Narrative:

I and my private pilot student departed under VFR conditions with ATIS reporting ceilings around 3;000 to 4;000 ft. This was well above what we needed for our mission. We flew to a nearby airport and those reported ceilings looked to be correct. We stayed at that airport the remainder of the morning while I was training a student how to do soft-field and short-field landings. Toward the end of our training some scattered clouds were starting to move in at our traffic pattern altitude but we were able to maintain VFR clearances by maneuvering. However it was getting harder to maneuver the longer we continued the flight. In fact we had to make several turns that put us too close and possibly encroached inside the cloud clearances. The clouds appeared to be only about 500 ft tall. So it was then I decided to bring the lesson to a close and head back to oma. I told my student to climb and helped him stay VFR by helping him maneuver between clouds. I picked up the ATIS at oma and it was still the same ATIS that we departed oma with. In fact I think the ATIS was the same for several hours. Since I was still under the impression it was good VFR back at oma I assumed the conditions were going to get better. I called oma approach and checked on with the ATIS identifier I had just heard and they gave me a VFR squawk code and told me to proceed to oma. We continued but then the clouds were getting harder to maneuver around. It looked like the bottoms were high enough that we could descend and remain at a safe VFR level and I used the ATIS that oma still had active to support my decision. I notified oma that we were going to descend to maintain VFR. They acknowledged. Omaha then came back on and told me that oma had just updated their ATIS and the ceiling was about 1;200 or 1;300 with good VFR visibility. I brought my approach plates with me just in case the weather turned to IMC. I immediately asked oma for a local IFR and told them I would circle VFR until they got me the clearance. They asked if I was IFR equipped and qualified which I affirmed. They got me an IFR clearance directly. They asked me to climb to 3;000; which I did and asked me what approach I wanted. I asked for the ILS to 12 as that was active. They gave me vectors for that approach. The controller came back on and asked me my aircraft type and equipment. I responded. The controller cleared me for the ILS and I intercepted the localizer. As I was getting closer I noticed the glide slope was out. I immediately notified the controller. He said he would query tower. They confirmed to him that it was out. He asked me what I wanted to do. I asked for the localizer approach to 14L at oma. What I thought he told me was that I was at the FAF and that I was cleared for the localizer approach. I immediately started my descent from 3;000 to 1;340; the MDA. At about 1;800 ft or so the controller asked me to check altitude and that he showed that I needed to cross the FAF at 2;400. I got a bad feeling at that precise moment because I thought I was already past bufft. I initiated a climb immediately and began to look at the approach. Things got worse because I had not properly briefed the localizer approach because I then noticed the only way I was going to identify bufft was with DME; which I did not have. The localizer approach was a localizer/DME approach. I inadvertently accepted an approach my aircraft was not equipped to fly. As I was climbing I saw the runway at oma. I asked for the contact approach and was cleared for it. We landed safely however; since my mind was pre-occupied with the fact that I had flown an approach I should not have accepted and the fact that I descended below the approach altitudes; I thought that tower cleared me for the option but I am not sure of that. Tower never said anything to me once I landed so I assume I was cleared for the option like I thought I heard. I am thankful this turned out ok. However; it has bothered me ever since it happened. I am a better pilot than that. I am disappointed with myself. I will definitely not let complacency and lack of planning hinder me again. Since then I have set out to get some more flying in IMC and to refine my skills and get proficiency; not just currency. Many contributing factors to this issue: 1) ATIS was not properly updated as I later went back and noticed there were metars that came out since the old ATIS was up. 2) continuing the lesson a little too long as I noticed the clouds moving in contributed to me getting too close to them and having to change to an IFR plan. 3) my lack of planning since I only brought my approach plates as a backup and never thought I would have to use them. My flight planning should not have been an after-thought. I should have expected to fly an IFR approach and properly planned to do so. 4) my lack of properly briefing the approach that I was cleared for as that would have given me a direct indication that my aircraft was not equipped for the approach. 5) my pre-occupation with the previous anomalies; once I realized my mistakes; contributed to the fact that I am not sure if I was cleared to land or for the option or either.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Instructor pilot returned to OMA from training to find it IFR and the ILS OTS so he began the LOC/DME 14 only to discover he was not DME equipped but fortunately became VMC before having to execute a missed approach.

