Narrative:

Aircraft X was a bmg arrival from the south. Bmg weather was such that an instrument approach (RNAV runway 17) was required. Bmg airport is located in a shelf owned by huf that butts up to ind approach. The RNAV runway 17 is situated so that its use requires a point out to ind as the iafs are on the boundary between the two facilities. The developmental I was training waited until the arrival was close enough to ind's radar site as to be easily seen by ind before calling ind for a point out. Ind did not answer. The developmental moved on to other traffic and attempted at least two more times to call ind for a point out. I also tried twice to contact ind without avail. I advised the developmental to turn the aircraft west away from the IAF. At that point I called the TRACON on an outside line and advised the flm that I was unable to contact ind for a point out and was holding an aircraft. He advised me that he would have someone pick up. After I hung up I waited approximately 2 minutes and advised the developmental to turn the aircraft left to the IAF (to keep aircraft south of the IAF and well within my airspace until he crossed the (IAF). I was anticipating a call from ind and hoped to be able to time the aircraft approaching the boundary. At the time we turned aircraft X back to the IAF he had gone approximately 20 miles to the west. By the time ind called I had lost the 1 1/2 miles required between the aircraft and ind airspace. This was an incredible disservice to aircraft X who was required to fly an additional 45 miles at low altitude. The increased fuel burn for this aircraft may have caused this to be a monetary loss for the company. This was not the only time we were not able to make point outs to ind on this particular shift. A helicopter was on the 15 DME arc for the localizer back course runway 23 at huf; which encroaches ind airspace; and was pulled off the arc and then vectored back on due to the inability to make a point out with ind after numerous calls. This significantly reduced the training opportunity for the helicopter; again at increased cost to the user. While adjusting the eastern boundary with ind is not feasible due to the distance from ind; moving the boundary for the bmg shelf north approximately 2 miles should have minimum impact on ind operations even in a runway 5 configuration. I am sure that the airspace (bmg shelf) was designed prior to the development of the RNAV approaches. This small adjustment would eliminate coordination for this approach. Due to the shape of our airspace there is an inordinate amount of coordination required. Any decrease of time spent on land lines would increase safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Reporter states while attempting to do a point out the receiving facility doesn't answer the call; vectors aircraft but ends up having an airspace violation. Reporter also states conflict about a shelf of airspace that they would like changed.

Narrative: Aircraft X was a BMG arrival from the south. BMG weather was such that an instrument approach (RNAV RWY 17) was required. BMG airport is located in a shelf owned by HUF that butts up to IND approach. The RNAV RWY 17 is situated so that its use requires a point out to IND as the IAFs are on the boundary between the two facilities. The Developmental I was training waited until the arrival was close enough to IND's radar site as to be easily seen by IND before calling IND for a point out. IND did not answer. The Developmental moved on to other traffic and attempted at least two more times to call IND for a point out. I also tried twice to contact IND without avail. I advised the Developmental to turn the aircraft west away from the IAF. At that point I called the TRACON on an outside line and advised the FLM that I was unable to contact IND for a point out and was holding an aircraft. He advised me that he would have someone pick up. After I hung up I waited approximately 2 minutes and advised the Developmental to turn the aircraft left to the IAF (to keep aircraft south of the IAF and well within my airspace until he crossed the (IAF). I was anticipating a call from IND and hoped to be able to time the aircraft approaching the boundary. At the time we turned Aircraft X back to the IAF he had gone approximately 20 miles to the west. By the time IND called I had lost the 1 1/2 miles required between the aircraft and IND airspace. This was an incredible disservice to Aircraft X who was required to fly an additional 45 miles at low altitude. The increased fuel burn for this aircraft may have caused this to be a monetary loss for the company. This was not the only time we were not able to make point outs to IND on this particular shift. A helicopter was on the 15 DME arc for the LOC BC RWY 23 at HUF; which encroaches IND airspace; and was pulled off the arc and then vectored back on due to the inability to make a point out with IND after numerous calls. This significantly reduced the training opportunity for the helicopter; again at increased cost to the user. While adjusting the eastern boundary with IND is not feasible due to the distance from IND; moving the boundary for the BMG shelf north approximately 2 miles should have minimum impact on IND operations even in a Runway 5 configuration. I am sure that the airspace (BMG shelf) was designed prior to the development of the RNAV approaches. This small adjustment would eliminate coordination for this approach. Due to the shape of our airspace there is an inordinate amount of coordination required. Any decrease of time spent on land lines would increase safety.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.