Narrative:

During the localizer/DME back course [runway] 22 approach at homer airport (hom); the first officer/pilot monitoring (pm) called the leadoff radial late while using the RMI as primary source of data. This resulted in loss of situational awareness; overshooting the localizer course; and a GPWS alert requiring a second approach to land. While on the ground in hom; first officer/pm determined that the RMI had been selected to the ADF on both pointers; thus giving incorrect information of the leadoff radial. After going missed and on a safe course and altitude; having regained situational awareness; first officer/pm contacted ATC to inform of the missed procedure. ATC said that flight xyz had a terrain warning and that the MSA in the area was in the 5;XXX MSL (not able to remember exact altitude at time of this statement); and thus since aircraft was above 6;XXX MSL (not able to remember exact alt at time of this statement); captain/pilot flying (PF) leveled off aircraft while going direct to VOR. First officer/pm asked captain/PF if we were going to do the approach again and was told yes; so first officer/pm briefed the captain/PF the following: direct VOR; fly outbound on the 003 radial to 11 DME to make a right hand turn at folar; cross the leadoff radial and turn to 218 and fly the localizer inbound. First officer/pm performed this brief to make sure first officer/pm knew what the plan was because the captain was the PF. Captain/PF agreed to the brief. ATC asked 'state intentions'. First officer/pm requested localizer DME (back crs runway 22) as formerly briefed with the captain/PF. ATC also asked if flight xyz had gotten the localizer on the first try and first officer/pm stated no (had flown past it). ATC cleared flight xyz for the approach; localizer DME (back crs runway 22); cleared aircraft to a lower altitude with stay on center until established on localizer; and gave us a phone number for crew to call when able. First officer/pm repeated clearance and told ATC was not able to copy phone number at that time. Captain/PF flew the approach using the captain's gauges; and first officer/pm input the course needles to allow captain/PF to fly. While captain/PF was flying; first officer/pm twisted VOR needle to count up to lead-off radial. First officer/pm input the localizer course needle and verified with captain/PF to point inbound needle to 038 degrees and not 218 degrees. First officer/pm wanted to make sure he was pointing the needle correctly. Captain/PF agreed. Then captain/PF called localizer alive. First officer/pm made calls of fixes/distances/altitudes to descend to while inputting the step downs into the altitude alerter. First officer/pm completed the landing checklist as requested by captain/PF. Captain/PF landed normally in hom. After taxiing off the runway in hom; first officer/pm radioed ATC to inform of safe on ground status and to close flight plan; first officer/pm also asked ATC to repeat the phone number given in the air. After parking and deplaning; the captain/PF called the number given by ATC and spoke with them. Captain/PF also called and spoke with operations and the assistant chief pilot. During this time; first officer/pm noticed that the copilot side RMI was selected to dual ADF and not navigation as would have been required to be properly configured for calling leadoff radial. Other pertinent data: first officer/pm attempted multiple times to hear the hom weather report without success; despite repeatedly 'breaking squelch' on radio #2 to try to hear it starting 40 miles out from hom. ATC asked flight xyz whether we had received the weather report at hom; but first officer/pm was not able to get hom weather until approximately 5-6 miles from folar (after 'breaking squelch' to get it; it came in abnormally weak and faint). This caused a delay in executing the descent to land checklist in the segment of flight just prior to approach to land procedures. When first officer/pm contacted hom local company frequency using radio #2 to give anupdate on landing time; company ground employee asked first officer/pm to repeat data several times due to weak and broken transmission while flight xyz was on the approach. Company ground employee asked first officer/pm about the weak and broken transmission once aircraft was on the ground. First officer/pm is in high minimum status with less than 40 hours in type/121 crew environment/alaska operations. Majority of prior duty times were on-call reserve status with multi-day gaps between flights. Consistent flying after a new type rating.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: First Officer describes a failed LOC/DME BC RWY 22 to HOM; caused partly by his inexperience and setting the RMI needles to ADF when at least one needed to be on VOR to define the lead in radial. The localizer is overshot toward high terrain causing ATC to issue a MSAW. The second attempt is successful with the RMI still improperly set.

