Narrative:

I was en route on an IFR flight from rockland, me, to manchester, nh, and was flying at 2000' on vectors to intercept the ILS runway 35 in manchester. I had intercepted the G/south and was descending to land, but was off the centerline, so requested another approach. I was again vectored for the approach, however overshot the centerline, and although on G/south, I was too far to the right to assure a safe landing, so I was given a third approach from further out to give me ample time to line up on the centerline. At approximately 1500' my engine shut down. I informed approach control of the engine failure and was told to stay on the approach frequency, and she would pass on any information necessary to the tower. I noticed that the right main tank was registering 'empty,' so I immediately switched to the left main and the engine restarted. I so informed approach and was told to climb again to 2000' for another try; however as I could now see the ground through the clouds, I informed her I had the ground in sight and would come in VFR, which she authority/authorized. I was surprised to see emergency vehicles lined up along the runway. After stopping, I was approached by members of the emergency squad who asked for my name, address, phone # and pilot's license #; and also asked me to call the tower, which I did and gave them the same information. I had anticipated there would be no need to change fuel tanks on my trip from rockland to manchester, and I had just filled the tanks prior to leaving rockland, and had only consumed approximately 1/2 tank going from manchester to rockland that morning. I neglected to take into consideration that the time involved while shooting the extra approachs while the engine was running at full mixture would substantially reduce the time remaining on that particular tank. I still had some 3 1/2 hours of fuel on board, as the other 3 tanks were all full. My initial problem in intercepting ILS was caused by the relatively short distance between the vectors and the G/south. This was compounded by the fact that my heading indicator was off several degrees as a result of the vectoring. In addition to this, I have had limited IFR experience doing approachs under near minimum conditions. In the future, I intend to have a timer with an alarm on it to forcibly remind me when it is time to change fuel tanks regardless of the circumstances.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA SMA RAN 1 TANK DRY ON IAP ILS APCH INTO MHI. AFTER TANK CHANGE ACFT WAS VFR AND PROCEEDED VISUAL TO THE ARPT.

Narrative: I WAS ENRTE ON AN IFR FLT FROM ROCKLAND, ME, TO MANCHESTER, NH, AND WAS FLYING AT 2000' ON VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE ILS RWY 35 IN MANCHESTER. I HAD INTERCEPTED THE G/S AND WAS DSNDING TO LAND, BUT WAS OFF THE CENTERLINE, SO REQUESTED ANOTHER APCH. I WAS AGAIN VECTORED FOR THE APCH, HOWEVER OVERSHOT THE CENTERLINE, AND ALTHOUGH ON G/S, I WAS TOO FAR TO THE RIGHT TO ASSURE A SAFE LNDG, SO I WAS GIVEN A THIRD APCH FROM FURTHER OUT TO GIVE ME AMPLE TIME TO LINE UP ON THE CENTERLINE. AT APPROX 1500' MY ENG SHUT DOWN. I INFORMED APCH CTL OF THE ENG FAILURE AND WAS TOLD TO STAY ON THE APCH FREQ, AND SHE WOULD PASS ON ANY INFO NECESSARY TO THE TWR. I NOTICED THAT THE RIGHT MAIN TANK WAS REGISTERING 'EMPTY,' SO I IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED TO THE LEFT MAIN AND THE ENG RESTARTED. I SO INFORMED APCH AND WAS TOLD TO CLB AGAIN TO 2000' FOR ANOTHER TRY; HOWEVER AS I COULD NOW SEE THE GND THROUGH THE CLOUDS, I INFORMED HER I HAD THE GND IN SIGHT AND WOULD COME IN VFR, WHICH SHE AUTH. I WAS SURPRISED TO SEE EMER VEHICLES LINED UP ALONG THE RWY. AFTER STOPPING, I WAS APCHED BY MEMBERS OF THE EMER SQUAD WHO ASKED FOR MY NAME, ADDRESS, PHONE # AND PLT'S LICENSE #; AND ALSO ASKED ME TO CALL THE TWR, WHICH I DID AND GAVE THEM THE SAME INFO. I HAD ANTICIPATED THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO CHANGE FUEL TANKS ON MY TRIP FROM ROCKLAND TO MANCHESTER, AND I HAD JUST FILLED THE TANKS PRIOR TO LEAVING ROCKLAND, AND HAD ONLY CONSUMED APPROX 1/2 TANK GOING FROM MANCHESTER TO ROCKLAND THAT MORNING. I NEGLECTED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE TIME INVOLVED WHILE SHOOTING THE EXTRA APCHS WHILE THE ENG WAS RUNNING AT FULL MIXTURE WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE TIME REMAINING ON THAT PARTICULAR TANK. I STILL HAD SOME 3 1/2 HRS OF FUEL ON BOARD, AS THE OTHER 3 TANKS WERE ALL FULL. MY INITIAL PROB IN INTERCEPTING ILS WAS CAUSED BY THE RELATIVELY SHORT DISTANCE BTWN THE VECTORS AND THE G/S. THIS WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT MY HDG INDICATOR WAS OFF SEVERAL DEGS AS A RESULT OF THE VECTORING. IN ADDITION TO THIS, I HAVE HAD LIMITED IFR EXPERIENCE DOING APCHS UNDER NEAR MINIMUM CONDITIONS. IN THE FUTURE, I INTEND TO HAVE A TIMER WITH AN ALARM ON IT TO FORCIBLY REMIND ME WHEN IT IS TIME TO CHANGE FUEL TANKS REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.