Narrative:

Aircraft was dispatched with an improper deferral that was reckless and unsafe. The improper deferral was detected and corrected at the last minute by the flight crew. However; aircraft had flown several flights the day before with the improper deferral. The initial write-up was about the air data reference-1 (adr-1) inoperative. The corrective action confirmed adr-1 was bad when it was swapped with adr-2 and adr-2 was [made] inoperative. The deferral was incorrectly defined for inertial reference-2 (ir-2) navigation inoperative (inoperative). No apparent reason to defer ir-2 navigation when adr-2 was inoperative. Just sloppy and quick deferral procedures without any apparent oversight. Ir-2 navigation inoperative only changes the autoland limit to CAT-3 single. However; the inoperative adr-2 also prohibits flight into rvsm airspace and takeoff with flaps 1+F (flaps position-1 with slats extended); both of which were planned for our flight. (We have early A-319 model). Once the deferral was corrected; the flight was properly dispatched using the new performance numbers (not flap 1+F) and not in rvsm airspace. Working with dispatch and maintenance control to identify and correct the issue was a team effort. Both men did an outstanding job to coordinate the changes and fix the deferral issues. This problem of the incorrect deferral is systemic of our procedures. No one seems to look at the deferrals and everything is left to the flight crews. Documentation errors. It's all about the 'on time'!

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Captain reports that incorrect deferrals by Maintenance Control have become a systemic problem at their Air Carrier; especially noticeable since the merger of the two airlines. Pilot noted that an Air Data Reference-2 (ADR-2) was inoperative on an A319; but deferred as Inertial Reference-2 NAV. Takeoff Performance Limitations for Flap settings and RVSM restrictions under inoperative ADR-2 were never applied; due to the incorrect deferral.

Narrative: Aircraft was dispatched with an improper deferral that was reckless and unsafe. The improper deferral was detected and corrected at the last minute by the flight crew. However; aircraft had flown several flights the day before with the improper deferral. The initial write-up was about the Air Data Reference-1 (ADR-1) inoperative. The Corrective Action confirmed ADR-1 was bad when it was swapped with ADR-2 and ADR-2 was [made] inoperative. The deferral was incorrectly defined for Inertial Reference-2 (IR-2) NAV INOPERATIVE (INOP). No apparent reason to defer IR-2 NAV when ADR-2 was Inoperative. Just sloppy and quick deferral procedures without any apparent oversight. IR-2 NAV INOP only changes the Autoland Limit to CAT-3 Single. However; the INOP ADR-2 also prohibits flight into RVSM airspace and takeoff with Flaps 1+F (Flaps Position-1 with Slats extended); both of which were planned for our flight. (We have early A-319 model). Once the deferral was corrected; the flight was properly dispatched using the new performance numbers (NOT Flap 1+F) and not in RVSM airspace. Working with Dispatch and Maintenance Control to identify and correct the issue was a team effort. Both men did an outstanding job to coordinate the changes and fix the deferral issues. This problem of the incorrect deferral is systemic of our procedures. No one seems to look at the deferrals and everything is left to the flight crews. Documentation errors. It's all about the 'On Time'!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.