Narrative:

As we were taxiing west on runway 27; we could see a radar return of a strong storm which was depicted red on our screen. The storm was directly west of the memphis airport and appeared to be moving east toward us. As we turned south on taxiway north; we could only see part of the storm to our right on the radar display. When we switched frequencies to tower; we heard that there was windshear on a two mile final for our runway. As we approached the runway; we advised tower that we would not takeoff. Tower reminded us that the windshear was two miles in the opposite direction from where we would be heading. It seemed like the cell was directly over the field at that time possibly centered a little north. I considered the fact that the fom guides us not to get within 5 miles of a cell below FL200. Tower instructed us to taxi out of the way so that several other aircraft could takeoff while we waited a few minutes for the storm to pass.I feel that tower was more concerned about getting airplanes on their way than wait a few minutes until it was safe. I also think [there is an] air carrier culture pressure to get the job done even if there is an increased risk. When one aircraft decides it is not safe to takeoff; perhaps tower should inform the following aircraft that might not have been on frequency to get the same information. Although several aircraft took off away from the storm; they faced the possibility of getting a decreasing performance windshear on takeoff. I would also suggest more fatigue prevention measures since crews may have felt in a hurry to get to the next hotel room.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: With weather depicted near MEM and a windshear alert issued; a flight crew declined takeoff clearance but felt pressure from ATC and the air carrier to not delay flight operations even with the increased risk.

Narrative: As we were taxiing west on Runway 27; we could see a radar return of a strong storm which was depicted red on our screen. The storm was directly west of the Memphis airport and appeared to be moving east toward us. As we turned south on Taxiway N; we could only see part of the storm to our right on the radar display. When we switched frequencies to Tower; we heard that there was windshear on a two mile final for our runway. As we approached the runway; we advised Tower that we would not takeoff. Tower reminded us that the windshear was two miles in the opposite direction from where we would be heading. It seemed like the cell was directly over the field at that time possibly centered a little north. I considered the fact that the FOM guides us not to get within 5 miles of a cell below FL200. Tower instructed us to taxi out of the way so that several other aircraft could takeoff while we waited a few minutes for the storm to pass.I feel that Tower was more concerned about getting airplanes on their way than wait a few minutes until it was safe. I also think [there is an] air carrier culture pressure to get the job done even if there is an increased risk. When one aircraft decides it is not safe to takeoff; perhaps Tower should inform the following aircraft that might not have been on frequency to get the same information. Although several aircraft took off away from the storm; they faced the possibility of getting a decreasing performance windshear on takeoff. I would also suggest more fatigue prevention measures since crews may have felt in a hurry to get to the next hotel room.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.