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37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
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| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1236213 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201501 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZZZZ.Airport |
| State Reference | FO |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | B747-C/F |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Takeoff |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
| Person 2 | |
| Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
The taxi route from our gate towards the runway contained 3 hotspots. We delayed configuration and taxi checklist until past all hot spots. This caused a significant disruption in our normal checklist procedure. I heard the captain call for the flight control check. While he certainly must have called for 'flaps 10' just before calling for the flight control check; I didn't hear it; and therefore did not react to it by putting the flaps to 10. It is completely my fault on this. Even if the captain had not called for the flaps; I should have asked him about them. I have no explanation other than my mind 'skipped ahead' and just missed it. Perhaps I subconsciously thought the flaps had already been extended. When I read the flaps 2 times in the checklist; I saw what I expected to see; not the actual flap position.although I tried to get quality rest/sleep the night before; that just did not happen prior to this flight. It's hard to get a perfectly restful night's sleep in our kind of job (due to circadian rhythm changes); but perhaps I was more fatigued than what I had realized. I could have at the least; alerted the other crew members of this. Also; our work has very tight time constraints with respect to on-time departures. I tend to be slower; or less efficient in general preparation for departures than most crew members. Due to this; I constantly push myself to 'get things done' as promptly as possible. But when you push yourself to be 'too fast'; it is possible to miss critical events; especially when one is not adequately rested. In the future; I am going to be more deliberate; and perhaps a little slower on these critical checklist items. I do not blame the company or anyone else for my errors in this incident.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B-747 air crew rejected a takeoff after a TAKEOFF CONFIG warning alerted them that the flaps were not set for takeoff. They taxied clear; configured properly and conducted a normal flight to their destination.
Narrative: The taxi route from our gate towards the runway contained 3 hotspots. We delayed configuration and taxi checklist until past all hot spots. This caused a significant disruption in our normal checklist procedure. I heard the Captain call for the flight control check. While he certainly must have called for 'Flaps 10' just before calling for the flight control check; I didn't hear it; and therefore did not react to it by putting the flaps to 10. It is completely my fault on this. Even if the captain had not called for the flaps; I should have asked him about them. I have no explanation other than my mind 'skipped ahead' and just missed it. Perhaps I subconsciously thought the flaps had already been extended. When I read the Flaps 2 times in the checklist; I saw what I expected to see; not the actual flap position.Although I tried to get quality rest/sleep the night before; that just did not happen prior to this flight. It's hard to get a perfectly restful night's sleep in our kind of job (due to circadian rhythm changes); but perhaps I was more fatigued than what I had realized. I could have at the least; alerted the other crew members of this. Also; our work has very tight time constraints with respect to on-time departures. I tend to be slower; or less efficient in general preparation for departures than most crew members. Due to this; I constantly push myself to 'get things done' as promptly as possible. But when you push yourself to be 'too fast'; it is possible to miss critical events; especially when one is not adequately rested. IN THE FUTURE; I AM GOING TO BE MORE DELIBERATE; AND PERHAPS A LITTLE SLOWER ON THESE CRITICAL CHECKLIST ITEMS. I do not blame the company or anyone else for my errors in this incident.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.