Narrative:

I had the watch as supervisor on duty of west side coastal area. Prior to the incident I glanced at the sector. I judge the sector to be manageable with about seven tracks. I looked at the tsd [traffic situation display] and the sector showed green across with less than 10 on the numbers and 2 arrivals to eyw/nqx. My setting for the tsd include eyw and nqx arrivals in light blue and were being used at the time. There were no flight progress strips on the bay. I was not aware however; that the controller on duty at R5 had released 3 airplanes simultaneously. Aircraft Z was first; aircraft a was second; and aircraft Y was third. All three released using visual separation as initial form of separation. First two were approved to 040 and third to 030. Aircraft Z and aircraft a were radar identified and turned north; controller then proceeded to descend aircraft X to 030 forgetting that aircraft Y had not yet departed and was also clear to 030. Eyw was departing east and aircraft X was arriving from mia located east of key west. When aircraft Y departed; controller was not able to start a track for reasons that are not known to me. Controller at this time asked for help and help was provided by a controller that was discussing a laser event with me and not on position. Aircraft X responded to an RA and climbed to 040 and aircraft Y also responded to an RA and turned left. The incident happened during a time that nqx approach would have normally been open. Since it was labor day they remained closed in observance of the holiday. The area assumes responsibility of the airspace at night when traffic is very sporadic. Nqx approach closures during holidays have created problems in the past. There was another instance when another controller mis-applied degree divergence rule and resulted in 3 operational errors. It is common practice in the area that when you work nqx approach you keep it simple and only release one aircraft at a time. I have seen two aircraft released at a time using degree divergence; but never three using visual separation (as it was the case on this incident). During questioning after the incident it became clear that the controller was un-sure about separation procedures off eyw when nqx approach remains closed. Controller said 'I was under the impression that they (eyw tower) will provide initial separation'.when I reviewed the incident in falcon and listened to the recordings I counted 5 losses of standard separation. At the end of the day I judge the sector by what a saw on the radar. I saw no departure strips and two arrival tracks to eyw; with a around seven tracks at the sector. That is why I had no d-side staffed. I overestimated the controllers judgment as I never thought that the controller would released three airplanes at the same time. The three departures increased the complexity of the sector considerably. Had a d-side being staffed; then probably they would have taken the call and clear out the airplanes differently or stopped the radar controller from issuing an improper clearance that resulted in all the incidents.ensure controllers have sufficient knowledge on procedures to operate the sector when nqx approach is closed. Nqx should operate during the agreed daytime hours in the LOA. Including holidays and weekends. The area is not properly set up to work nqx approach during the daytime. Staff a radar associate (d-side) at all times when nqx has scheduled or un-schedule closures during daytime hours.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZMA FLM; Controller; and a pilot report of a conflict that happened while the aircraft was on initial climbout. A RA occurred and the pilot descended avoiding a prior departure from the airport.

Narrative: I had the watch as supervisor on duty of West Side Coastal Area. Prior to the incident I glanced at the sector. I judge the sector to be manageable with about seven tracks. I looked at the TSD [Traffic Situation Display] and the sector showed green across with less than 10 on the numbers and 2 arrivals to EYW/NQX. My setting for the TSD include EYW and NQX arrivals in light blue and were being used at the time. There were no flight progress strips on the bay. I was not aware however; that the controller on duty at R5 had released 3 airplanes simultaneously. Aircraft Z was first; Aircraft A was second; and Aircraft Y was third. All three released using visual separation as initial form of separation. First two were approved to 040 and third to 030. Aircraft Z and Aircraft A were radar identified and turned north; controller then proceeded to descend Aircraft X to 030 forgetting that Aircraft Y had not yet departed and was also clear to 030. EYW was departing east and Aircraft X was arriving from MIA located east of Key West. When Aircraft Y departed; controller was not able to start a track for reasons that are not known to me. Controller at this time asked for help and help was provided by a controller that was discussing a laser event with me and not on position. Aircraft X responded to an RA and climbed to 040 and Aircraft Y also responded to an RA and turned left. The incident happened during a time that NQX approach would have normally been open. Since it was Labor Day they remained closed in observance of the holiday. The area assumes responsibility of the airspace at night when traffic is very sporadic. NQX approach closures during holidays have created problems in the past. There was another instance when another controller mis-applied degree divergence rule and resulted in 3 operational errors. It is common practice in the area that when you work NQX approach you keep it simple and only release one aircraft at a time. I have seen two aircraft released at a time using degree divergence; but never three using visual separation (as it was the case on this incident). During questioning after the incident it became clear that the controller was un-sure about separation procedures off EYW when NQX approach remains closed. Controller said 'I was under the impression that they (EYW tower) will provide initial separation'.When I reviewed the incident in FALCON and listened to the recordings I counted 5 losses of standard separation. At the end of the day I judge the sector by what a saw on the radar. I saw no departure strips and two arrival tracks to EYW; with a around seven tracks at the sector. That is why I had no D-side staffed. I overestimated the controllers judgment as I never thought that the controller would released three airplanes at the same time. The three departures increased the complexity of the sector considerably. Had a D-side being staffed; then probably they would have taken the call and clear out the airplanes differently or stopped the radar controller from issuing an improper clearance that resulted in all the incidents.Ensure controllers have sufficient knowledge on procedures to operate the sector when NQX approach is closed. NQX should operate during the agreed daytime hours in the LOA. Including holidays and weekends. The Area is not properly set up to work NQX approach during the daytime. Staff a radar associate (D-side) at all times when NQX has scheduled or un-schedule closures during daytime hours.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.