Narrative: I and my Private Pilot student departed under VFR conditions with ATIS reporting ceilings around 3;000 to 4;000 FT. This was well above what we needed for our mission. We flew to a nearby airport and those reported ceilings looked to be correct. We stayed at that airport the remainder of the morning while I was training a student how to do soft-field and short-field landings. Toward the end of our training some scattered clouds were starting to move in at our traffic pattern altitude but we were able to maintain VFR clearances by maneuvering. However it was getting harder to maneuver the longer we continued the flight. In fact we had to make several turns that put us too close and possibly encroached inside the cloud clearances. The clouds appeared to be only about 500 FT tall. So it was then I decided to bring the lesson to a close and head back to OMA. I told my student to climb and helped him stay VFR by helping him maneuver between clouds. I picked up the ATIS at OMA and it was still the same ATIS that we departed OMA with. In fact I think the ATIS was the same for several hours. Since I was still under the impression it was good VFR back at OMA I assumed the conditions were going to get better. I called OMA Approach and checked on with the ATIS identifier I had just heard and they gave me a VFR squawk code and told me to proceed to OMA. We continued but then the clouds were getting harder to maneuver around. It looked like the bottoms were high enough that we could descend and remain at a safe VFR level and I used the ATIS that OMA still had active to support my decision. I notified OMA that we were going to descend to maintain VFR. They acknowledged. Omaha then came back on and told me that OMA had just updated their ATIS and the ceiling was about 1;200 or 1;300 with good VFR visibility. I brought my approach plates with me just in case the weather turned to IMC. I immediately asked OMA for a local IFR and told them I would circle VFR until they got me the clearance. They asked if I was IFR equipped and qualified which I affirmed. They got me an IFR clearance directly. They asked me to climb to 3;000; which I did and asked me what approach I wanted. I asked for the ILS to 12 as that was active. They gave me vectors for that approach. The Controller came back on and asked me my aircraft type and equipment. I responded. The Controller cleared me for the ILS and I intercepted the LOC. As I was getting closer I noticed the glide slope was out. I immediately notified the Controller. He said he would query tower. They confirmed to him that it was out. He asked me what I wanted to do. I asked for the LOC approach to 14L at OMA. What I thought he told me was that I was at the FAF and that I was cleared for the LOC approach. I immediately started my descent from 3;000 to 1;340; the MDA. At about 1;800 FT or so the Controller asked me to check altitude and that he showed that I needed to cross the FAF at 2;400. I got a bad feeling at that precise moment because I thought I was already past BUFFT. I initiated a climb immediately and began to look at the approach. Things got worse because I had not properly briefed the LOC approach because I then noticed the only way I was going to identify BUFFT was with DME; which I did not have. The LOC approach was a LOC/DME approach. I inadvertently accepted an approach my aircraft was not equipped to fly. As I was climbing I saw the runway at OMA. I asked for the Contact Approach and was cleared for it. We landed safely however; since my mind was pre-occupied with the fact that I had flown an approach I should not have accepted and the fact that I descended below the approach altitudes; I thought that Tower cleared me for the Option but I am not sure of that. Tower never said anything to me once I landed so I assume I was cleared for the Option like I thought I heard. I am thankful this turned out OK. However; it has bothered me ever since it happened. I am a better pilot than that. I am disappointed with myself. I will definitely not let complacency and lack of planning hinder me again. Since then I have set out to get some more flying in IMC and to refine my skills and get proficiency; not just currency. Many contributing factors to this issue: 1) ATIS was not properly updated as I later went back and noticed there were METARS that came out since the old ATIS was up. 2) Continuing the lesson a little too long as I noticed the clouds moving in contributed to me getting too close to them and having to change to an IFR plan. 3) My lack of planning since I only brought my approach plates as a backup and never thought I would have to use them. My flight planning should not have been an after-thought. I should have EXPECTED to fly an IFR approach and properly planned to do so. 4) My lack of properly briefing the approach that I was cleared for as that would have given me a direct indication that my aircraft was not equipped for the approach. 5) My pre-occupation with the previous anomalies; once I realized my mistakes; contributed to the fact that I am not sure if I was cleared to land or for the option or either.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.