Narrative:

I was the first officer and was flying the aircraft. The captain and I had not flown together before but were attempting to adhere to SOP's. There were no animosities or other human-relation oriented reasons for any breakdown of communications that might have contributed to the following departure from normal ATC procedures compliance. About 75 NM west of flint, mi (fnt) VOR we were handed off to the cleveland ARTCC. The controller taking the handoff made a very brief acknowledgement, and then went back to what sounded to be a compliance problem with a non-commercial aircraft. At 40 NM northwest of fnt, the controller issued a clearance to our flight to 'cross 30 NM east of fnt at and maintain FL240'. There was no ambiguity in his issuance of the clearance. Both the captain and I immediately wrote down the clearance at that time. Our airline operates 3 different models of the medium large transport, a, B, and C. The models which I am rated in are the medium large transport B and the medium large transport a. The aircraft on this day was an medium large transport a which was originally sold to a foreign air carrier. The instrumentation is the original equipment which is not almost 20 yrs old. There is no DME readout on the flight director as on the medium large transport B, FD, and an additional RMI indicator is on the opposite side of the flight instrument panel than the singular instrument on the medium large transport B. The B RMI is a combination ADF/VOR RMI positioned on the left side of a t-confign instrument layout. The model a has a separate ADF RMI on the left, and the VOR RMI on the right of the t-confign. Both DME readouts on the a are positioned where the #2 DME readout is on the B. On the a, the #1 DME readout is also positioned directly above the #2 DME readout on both the captain and first officer sides. Neither the DME readouts or the RMI indicators are labeled on the a. Switching back and forth between the a and the B several times in one trip series contributes to numerous cases of misreading these instruments by many of our pilots including myself. The instrumentation on these models are so nonstandard in our fleet that the medium large transport a has been restr to higher landing mins unless both crew members receive an additional proficiency check in this model, a practice that is not done on this airline. I was navigating on #2 navigation and proceeding on airways to fnt. I originally had the captain's navigation #1 tuned to fnt along with mine #2. At some point, the captain tuned the #1 navigation to windsor, ontario yqg which was our next fix after fnt. It is likely that I missed this change due in part to the confusing DME and RMI layout. Confusion is added when the captain does not always announce the changes to #1 navigation. I do not recall if this was the case. Concurrent with the issuance by ATC of the crossing restriction, the first F/a requested access to the flight deck and then entered. A conversation between the captain and the F/a then began, the context of which was mostly flight oriented. We had previously requested direct windsor and were given the clearance just over fnt. This would negate the necessity of the log-leg on V42/V218 southeast of fnt. At this time, I switched my navigation from fnt to yqg (windsor). I had not forgotten the 30 NM southeast fnt FL240 crossing restriction, but now had no cue for the distance from fnt. I believe I was still under the mistaken impression that there was still sufficient distance for the crossing restriction because I was reading the #1 navigation DME as if it was the #2 navigation DME readout north the model 200. It was of course, displaying the DME from windsor. The captain was still in discussion with the F/a. At 24 NM southeast (EST) of fnt, the center controller came on the radio with 'flight XXX, you blew that one...didn't you! You have only 6 miles to make the crossing at FL240!' we were still at FL330. The controller then gave us another clearance to FL240 and a vector 30 degree right for the descent. There was no mention of impending traffic conflict or any sense of urgency in the vector clearance. However, the controller's sarcasm was quite understandable, as compliance with his instructions could normally be expected as routine from an air carrier pilot. I do not think this was a case of entrapment on his part, and believe he had a problemwith other traffic sufficient to prevent his normal monitoring of our flight progress. It is my responsibility for compliance but often hear reminders by controllers when a descent looks to be 'tightly planned' by the pilot. Because of the instrumentation problem on the medium large transport a constant cross-checking of the radio frequencys, and self reminders as to the difference in the instrumentation layout between these 2 models of aircraft is essential. Even though there was a high contribution of nonstandard cockpit layout to this error, the problem here was apparently that I did not properly use all the tools at my disposal and pay sufficient attention to the priorities of cockpit management. The captain's distraction was crew related and a part of the reason the second crew member of a 2-MAN crew (myself) should be concentrating on flying the aircraft.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CROSSING RESTRICTION IN DESCENT NOT MET. DEVIATION FROM ARTCC CTLR'S CLRNC.

