Narrative:

Received a warning message on ED1 during takeoff roll; I aborted the takeoff and cleared the runway. I'm concerned I might've initiated the rejected takeoff above V1. The warning message only lasted for a few seconds during which I initiated the rejected takeoff. The message cleared itself during the rejected takeoff and my focus was divided between evaluating the message; directional control and decelerating. I'm not sure if the message distracted me near enough to V1 that I initiated the abort at or over V1 or if I wasn't near calling V1 just yet. It really all just ran together at the time and I'm unsure that I followed procedure properly. Post event conversation with the pilot flying seems to indicate we were near but not over V1 when the message illuminated and rejected takeoff initiated. The rejected takeoff heated already warm brakes on a 90+ degrees F day to no more than 10 on two btms indicators and all post event maintenance inspections were good. It's a good possibility that we weren't over V1 at rejected takeoff initiation; I just cannot remember our speed clearly enough to be confident. Some warning messages are a nuisance when overall conditions support a go decision. 'Nose door' or intermittent 'APU overtemp' warnings are not high on the list of issues for compromising performance or directional control under normal conditions. Our mandate for aborts indicates we will abort for 'engine failures or warning messages prior to V1'. We don't differentiate between a low speed and high speed abort criteria. Some caution messages require an abort. Some mx deferrals and additional caution messages (a deferred gen then opposite side idg caution during initial takeoff roll) make an aborted takeoff the prudent course. But similar to some warning messages there should be some latitude during the high speed portion of the takeoff roll to continue if the problem does not indicate control or performance issues. That's a part in evaluating the prudence of aborts for any warning message when operating from a short runway on a hot day with a heavy aircraft. I reacted and initiated an aborted takeoff more out of reflex from standardized training than proper evaluation of the problem. Given we had a sufficiently long runway also contributed to the auto-abort decision; I'm sure there would have been more discussion prior to taxi had it looked like planned performance could be compromised. I followed procedure but I'm not sure of my timing. Continued effort in discipline and diligence to following established procedure. Strongly suggest we evaluate high speed vs. Low speed abort criteria. I believe other carriers have similar considerations. Given we are going to be operating more massive aircraft we could benefit from a high speed abort criteria that allows spurious messages and other criteria that do not affect performance or directional control to be deprioritized so as to not lead us into a unnecessary greater potential for an rejected takeoff accident. Procedure and experience obtained at a previous operator would have allowed me to make what I think would have been an operationally safer decision.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 Captain reports rejecting a takeoff at or near V1 for a momentary Warning Message on ED1.

Narrative: Received a Warning Message on ED1 during takeoff roll; I aborted the takeoff and cleared the runway. I'm concerned I might've initiated the RTO above V1. The warning message only lasted for a few seconds during which I initiated the RTO. The message cleared itself during the RTO and my focus was divided between evaluating the message; directional control and decelerating. I'm not sure if the message distracted me near enough to V1 that I initiated the abort at or over V1 or if I wasn't near calling V1 just yet. It really all just ran together at the time and I'm unsure that I followed procedure properly. Post event conversation with the pilot flying seems to indicate we were near but not over V1 when the message illuminated and RTO initiated. The RTO heated already warm brakes on a 90+ degrees F day to no more than 10 on two BTMS indicators and all post event Maintenance inspections were good. It's a good possibility that we weren't over V1 at RTO initiation; I just cannot remember our speed clearly enough to be confident. Some Warning Messages are a nuisance when overall conditions support a GO decision. 'Nose Door' or intermittent 'APU Overtemp' Warnings are not high on the list of issues for compromising performance or directional control under normal conditions. Our mandate for aborts indicates we will abort for 'Engine Failures or Warning Messages prior to V1'. We don't differentiate between a low speed and high speed abort criteria. Some Caution Messages require an abort. Some MX deferrals and additional Caution Messages (a deferred Gen then opposite side IDG Caution during initial takeoff roll) make an aborted takeoff the prudent course. But similar to some Warning Messages there should be some latitude during the high speed portion of the takeoff roll to continue if the problem does not indicate control or performance issues. That's a part in evaluating the prudence of aborts for any Warning Message when operating from a short runway on a hot day with a heavy aircraft. I reacted and initiated an aborted takeoff more out of reflex from standardized training than proper evaluation of the problem. Given we had a sufficiently long runway also contributed to the auto-abort decision; I'm sure there would have been more discussion prior to taxi had it looked like planned performance could be compromised. I followed procedure but I'm not sure of my timing. Continued effort in discipline and diligence to following established procedure. Strongly suggest we evaluate high speed vs. low speed abort criteria. I believe other carriers have similar considerations. Given we are going to be operating more massive aircraft we could benefit from a high speed abort criteria that allows spurious messages and other criteria that do not affect performance or directional control to be deprioritized so as to not lead us into a unnecessary greater potential for an RTO accident. Procedure and experience obtained at a previous operator would have allowed me to make what I think would have been an operationally safer decision.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.