Narrative:

Special activities; presidential tfr was in effect and the 30 NM radius covered all airports within my control jurisdiction. As such all aircraft arriving and departing these airports ful; lgb; sli; and toa had to be squawking and talking to me. Also; J/M en-route air traffic that would normally be cleared direct lax VOR had to be put on radar vectors to go around the 10NM radius presidential tfr that centered over the lax VOR. Aircraft involved:aircraft X arrival for sna airport on a heading assigned by newr radar descending to 050. Aircraft Y departing sna en-route filed over lax VOR level at 060. Aircraft Y I assigned a heading of 270 to go around 10NM radius tfr. Aircraft X and aircraft Y were on converging courses and I anticipated aircraft X to be at 050 before being a conflict with aircraft Y. During this evolution I had a aircraft Z depart ful airport IFR who subsequently canceled and went VFR. Aircraft Z had an IFR flight plan filed to his destination. I was going to have flight data amend his flight altitude to VFR but decided to put in a zpatch instead. I chose to do this because when I looked over at the flight data operator I saw that they were busy putting in route amendments due to presidential tfr. During this I had aircraft west flight check in about 10 miles in trail of aircraft X in level flight at 050. When this check in happened I was looking at aircraft X knowing I needed to provide traffic to aircraft X for conflicting traffic aircraft Y. I provided traffic call and then I was amending my zpatch entry for aircraft Z because I had mistyped his destination. I was asking coworkers at this time on the correct format; this being F9; 0; space and the fix. At this time a coworker pointed out to me my imminent loss of separation between aircraft X and aircraft Y. I panicked; I called traffic to aircraft X and turned him to 120 and broke for control to aircraft Y and assigned a 320 heading. Aircraft Y called aircraft X insight. I was still a bit flustered and here my recall is not perfect. I do know that I did finally use the maintain visual separation phraseology but not in perfect sequence as required by the 7110.65.at this point I was very upset and my voice was cracking and I felt it difficult to speak I asked for a relief. In retrospect I believe my scan I thought aircraft X to be at 050 because I was looking at the aircraft west who had checked in level at 050 while giving traffic. Normally I would have requested aircraft X to expedite and have issued a heading south to southeast bound to ensure positive control and separation. I was relieved and asked my flm to look at playback on falcon. I really wanted to see it. He told me to go take a break first and to take as much time as I needed. Again; I asked to please see it now because I was perplexed about the moment that I knew I called traffic to aircraft X because in my mind I was thinking he was at 050. My supervisor told me to wait. This was frustrating to me because I really wanted to know where I had failed. But; I went on my break still questioning my thoughts about what had transpired. I took a break and came back to the coast area and asked flm if he had watched the incident on falcon and if it was bad. He said yes it was bad and didn't look so good. He played it for me on falcon and told me I needed to file atsap and I agreed but that I would like to watch it where you have voice playback as well. I was told by flm that the OM was watching it and would speak with me soon and I needed to wait. The OM did send for me and we went and reviewed the incident with voice playback and falcon. He was very supportive and we spoke a great deal about the incident and how I could have handled my workload better by having flight data amend the BE9L to VFR etc. I asked to take the rest of my shift off on sick leave. The OM asked me if I would be capable of working my scheduled mid-shift that night. I assured him iwould that I just wanted to go home and digress the mornings events. On my drive into work for the mid I received a text from my coworker that I was scheduled to work mid with. He asked if I was okay because he looked at web schedule and saw that I was not scheduled to work mid. Like I just stated I had every intention of working my mid and had spoken to OM before I left work that I would be there. So; as I am driving into work I call my flm on duty and he stated that he was informed by OM that I was 'disqualified' and was put on the schedule for a detail the next day at 0630L that I could not go into work with a headset.in retrospect I think with the location of the presidential tfr and the airports involved; harbor radar and beach radar could have been de combined. Normally for this time of day de combining sectors is unnecessary. However; with standard hand off procedures needing to be augmented due to 10 NM tfr radius and the added duties required for aircraft and controllers within the 30 NM radius I feel this incident would have been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SCT Controller describes a conflict between two aircraft that leave him/her flustered and cannot talk well afterward.

