Narrative:

Traffic complexity was high; and there was a large amount of offline coordination and hand off to radar communication taking place; as well as hand off training occurring at this time. Trying to anticipate needs; projecting ahead; we called from the hand off to the next sector (sct-vly) with an apreq of aircraft Y high but descending on the KIMMO2 arrival (not yet on frequency; 5 miles east of pmd at 140; vectored off course by ZLA-17 for traffic considerations). Even when aircraft Y came on frequency we were unable to descend immediately; due to aircraft X converging northbound; descending through 128. A couple minutes later; sct (vly) says: 'aircraft Y turn left heading 180 for a guy south of slapp' - we did so. The r-side already having descended the aircraft to the expected handoff altitude without an apreq of 080. As aircraft Y made the turn; it was observed that the aircraft missed an opposite direction aircraft by about 3 miles and maybe 1;000 feet; not a point out; not known then if IFR or VFR. Shortly thereafter; there was this same 'limited' bcn 1015 observed about 130 eastbound; south of pmd; with aircraft west descending (about 120) on the LYNXX8 arrival into vny/bur with a air carrier trailing; descending to 140 - that's when we had FD/clearance delivery print out a strip of the aircraft flight plan: [showing the routing of aircraft Z. We had just dealt with another aircraft; on our frequency at FL230; after accepting a point out from sct-vly of still another aircraft climbing out slow & low on the same NUAL8 departure that was very tight - not sure we could have provided ZLA their desired 5 miles; happy to be able to use 3 miles; only safely getting the heavy down through traffic by a left vector as soon as we were told that the buckhorn MOA was no longer active. I advised the r-side to turn heavy left after his efforts to expedite the descent of the aircraft were considered insufficient. With the discovery of aircraft Z's possible flight status as IFR (possibly there was a VFR climb involved?). We weren't sure what course of action to take as that was the first moment complexity began to lessen; and there were no longer any IFR proximity issues to still consider. We're not sure if minimum separation was maintained throughout that period of high complexity.the issues are hard to grapple with; but reporting the event to management; ideas of airspace/LOA changes were immediately brainstormed among a few controllers. Taking the hand off of the heavy so high; that far away; repeated; I would have issued a control instruction to ZLA prior to accepting the hand off or made them keep it in their airspace until passing pmd to fight through their own traffic concerns in their own airspace. Recommendations heard were to require aircraft landing vcv to be no higher than 140 at our antelope airspace boundaries. I don't know that I agree with that; preferring instead for an LOA change whereby ZLA sectors within area B's jurisdiction communicate with each other better; not just between sector 3 with 4; and then 17 with 18; but also unlike the current expectation of sector 3 in the future better coordinating with sector 17.in lieu of our facility telling their facility how to run their airspace; I believe I will be very unlikely to accept a hand off from sector 3 until it crosses the sector 17 boundary so they are not unaware of pressures on criss-crossing demands at pmd. I have often recommended; in the past; of the use of zoren intersection for a NUAL8 climb out route over slapp to stay south of pmd and then next fix (dag; hec; blh); and; it's possible that could have helped relieve some of the pressure the system seemed to face today. It just felt like 'expeditious' became more important than 'safe' and/or 'orderly' - pushing they system too hard; not recognizing pressures put on the system until it was (almost) too late. If staffing had permitted; maybe an overhead could have been utilized effectively. In today's scenario; I eventually dismissed the trainee from the hand off in order to try to respond more quickly to sector demands; but; that's also when complexity issues dissipated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Controllers describe a situation where an aircraft is not pointed out and a loss of separation happens.

Narrative: Traffic complexity was high; and there was a large amount of offline coordination and Hand Off to Radar communication taking place; as well as Hand Off training occurring at this time. Trying to anticipate needs; projecting ahead; we called from the Hand Off to the next sector (SCT-VLY) with an APREQ of Aircraft Y high but descending on the KIMMO2 Arrival (not yet on frequency; 5 miles east of PMD at 140; vectored off course by ZLA-17 for traffic considerations). Even when Aircraft Y came on frequency we were unable to descend immediately; due to Aircraft X converging northbound; descending through 128. A couple minutes later; SCT (VLY) says: 'Aircraft Y turn left heading 180 for a guy south of SLAPP' - we did so. The R-Side already having descended the aircraft to the expected handoff altitude without an APREQ of 080. As Aircraft Y made the turn; it was observed that the aircraft missed an opposite direction aircraft by about 3 miles and maybe 1;000 feet; not a point out; not known then if IFR or VFR. Shortly thereafter; there was this same 'limited' BCN 1015 observed about 130 eastbound; south of PMD; with Aircraft W descending (about 120) on the LYNXX8 Arrival into VNY/BUR with a air carrier trailing; descending to 140 - that's when we had FD/CD print out a strip of the aircraft flight plan: [showing the routing of Aircraft Z. We had just dealt with another aircraft; on our frequency at FL230; after accepting a point out from SCT-VLY of still another aircraft climbing out slow & low on the same NUAL8 departure that was very tight - not sure we could have provided ZLA their desired 5 miles; happy to be able to use 3 miles; only safely getting the heavy down through traffic by a left vector as soon as we were told that the Buckhorn MOA was no longer active. I advised the R-Side to turn heavy left after his efforts to expedite the descent of the aircraft were considered insufficient. With the discovery of Aircraft Z's possible flight status as IFR (possibly there was a VFR climb involved?). We weren't sure what course of action to take as that was the first moment complexity began to lessen; and there were no longer any IFR proximity issues to still consider. We're not sure if minimum separation was maintained throughout that period of high complexity.The issues are hard to grapple with; but reporting the event to Management; ideas of airspace/LOA changes were immediately brainstormed among a few controllers. Taking the hand off of the heavy so high; that far away; repeated; I would have issued a control instruction to ZLA prior to accepting the hand off or made them keep it in their airspace until passing PMD to fight through their own traffic concerns in their own airspace. Recommendations heard were to require aircraft landing VCV to be no higher than 140 at our Antelope airspace boundaries. I don't know that I agree with that; preferring instead for an LOA change whereby ZLA sectors within Area B's jurisdiction communicate with each other better; not just between Sector 3 with 4; and then 17 with 18; but also unlike the current expectation of Sector 3 in the future better coordinating with Sector 17.In lieu of our facility telling their facility how to run their airspace; I believe I will be very unlikely to accept a hand off from Sector 3 until it crosses the Sector 17 boundary so they are not unaware of pressures on criss-crossing demands at PMD. I have often recommended; in the past; of the use of ZOREN intersection for a NUAL8 climb out route over SLAPP to stay south of PMD and then next fix (DAG; HEC; BLH); and; it's possible that could have helped relieve some of the pressure the system seemed to face today. It just felt like 'expeditious' became more important than 'safe' and/or 'orderly' - pushing they system too hard; not recognizing pressures put on the system until it was (almost) too late. If staffing had permitted; maybe an overhead could have been utilized effectively. In today's scenario; I eventually dismissed the trainee from the hand off in order to try to respond more quickly to sector demands; but; that's also when complexity issues dissipated.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.