Narrative: I WAS THE F/O AND WAS FLYING THE ACFT. THE CAPT AND I HAD NOT FLOWN TOGETHER BEFORE BUT WERE ATTEMPTING TO ADHERE TO SOP'S. THERE WERE NO ANIMOSITIES OR OTHER HUMAN-RELATION ORIENTED REASONS FOR ANY BREAKDOWN OF COMS THAT MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE FOLLOWING DEP FROM NORMAL ATC PROCS COMPLIANCE. ABOUT 75 NM W OF FLINT, MI (FNT) VOR WE WERE HANDED OFF TO THE CLEVELAND ARTCC. THE CTLR TAKING THE HANDOFF MADE A VERY BRIEF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, AND THEN WENT BACK TO WHAT SOUNDED TO BE A COMPLIANCE PROBLEM WITH A NON-COMMERCIAL ACFT. AT 40 NM NW OF FNT, THE CTLR ISSUED A CLRNC TO OUR FLT TO 'CROSS 30 NM E OF FNT AT AND MAINTAIN FL240'. THERE WAS NO AMBIGUITY IN HIS ISSUANCE OF THE CLRNC. BOTH THE CAPT AND I IMMEDIATELY WROTE DOWN THE CLRNC AT THAT TIME. OUR AIRLINE OPERATES 3 DIFFERENT MODELS OF THE MLG, A, B, AND C. THE MODELS WHICH I AM RATED IN ARE THE MLG B AND THE MLG A. THE ACFT ON THIS DAY WAS AN MLG A WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY SOLD TO A FOREIGN ACR. THE INSTRUMENTATION IS THE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NOT ALMOST 20 YRS OLD. THERE IS NO DME READOUT ON THE FLT DIRECTOR AS ON THE MLG B, FD, AND AN ADDITIONAL RMI INDICATOR IS ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE FLT INSTRUMENT PANEL THAN THE SINGULAR INSTRUMENT ON THE MLG B. THE B RMI IS A COMBINATION ADF/VOR RMI POSITIONED ON THE LEFT SIDE OF A T-CONFIGN INSTRUMENT LAYOUT. THE MODEL A HAS A SEPARATE ADF RMI ON THE LEFT, AND THE VOR RMI ON THE RIGHT OF THE T-CONFIGN. BOTH DME READOUTS ON THE A ARE POSITIONED WHERE THE #2 DME READOUT IS ON THE B. ON THE A, THE #1 DME READOUT IS ALSO POSITIONED DIRECTLY ABOVE THE #2 DME READOUT ON BOTH THE CAPT AND F/O SIDES. NEITHER THE DME READOUTS OR THE RMI INDICATORS ARE LABELED ON THE A. SWITCHING BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE A AND THE B SEVERAL TIMES IN ONE TRIP SERIES CONTRIBUTES TO NUMEROUS CASES OF MISREADING THESE INSTRUMENTS BY MANY OF OUR PLTS INCLUDING MYSELF. THE INSTRUMENTATION ON THESE MODELS ARE SO NONSTANDARD IN OUR FLEET THAT THE MLG A HAS BEEN RESTR TO HIGHER LNDG MINS UNLESS BOTH CREW MEMBERS RECEIVE AN ADDITIONAL PROFICIENCY CHECK IN THIS MODEL, A PRACTICE THAT IS NOT DONE ON THIS AIRLINE. I WAS NAVIGATING ON #2 NAV AND PROCEEDING ON AIRWAYS TO FNT. I ORIGINALLY HAD THE CAPT'S NAV #1 TUNED TO FNT ALONG WITH MINE #2. AT SOME POINT, THE CAPT TUNED THE #1 NAV TO WINDSOR, ONTARIO YQG WHICH WAS OUR NEXT FIX AFTER FNT. IT IS LIKELY THAT I MISSED THIS CHANGE DUE IN PART TO THE CONFUSING DME AND RMI LAYOUT. CONFUSION IS ADDED WHEN THE CAPT DOES