Narrative: During the LOC/DME Back Course [Runway] 22 approach at Homer Airport (HOM); the First Officer/pilot monitoring (PM) called the Leadoff Radial late while using the RMI as primary source of data. This resulted in loss of situational awareness; overshooting the LOC course; and a GPWS Alert requiring a second approach to land. While on the ground in HOM; First Officer/PM determined that the RMI had been selected to the ADF on both pointers; thus giving incorrect information of the Leadoff Radial. After going missed and on a safe course and altitude; having regained situational awareness; First Officer/PM contacted ATC to inform of the missed procedure. ATC said that Flight XYZ had a terrain warning and that the MSA in the area was in the 5;XXX MSL (not able to remember exact altitude at time of this statement); and thus since aircraft was above 6;XXX MSL (not able to remember exact alt at time of this statement); Captain/pilot flying (PF) leveled off aircraft while going direct to VOR. First Officer/PM asked Captain/PF if we were going to do the approach again and was told yes; so First Officer/PM briefed the Captain/PF the following: Direct VOR; fly outbound on the 003 radial to 11 DME to make a right hand turn at FOLAR; cross the leadoff radial and turn to 218 and fly the LOC inbound. First Officer/PM performed this brief to make sure First Officer/PM knew what the plan was because the Captain was the PF. Captain/PF agreed to the brief. ATC asked 'state intentions'. First Officer/PM requested LOC DME (BACK CRS RWY 22) as formerly briefed with the Captain/PF. ATC also asked if Flight XYZ had gotten the Localizer on the first try and First Officer/PM stated no (had flown past it). ATC cleared Flight XYZ for the approach; LOC DME (BACK CRS RWY 22); cleared aircraft to a lower altitude with stay on center until established on LOC; and gave us a phone number for crew to call when able. First Officer/PM repeated clearance and told ATC was not able to copy phone number at that time. Captain/PF flew the approach using the Captain's gauges; and First Officer/PM input the course needles to allow Captain/PF to fly. While Captain/PF was flying; First Officer/PM twisted VOR needle to count up to Lead-off Radial. First Officer/PM input the localizer course needle and verified with Captain/PF to point inbound needle to 038 degrees and not 218 degrees. First Officer/PM wanted to make sure he was pointing the needle correctly. Captain/PF agreed. Then Captain/PF called LOC alive. First Officer/PM made calls of fixes/distances/altitudes to descend to while inputting the step downs into the altitude alerter. First Officer/PM completed the Landing Checklist as requested by Captain/PF. Captain/PF landed normally in HOM. After taxiing off the runway in HOM; First Officer/PM radioed ATC to inform of safe on ground status and to close flight plan; First Officer/PM also asked ATC to repeat the phone number given in the air. After parking and deplaning; the Captain/PF called the number given by ATC and spoke with them. Captain/PF also called and spoke with Operations and the Assistant Chief Pilot. During this time; First Officer/PM noticed that the copilot side RMI was selected to dual ADF and not NAV as would have been required to be properly configured for calling Leadoff Radial. Other pertinent data: First Officer/PM attempted multiple times to hear the HOM weather report without success; despite repeatedly 'breaking squelch' on radio #2 to try to hear it starting 40 miles out from HOM. ATC asked Flight XYZ whether we had received the weather report at HOM; but First Officer/PM was not able to get HOM weather until approximately 5-6 miles from FOLAR (after 'breaking squelch' to get it; it came in abnormally weak and faint). This caused a delay in executing the descent to land checklist in the segment of flight just prior to approach to land procedures. When First Officer/PM contacted HOM local company frequency using radio #2 to give anupdate on landing time; company ground employee asked First Officer/PM to repeat data several times due to weak and broken transmission while Flight XYZ was on the approach. Company ground employee asked First Officer/PM about the weak and broken transmission once aircraft was on the ground. First Officer/PM is in high minimum status with less than 40 hours in type/121 crew environment/Alaska operations. Majority of prior duty times were on-call reserve status with multi-day gaps between flights. Consistent flying after a new type rating.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.