Narrative:

I only saw a shadow flash over me as captain of large transport and as pilot flying on landing rollout as we crossed runway intersection and, according to first officer, experienced a near miss of an small aircraft which had been cleared by tower, according to telecall with tower chief later, to conduct a runway 18 touch and go. That's it. No time for evasion! 99 passenger plus crew of 7 almost died because cvg tower had cleared a light aircraft to conduct a touch and go landing on an intersecting runway, even while he had cleared us twice to land out of the haze on runway 9R. We did not see him nor did we hear his conversation with tower because we were so engrossed in conducting a stupid NDB approach to a non-VASI short runway while the very long runway we should have been using was being used for touch and go lndgs by an small aircraft! Idiot FAA! Upgrade cvg to a TCA! Don't allow touch and go lndgs on intersecting runways! Pure, simple logic! Clear us T land on the proper logical runway! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter was the second officer and could not or did not see the small aircraft out the left side of air carrier aircraft. He stated that all normal checklist procedures were carried out and at the final approach fix the final checklist was completed. There was no unnecessary talk within the cockpit and he is certain that no traffic advisory was given to them by approach controller or tower controller. He further stated that the captain had a review of the event with the tower chief and that the tower controller was being taken off position. Callback from acn 116057: reporter states that the flight crew was not advised of the traffic that would be crossing the runway they were landing on. Isn't it required for ATC to have an acknowledgement of pilots of both aircraft prior to using this multiple, crossing runway operation? The first officer's initial thought as he saw the small aircraft in the captain's windscreen was that he hoped the aircraft would clear their tail. On the 1ST call to the tower, the personnel were very guarded in their conversation, according to the reporter. He further stated that they did refer to the event as an incident. The captain called back later, it was stated, and talked to the tower chief who had not been in the tower at the time of the event. Later, it was understood that the tower controller was taken off duty. Something was said about the small aircraft being on a different frequency from the air carrier aircraft. The following week the chief pilot of this air carrier received a letter from this facility, admitting error and wrong procedure. They stated that a change had been made west/I the facility to preclude a repeat of this type of event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW REPORTS LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION BETWEEN THEIR ACFT ON ROLLOUT AND AN SMA PRACTICING A TOUCH AND GO ON AN INTERSECTING RWY. NEAR COLLISION AS SMA PASSED DIRECTLY OVER TRANSPORT.

Narrative: I ONLY SAW A SHADOW FLASH OVER ME AS CAPT OF LGT AND AS PLT FLYING ON LNDG ROLLOUT AS WE CROSSED RWY INTXN AND, ACCORDING TO F/O, EXPERIENCED A NEAR MISS OF AN SMA WHICH HAD BEEN CLRED BY TWR, ACCORDING TO TELECALL WITH TWR CHIEF LATER, TO CONDUCT A RWY 18 TOUCH AND GO. THAT'S IT. NO TIME FOR EVASION! 99 PAX PLUS CREW OF 7 ALMOST DIED BECAUSE CVG TWR HAD CLRED A LIGHT ACFT TO CONDUCT A TOUCH AND GO LNDG ON AN INTERSECTING RWY, EVEN WHILE HE HAD CLRED US TWICE TO LAND OUT OF THE HAZE ON RWY 9R. WE DID NOT SEE HIM NOR DID WE HEAR HIS CONVERSATION WITH TWR BECAUSE WE WERE SO ENGROSSED IN CONDUCTING A STUPID NDB APCH TO A NON-VASI SHORT RWY WHILE THE VERY LONG RWY WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN USING WAS BEING USED FOR TOUCH AND GO LNDGS BY AN SMA! IDIOT FAA! UPGRADE CVG TO A TCA! DON'T ALLOW TOUCH AND GO LNDGS ON INTERSECTING RWYS! PURE, SIMPLE LOGIC! CLEAR US T LAND ON THE PROPER LOGICAL RWY! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: REPORTER WAS THE S/O AND COULD NOT OR DID NOT SEE THE SMA OUT THE LEFT SIDE OF ACR ACFT. HE STATED THAT ALL NORMAL CHECKLIST PROCS WERE CARRIED OUT AND AT THE FINAL APCH FIX THE FINAL CHECKLIST WAS COMPLETED. THERE WAS NO UNNECESSARY TALK WITHIN THE COCKPIT AND HE IS CERTAIN THAT NO TFC ADVISORY WAS GIVEN TO THEM BY APCH CTLR OR TWR CTLR. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE CAPT HAD A REVIEW OF THE EVENT WITH THE TWR CHIEF AND THAT THE TWR CTLR WAS BEING TAKEN OFF POSITION. CALLBACK FROM ACN 116057: REPORTER STATES THAT THE FLT CREW WAS NOT ADVISED OF THE TFC THAT WOULD BE XING THE RWY THEY WERE LNDG ON. ISN'T IT REQUIRED FOR ATC TO HAVE AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PLTS OF BOTH ACFT PRIOR TO USING THIS MULTIPLE, XING RWY OPERATION? THE F/O'S INITIAL THOUGHT AS HE SAW THE SMA IN THE CAPT'S WINDSCREEN WAS THAT HE HOPED THE ACFT WOULD CLEAR THEIR TAIL. ON THE 1ST CALL TO THE TWR, THE PERSONNEL WERE VERY GUARDED IN THEIR CONVERSATION, ACCORDING TO THE REPORTER. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THEY DID REFER TO THE EVENT AS AN INCIDENT. THE CAPT CALLED BACK LATER, IT WAS STATED, AND TALKED TO THE TWR CHIEF WHO HAD NOT BEEN IN THE TWR AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT. LATER, IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE TWR CTLR WAS TAKEN OFF DUTY. SOMETHING WAS SAID ABOUT THE SMA BEING ON A DIFFERENT FREQ FROM THE ACR ACFT. THE FOLLOWING WEEK THE CHIEF PLT OF THIS ACR RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THIS FAC, ADMITTING ERROR AND WRONG PROC. THEY STATED THAT A CHANGE HAD BEEN MADE W/I THE FAC TO PRECLUDE A REPEAT OF THIS TYPE OF EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.