NOT ALWAYS ANNOUNCE THE CHANGES TO #1 NAV. I DO NOT RECALL IF THIS WAS THE CASE. CONCURRENT WITH THE ISSUANCE BY ATC OF THE XING RESTRICTION, THE FIRST F/A REQUESTED ACCESS TO THE FLT DECK AND THEN ENTERED. A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE CAPT AND THE F/A THEN BEGAN, THE CONTEXT OF WHICH WAS MOSTLY FLT ORIENTED. WE HAD PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED DIRECT WINDSOR AND WERE GIVEN THE CLRNC JUST OVER FNT. THIS WOULD NEGATE THE NECESSITY OF THE LOG-LEG ON V42/V218 SE OF FNT. AT THIS TIME, I SWITCHED MY NAV FROM FNT TO YQG (WINDSOR). I HAD NOT FORGOTTEN THE 30 NM SE FNT FL240 XING RESTRICTION, BUT NOW HAD NO CUE FOR THE DISTANCE FROM FNT. I BELIEVE I WAS STILL UNDER THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS STILL SUFFICIENT DISTANCE FOR THE XING RESTRICTION BECAUSE I WAS READING THE #1 NAV DME AS IF IT WAS THE #2 NAV DME READOUT N THE MODEL 200. IT WAS OF COURSE, DISPLAYING THE DME FROM WINDSOR. THE CAPT WAS STILL IN DISCUSSION WITH THE F/A. AT 24 NM SE (EST) OF FNT, THE CENTER CTLR CAME ON THE RADIO WITH 'FLT XXX, YOU BLEW THAT ONE...DIDN'T YOU! YOU HAVE ONLY 6 MILES TO MAKE THE XING AT FL240!' WE WERE STILL AT FL330. THE CTLR THEN GAVE US ANOTHER CLRNC TO FL240 AND A VECTOR 30 DEG RIGHT FOR THE DSCNT. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF IMPENDING TFC CONFLICT OR ANY SENSE OF URGENCY IN THE VECTOR CLRNC. HOWEVER, THE CTLR'S SARCASM WAS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE, AS COMPLIANCE WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS COULD NORMALLY BE EXPECTED AS ROUTINE FROM AN AIR CARRIER PLT. I DO NOT THINK THIS WAS A CASE OF ENTRAPMENT ON HIS PART, AND BELIEVE HE HAD A PROBLEMWITH OTHER TFC SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT HIS NORMAL MONITORING OF OUR FLT PROGRESS. IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPLIANCE BUT OFTEN HEAR REMINDERS BY CTLRS WHEN A DSCNT LOOKS TO BE 'TIGHTLY PLANNED' BY THE PLT. BECAUSE OF THE INSTRUMENTATION PROBLEM ON THE MLG A CONSTANT CROSS-CHECKING OF THE RADIO FREQS, AND SELF REMINDERS AS TO THE DIFFERENCE IN THE INSTRUMENTATION LAYOUT BETWEEN THESE 2 MODELS OF ACFT IS ESSENTIAL. EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS A HIGH CONTRIBUTION OF NONSTANDARD COCKPIT LAYOUT TO THIS ERROR, THE PROBLEM HERE WAS APPARENTLY THAT I DID NOT PROPERLY USE ALL THE TOOLS AT MY DISPOSAL AND PAY SUFFICIENT ATTN TO THE PRIORITIES OF COCKPIT MGMNT. THE CAPT'S DISTR WAS CREW RELATED AND A PART OF THE REASON THE SECOND CREW MEMBER OF A 2-MAN CREW (MYSELF) SHOULD BE CONCENTRATING ON FLYING THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.