Narrative:

I was working a mid shift. It was the [arrival rush]; we were landing 18L; 18R; and 27 with crda operations. Local 1; 2; and 3 were open. I was working local 3; the arrivals to runway 27. I had the ghost targets enabled on my scope to assist with spacing from 18L arrivals. Aircraft X; was inbound to runway 27. I remember aircraft X on the ghost coming down final. The 18L final was packed with heavy jets. Aircraft X checked in with me at about 5-6 mile final; any speed adjustments are now a recommendation. Based on aircraft characteristic; I was expecting aircraft X to slow down once reaching about a 4 to 5 mile final; so I did not want to manipulate his speed foreseeing that the aircraft will be a factor to the next arrival to 18L. The arrival to 18L associated with the ghost target on runway 27 slowed down to 90kts. I attempted to slow aircraft X down even more on about a 2 1/2 mile final. Taking into consideration the speed of these two aircraft; it was understood that it was going to be a tie with these two arrivals. Our standard operating procedures states that in this situation the 18L arrival is the one that need to be sent around in the event of a tie. The supervisor in charge at the time made the statement that; I do not want to send [carrier] around for aircraft X. The supervisor told me to give aircraft X a 'south' turn to the north. I relayed the 'south' turn instructions to aircraft X. I observed aircraft X commencing the maneuver; I gave a scan of the other finals and runway; aircraft X told me that he was going around. I yelled out my guy on 27 is going around. I looked out the window in the direction of aircraft X so that I could determine the aircraft's position; example: to see if the aircraft was facing north; south; etc.; before issuing conflicting headings. It was dark outside so it was hard to determine this. The supervisor immediately told me to give aircraft X a 230 heading. I questioned the 230 heading; he said yes 230. We did not realize aircraft X was heading to the northeast until after the 230 heading was issued. There was a lot of dead air time due to the fact of listening to the supervisor giving their instructions to me along with trying to understand the supervisor's plan that they had already formulated in their mind; also being concerned with what the pilot was doing along with trying to keep everyone as safe as possible due to the unforeseen circumstance. Aircraft Y was inbound to runway 27 requesting a landing clearance. The supervisor told me to bring aircraft X southbound. I keyed up and told aircraft X head due south because I was not sure where aircraft X was at in his 230 heading. Aircraft X asked what altitude would I like him to maintain. I gave traffic a aircraft Y 5 mile final and to aircraft X to 'climb; climb and maintain 3;000 fly heading 180'. Aircraft X climb above the traffic. Coordination was made and aircraft X went back to approach.I recommend that 'go around' procedures for crda should have been followed by sending the 18L arrival around. Aircraft X was already inside of 5 miles so a speed adjustment is now a recommendation. The supervisor should not have instructed local 3 to give and 'south' turn to the north to an aircraft at a 1 1/2 mile final; it wasn't going to work. During this situation I did what the supervisor told me to do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MEM Tower Local Control describes a situation where they had to take an aircraft out for resequence due to its speed on final.

Narrative: I was working a MID shift. It was the [arrival rush]; we were landing 18L; 18R; and 27 with CRDA operations. Local 1; 2; and 3 were open. I was working local 3; the arrivals to runway 27. I had the ghost targets enabled on my scope to assist with spacing from 18L arrivals. Aircraft X; was inbound to runway 27. I remember Aircraft X on the ghost coming down final. The 18L final was packed with heavy jets. Aircraft X checked in with me at about 5-6 mile final; any speed adjustments are now a recommendation. Based on aircraft characteristic; I was expecting Aircraft X to slow down once reaching about a 4 to 5 mile final; so I did not want to manipulate his speed foreseeing that the aircraft will be a factor to the next arrival to 18L. The arrival to 18L associated with the ghost target on runway 27 slowed down to 90kts. I attempted to slow Aircraft X down even more on about a 2 1/2 mile final. Taking into consideration the speed of these two aircraft; it was understood that it was going to be a tie with these two arrivals. Our standard operating procedures states that in this situation the 18L arrival is the one that need to be sent around in the event of a tie. The supervisor in charge at the time made the statement that; I do not want to send [Carrier] around for Aircraft X. The supervisor told me to give Aircraft X a 'S' turn to the north. I relayed the 'S' turn instructions to Aircraft X. I observed Aircraft X commencing the maneuver; I gave a scan of the other finals and runway; Aircraft X told me that he was going around. I yelled out my guy on 27 is going around. I looked out the window in the direction of Aircraft X so that I could determine the aircraft's position; example: to see if the aircraft was facing north; south; etc.; before issuing conflicting headings. It was dark outside so it was hard to determine this. The supervisor immediately told me to give Aircraft X a 230 heading. I questioned the 230 heading; he said yes 230. We did not realize Aircraft X was heading to the northeast until after the 230 heading was issued. There was a lot of dead air time due to the fact of listening to the supervisor giving their instructions to me along with trying to understand the supervisor's plan that they had already formulated in their mind; also being concerned with what the pilot was doing along with trying to keep everyone as safe as possible due to the unforeseen circumstance. Aircraft Y was inbound to runway 27 requesting a landing clearance. The supervisor told me to bring Aircraft X southbound. I keyed up and told Aircraft X head due south because I was not sure where Aircraft X was at in his 230 heading. Aircraft X asked what altitude would I like him to maintain. I gave traffic a Aircraft Y 5 mile final and to Aircraft X to 'Climb; climb and maintain 3;000 fly heading 180'. Aircraft X climb above the traffic. Coordination was made and Aircraft X went back to approach.I recommend that 'go around' procedures for CRDA should have been followed by sending the 18L arrival around. Aircraft X was already inside of 5 miles so a speed adjustment is now a recommendation. The supervisor should not have instructed local 3 to give and 'S' turn to the north to an aircraft at a 1 1/2 mile final; it wasn't going to work. During this situation I did what the supervisor told me to do.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.