Narrative:

Approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes after departure; the copilot's nd displayed a map not avail message with loss of navigation data. In addition; gw indication displayed xx and cabin attendant pr ldg elev fault was displayed. We completed the cabin attendant pr ECAM and reviewed the FMGC single failure procedure. The indications did not define a full FMGC 2 failure; but a partial failure was evident. Specifically; mcdu 1 displayed independent operation; nd 2 displayed map not avail regardless of range/mode selection; and mcdu 2 did not display opp FMGC in process. In addition; there was no select offside rng/mode indication and both fmas displayed 1fd2. At this time; we also reviewed dual FMGC failure procedures in the QRH. We determined a partial degradation of FMGC 2 data and selected AP1 for the remainder of flight. No additional indications were present during remaining cruise; descent and initial approach. It was the first officer's leg and he briefed for ILS approach 26R; including missed approach; current weather conditions including possible windshear; and contingencies for possible anomalies/failures of afs/FMGC systems including manual approach speed computation. During the approach phase we received radar vectors north of the airport with deviations for radar cells for a right downwind and base to final for 26R. Shortly after receiving an intercept heading for 26R localizer; the #1 ap disengaged with accompanying unreliable FD guidance. Additionally; degraded and erroneous information was displayed on the first officer's side with loss of glideslope (GS)/localizer indications. Transfer of the aircraft was made to the captain during localizer intercept with manual maneuvering required to establish track back to centerline with winds indicating 25-30 KTS direct crosswind from the north. The weather at the time was rapidly changing with winds reported at 32017g24 and peak gusts to 28. Current visibility was 2 SM in RA and ceilings 500 broken. Aircraft computed winds on final indicated n-nw from 02 to 28 KTS. The autothrottles appeared unreliable and were disconnected while level at 2;000 MSL and configured for GS intercept from below GS. The remainder of the approach was flown raw data with runway in sight at 500 AGL followed by an uneventful landing. After arriving at the gate; maintenance personnel met the aircraft and provided a requested maintenance history record. The maintenance history documented consistent and chronic failures of [auto flight system] components including FMGC 1; FMGC 2; ap; and FCU. These included an event on six weeks previously indicating 'multiple failures on final app dual FMGC fail automatic press mode l-g disagree'all of the previous failures were addressed by cycled circuit breakers or resets. No substantive troubleshooting was indicated in the history log even though chronic failures were evident. In addition to numerous annunciated and unannunciated afs failures; status faults and failures were evident in the cfds data. The continued operation of this aircraft with a [documented] history (unknown to the flight crew) of related failures created a substantial risk to the safety of the flight with critical failures under the worst possible conditions. There appeared to be no significant analysis of consistent and chronic failures/faults in these critical afs systems. The known processes/tools of predictive analysis utilizing maintenance history would result in improved safety; costs and efficiency. The current model of flying an aircraft until it breaks is an obsolete and dangerous practice.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: After experiencing multiple autoflight and FMC related failures while conducting an approach in challenging IMC weather the Captain of an A319 expressed measured but pointed concern at the failure of maintenance to conscientiously address multiple previous write-ups of similar failures; including one near identical episode. The reporter further cited the necessity of having to request a detailed maintenance history to learn of the chronic nature of the problem and the apparent fact that no substantive troubleshooting of the cause had been performed. That; in lieu of such substantive investigation; write-ups had been routinely resolved by merely cycling circuit breakers.

Narrative: Approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes after departure; the copilot's ND displayed a MAP NOT AVAIL message with loss of navigation data. In addition; GW indication displayed XX and CAB PR LDG ELEV FAULT was displayed. We completed the CAB PR ECAM and reviewed the FMGC Single Failure procedure. The indications did not define a full FMGC 2 failure; but a partial failure was evident. Specifically; MCDU 1 displayed Independent Operation; ND 2 displayed MAP NOT AVAIL regardless of range/mode selection; and MCDU 2 did not display OPP FMGC IN PROCESS. In addition; there was NO SELECT OFFSIDE RNG/MODE indication and both FMAs displayed 1FD2. At this time; we also reviewed Dual FMGC Failure procedures in the QRH. We determined a partial degradation of FMGC 2 data and selected AP1 for the remainder of flight. No additional indications were present during remaining cruise; descent and initial approach. It was the First Officer's leg and he briefed for ILS Approach 26R; including missed approach; current weather conditions including possible windshear; and contingencies for possible anomalies/failures of AFS/FMGC systems including manual approach speed computation. During the approach phase we received radar vectors north of the airport with deviations for radar cells for a right downwind and base to final for 26R. Shortly after receiving an intercept heading for 26R localizer; the #1 AP disengaged with accompanying unreliable FD guidance. Additionally; degraded and erroneous information was displayed on the First Officer's side with loss of glideslope (GS)/LOC indications. Transfer of the aircraft was made to the Captain during LOC intercept with manual maneuvering required to establish track back to centerline with winds indicating 25-30 KTS direct crosswind from the north. The weather at the time was rapidly changing with winds reported at 32017G24 and peak gusts to 28. Current visibility was 2 SM in RA and ceilings 500 broken. Aircraft computed winds on final indicated N-NW from 02 to 28 KTS. The autothrottles appeared unreliable and were disconnected while level at 2;000 MSL and configured for GS intercept from below GS. The remainder of the approach was flown raw data with runway in sight at 500 AGL followed by an uneventful landing. After arriving at the gate; Maintenance personnel met the aircraft and provided a requested maintenance history record. The maintenance history documented consistent and chronic failures of [Auto Flight System] components including FMGC 1; FMGC 2; AP; and FCU. These included an event on six weeks previously indicating 'MULTIPLE FAILURES ON FINAL APP DUAL FMGC FAIL AUTO PRESS MODE L-G DISAGREE'All of the previous failures were addressed by cycled circuit breakers or resets. No substantive troubleshooting was indicated in the History Log even though chronic failures were evident. In addition to numerous annunciated and unannunciated AFS failures; status faults and failures were evident in the CFDS data. The continued operation of this aircraft with a [documented] history (unknown to the flight crew) of related failures created a substantial risk to the safety of the flight with critical failures under the worst possible conditions. There appeared to be no significant analysis of consistent and chronic failures/faults in these critical AFS systems. The known processes/tools of predictive analysis utilizing maintenance history would result in improved safety; costs and efficiency. The current model of flying an aircraft until it breaks is an obsolete and dangerous practice.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.