turn on the runway we prepared to depart. During the takeoff roll; with limited visibility both out our windows and due to snow covered ground/runway and snow falling; [but] things seemed normal on the surface. It was only as the V speed became visible on the speed tape; I realized that due to the severe split in V1 and vr; that we should have selected flaps 18. I looked and realized we had set 9 instead. My gut reaction was to try to salvage the takeoff and select 18 while accelerating. I actually initiated this change. Simultaneously; the aircraft gave a 'master warning.' I remembered another crew in crw did something nearly identical. I immediately abandoned the fleeting thought of salvaging this departure and aborted just prior to V1. We announced our abort to the tower and he responded by asking our location on the runway since we were not in sight. I remember stowing the thrust reversers passing the 4;000 ft remaining sign. We were instructed to exit the runway via A5 and contract ground since we declined any assistance. We evaluated our fuel on board and options. We came to the conclusion that we could deice once again since we surely would have lost most of the type iv fluid previously applied. We did another complete deice cycle and departed without further incident. I was distracted by the reduced visibility due to deice fluid on the windows as well as the weather conditions. We were also feeling a little time crunch trying to complete the flight as close to on time as possible. I focused more on taxiing the aircraft and less on the oversight of proper aircraft configuration for departure in adverse conditions. I used to use a visual cue for non-standard takeoff configurations. I skipped this cue this time and failed to catch the configuration deviation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An EMB-145 Captain rejected the takeoff just prior to V1 when he realized that flaps 9 was selected instead of flaps 18 which was required for aircraft and runway conditions.

Narrative: After landing and waiting nearly 20 minutes to get to the gate; our half hour turn was under pressure to depart on time. The ground crew was trying to repair the nozzle on the de-ice truck to deice another flight that departed the gate waiting to deice. We were eventually able to use the gate in for our flight. Because there was some question as to the availability of deicing; I asked not to board until the operation of the deice truck could be verified. I planned to board while the other aircraft (a CRJ200) was being deiced minimizing our delay on the ground with our passengers on the aircraft. After boarding; with the weather conditions; our takeoff performance dictated a flaps 18 takeoff. After pushing and being deiced we taxied to the Runway 9 for departure. Having type one and four applied to our aircraft; we had limited visibility out our windows except where the windshield wipers cleared the forward windows. While I; (Captain; pilot not flying) focused on taxing via the correct route in very restricted visibility; I paid less attention to the First Officer (pilot flying) during the Taxi Checklist. Approaching the runway end; the preceding CRJ flight was still holding short waiting [for] their departure and we were ready so the Tower instructed us to use an intersection to back taxi full length. After making the turn on the runway we prepared to depart. During the takeoff roll; with limited visibility both out our windows and due to snow covered ground/runway and snow falling; [but] things seemed normal on the surface. It was only as the V speed became visible on the speed tape; I realized that due to the severe split in V1 and VR; that we should have selected flaps 18. I looked and realized we had set 9 instead. My gut reaction was to try to salvage the takeoff and select 18 while accelerating. I actually initiated this change. Simultaneously; the aircraft gave a 'Master Warning.' I remembered another crew in CRW did something nearly identical. I immediately abandoned the fleeting thought of salvaging this departure and aborted just prior to V1. We announced our abort to the Tower and he responded by asking our location on the runway since we were not in sight. I remember stowing the thrust reversers passing the 4;000 FT remaining sign. We were instructed to exit the runway via A5 and contract Ground since we declined any assistance. We evaluated our fuel on board and options. We came to the conclusion that we could deice once again since we surely would have lost most of the Type IV fluid previously applied. We did another complete deice cycle and departed without further incident. I was distracted by the reduced visibility due to deice fluid on the windows as well as the weather conditions. We were also feeling a little time crunch trying to complete the flight as close to on time as possible. I focused more on taxiing the aircraft and less on the oversight of proper aircraft configuration for departure in adverse conditions. I used to use a visual cue for non-standard takeoff configurations. I skipped this cue this time and failed to catch the configuration deviation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.