Narrative:

As an instructor pilot, I was occupying the jump seat in an mlt during climbout from andrews AFB, md on in august, 1989. Even though I wasn't physically flying, I did sign for the aircraft. The aircraft was cleared to FL220 and to intercept V-33 (sbound). The navigator had reported that his INS information didn't match the instrument requirements. He then began to update his INS. I turned from the jump seat to converse with the boom operator. The pilot flying the plane couldn't remember DME of the next fix so he picked up a low chart to check his turn point. As he continued to climb, he passed FL220. When he did this while distracted, the fuel system advisory system (fsas) altitude readout automatically changed to FL280, which was to be our final altitude. The copilot working the radios saw the change and was confused as to why it had changed without any manual input. When everyone turned around, we all saw FL280 in the window and assumed we had been cleared to FL280 and they had missed the call. As the aircraft passed FL240, I heard another aircraft on radio asking about the altitude of the military tanker. Thinking we were below him when actually we were now above him. Washington center then called to confirm our altitude was FL220. The pilot flying stated that he thought we were cleared to FL280 and would go back down. Center then cleared us to FL260. Approximately 2 minutes later we were advised that we may be guilty of an airspace deviation. At no time did center warn us of going off altitude. When asked later by phone, the watch supervisor stated the alarm must have malfunctioned. This was dangerous in a high density environment like washington, dc and although accidental it does prove that even a very experienced crew can fall victim to distraction. Later we also found that once you pass the altitude the fsas is manually set to, it will go to the programmed projected level off altitude. This is currently being examined as potentially dangerous. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: the mlt does not have an altitude alerting system and it has become common practice to use the fsas as a reminder. The final cruise altitude as programmed during preflight checks but no one knew that the software allowed the cruise altitude to be displayed automatically if a lower set altitude was exceeded during climb. A briefing has been circulated through the group cautioning them of the potential problems. Investigation is still being conducted about reprogramming the software.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MIL ALT DEVIATION OVERSHOT DURING CLIMB APPARENTLY CAUSING LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION WITH UNKNOWN ACFT.

Narrative: AS AN INSTRUCTOR PLT, I WAS OCCUPYING THE JUMP SEAT IN AN MLT DURING CLIMBOUT FROM ANDREWS AFB, MD ON IN AUGUST, 1989. EVEN THOUGH I WASN'T PHYSICALLY FLYING, I DID SIGN FOR THE ACFT. THE ACFT WAS CLRED TO FL220 AND TO INTERCEPT V-33 (SBOUND). THE NAVIGATOR HAD REPORTED THAT HIS INS INFO DIDN'T MATCH THE INSTRUMENT REQUIREMENTS. HE THEN BEGAN TO UPDATE HIS INS. I TURNED FROM THE JUMP SEAT TO CONVERSE WITH THE BOOM OPERATOR. THE PLT FLYING THE PLANE COULDN'T REMEMBER DME OF THE NEXT FIX SO HE PICKED UP A LOW CHART TO CHECK HIS TURN POINT. AS HE CONTINUED TO CLIMB, HE PASSED FL220. WHEN HE DID THIS WHILE DISTRACTED, THE FUEL SYSTEM ADVISORY SYSTEM (FSAS) ALT READOUT AUTOMATICALLY CHANGED TO FL280, WHICH WAS TO BE OUR FINAL ALT. THE COPLT WORKING THE RADIOS SAW THE CHANGE AND WAS CONFUSED AS TO WHY IT HAD CHANGED WITHOUT ANY MANUAL INPUT. WHEN EVERYONE TURNED AROUND, WE ALL SAW FL280 IN THE WINDOW AND ASSUMED WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO FL280 AND THEY HAD MISSED THE CALL. AS THE ACFT PASSED FL240, I HEARD ANOTHER ACFT ON RADIO ASKING ABOUT THE ALT OF THE MIL TANKER. THINKING WE WERE BELOW HIM WHEN ACTUALLY WE WERE NOW ABOVE HIM. WASHINGTON CENTER THEN CALLED TO CONFIRM OUR ALT WAS FL220. THE PLT FLYING STATED THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED TO FL280 AND WOULD GO BACK DOWN. CENTER THEN CLRED US TO FL260. APPROX 2 MINUTES LATER WE WERE ADVISED THAT WE MAY BE GUILTY OF AN AIRSPACE DEVIATION. AT NO TIME DID CENTER WARN US OF GOING OFF ALT. WHEN ASKED LATER BY PHONE, THE WATCH SUPVR STATED THE ALARM MUST HAVE MALFUNCTIONED. THIS WAS DANGEROUS IN A HIGH DENSITY ENVIRONMENT LIKE WASHINGTON, DC AND ALTHOUGH ACCIDENTAL IT DOES PROVE THAT EVEN A VERY EXPERIENCED CREW CAN FALL VICTIM TO DISTR. LATER WE ALSO FOUND THAT ONCE YOU PASS THE ALT THE FSAS IS MANUALLY SET TO, IT WILL GO TO THE PROGRAMMED PROJECTED LEVEL OFF ALT. THIS IS CURRENTLY BEING EXAMINED AS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THE MLT DOES NOT HAVE AN ALT ALERTING SYSTEM AND IT HAS BECOME COMMON PRACTICE TO USE THE FSAS AS A REMINDER. THE FINAL CRUISE ALT AS PROGRAMMED DURING PREFLT CHECKS BUT NO ONE KNEW THAT THE SOFTWARE ALLOWED THE CRUISE ALT TO BE DISPLAYED AUTOMATICALLY IF A LOWER SET ALT WAS EXCEEDED DURING CLIMB. A BRIEFING HAS BEEN CIRCULATED THROUGH THE GROUP CAUTIONING THEM OF THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS. INVESTIGATION IS STILL BEING CONDUCTED ABOUT REPROGRAMMING THE SOFTWARE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.