Narrative: Special Activities; Presidential TFR was in effect and the 30 NM radius covered all airports within my control jurisdiction. As such all aircraft arriving and departing these airports FUL; LGB; SLI; and TOA had to be squawking and talking to me. Also; J/M en-route air traffic that would normally be cleared direct LAX VOR had to be put on radar vectors to go around the 10NM radius Presidential TFR that centered over the LAX VOR. Aircraft involved:Aircraft X arrival for SNA airport on a heading assigned by NEWR radar descending to 050. Aircraft Y departing SNA en-route filed over LAX VOR level at 060. Aircraft Y I assigned a heading of 270 to go around 10NM radius TFR. Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were on converging courses and I anticipated Aircraft X to be at 050 before being a conflict with Aircraft Y. During this evolution I had a Aircraft Z depart FUL airport IFR who subsequently canceled and went VFR. Aircraft Z had an IFR flight plan filed to his destination. I was going to have flight data amend his flight altitude to VFR but decided to put in a Zpatch instead. I chose to do this because when I looked over at the flight data operator I saw that they were busy putting in route amendments due to Presidential TFR. During this I had Aircraft W flight check in about 10 miles in trail of Aircraft X in level flight at 050. When this check in happened I was looking at Aircraft X knowing I needed to provide traffic to Aircraft X for conflicting traffic Aircraft Y. I provided traffic call and then I was amending my Zpatch entry for Aircraft Z because I had mistyped his destination. I was asking coworkers at this time on the correct format; this being F9; 0; space and the fix. At this time a coworker pointed out to me my imminent loss of separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. I panicked; I called traffic to Aircraft X and turned him to 120 and broke for control to Aircraft Y and assigned a 320 heading. Aircraft Y called Aircraft X insight. I was still a bit flustered and here my recall is not perfect. I do know that I did finally use the maintain visual separation phraseology but not in perfect sequence as required by the 7110.65.At this point I was very upset and my voice was cracking and I felt it difficult to speak I asked for a relief. In retrospect I believe my scan I thought Aircraft X to be at 050 because I was looking at the Aircraft W who had checked in level at 050 while giving traffic. Normally I would have requested Aircraft X to expedite and have issued a heading south to southeast bound to ensure positive control and separation. I was relieved and asked my FLM to look at playback on Falcon. I really wanted to see it. He told me to go take a break first and to take as much time as I needed. Again; I asked to please see it now because I was perplexed about the moment that I knew I called traffic to Aircraft X because in my mind I was thinking he was at 050. My supervisor told me to wait. This was frustrating to me because I really wanted to know where I had failed. But; I went on my break still questioning my thoughts about what had transpired. I took a break and came back to the Coast Area and asked FLM if he had watched the incident on Falcon and if it was bad. He said yes it was bad and didn't look so good. He played it for me on Falcon and told me I needed to file ATSAP and I agreed but that I would like to watch it where you have voice playback as well. I was told by FLM that the OM was watching it and would speak with me soon and I needed to wait. The OM did send for me and we went and reviewed the incident with voice playback and Falcon. He was very supportive and we spoke a great deal about the incident and how I could have handled my workload better by having flight data amend the BE9L to VFR etc. I asked to take the rest of my shift off on sick leave. The OM asked me if I would be capable of working my scheduled mid-shift that night. I assured him Iwould that I just wanted to go home and digress the mornings events. On my drive into work for the Mid I received a text from my coworker that I was scheduled to work mid with. He asked if I was okay because he looked at web schedule and saw that I was not scheduled to work mid. Like I just stated I had every intention of working my mid and had spoken to OM before I left work that I would be there. So; as I am driving into work I call my FLM on duty and he stated that he was informed by OM that I was 'Disqualified' and was put on the schedule for a detail the next day at 0630L that I could not go into work with a headset.In retrospect I think with the location of the Presidential TFR and the airports involved; Harbor Radar and Beach Radar could have been de combined. Normally for this time of day de combining sectors is unnecessary. However; with standard hand off procedures needing to be augmented due to 10 NM TFR radius and the added duties required for aircraft and controllers within the 30 NM radius I feel this incident would have been avoided.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.