Narrative:

Captain called into maintenance control reporting that as soon as he put power on his aircraft he received the following cas messages lg lever disag; E1 fuel imp byp; presn automatic fail and engine no dispatch. The status page showed engine 1-2 short dispatch. Received left and right medium large transport up and locked indications and a red hatched nlg gear unsafe indication along with aural 'landing gear' warning. The electrical status page displayed yellow X's over batt 1; hot bus 1; dc bus 1 and shed bus 1. As there was no previous history for any of these issues on the aircraft and phenoms are known to produce these miscellaneous nuisance faults during a bad power up; maintenance control suggested performing the 'airplane power reset' procedure per embraer's phenom 300 pilot's operating handbook (a manual for flight crews published by the oem for ground operations of the aircraft). After I made this suggesting the crew's first response is 'do we have an approved procedure for that?' I once again referred the crew to their poh section 5-55 page 6. The crew refused to perform the oem approved procedure to prevent a non issue from becoming an aog event. The crew then called their chief pilot and reported this as a safety issue. Once maintenance personnel arrived and performed a cmc download and submitted the data to the embraer contact center for evaluation; they responded that it was some transient in the system; and that taking into consideration that all messages went away on the next power up; there was no need for any further troubleshooting on this matter. The technician then proceeded to perform the ops test on the engine/airframe unit with no faults found and the aircraft was returned to service. This situation has created a conflict in the tasks set for the maintenance control department. We are tasked with providing technical support and being a resource for the flight crews. When a maintenance controller offers a flight crew an oem approved procedures from a pilots operating handbook and is then accused of suggesting an unsafe procedure it creates unwanted stress in an already stressful work environment. Flight crews and maintenance controllers need to be notified if a crew is not allowed to follow a procedure listed in a pilot operating handbook or other oem published manuals for their specific aircraft or if maintenance control is not allowed to suggest these procedures. This should be addressed by the heads of the maintenance and operations department to determine what the SOP should be for events similar to this in the future. As we are stressing aircraft availability during our peak period and now allowing aircraft to become aog when an oem approved procedure can keep an aircraft flying safely and prevent unneeded downtime for maintenance in remote locations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Maintenance Controller reported that Pilots are unwilling to perform published manufacturer's recommended procedures to solve simple aircraft power-up faults.

Narrative: Captain called into Maintenance Control reporting that as soon as he put power on his aircraft he received the following CAS messages LG LEVER DISAG; E1 FUEL IMP BYP; PRESN AUTO FAIL and ENG NO DISPATCH. The status page showed ENG 1-2 SHORT DISPATCH. Received left and right MLG up and locked indications and a red hatched NLG gear unsafe indication along with aural 'landing gear' warning. The electrical status page displayed yellow X's over BATT 1; HOT BUS 1; DC BUS 1 and SHED BUS 1. As there was no previous history for any of these issues on the aircraft and Phenoms are known to produce these miscellaneous nuisance faults during a bad power up; Maintenance Control suggested performing the 'Airplane Power Reset' Procedure per Embraer's Phenom 300 Pilot's Operating Handbook (a manual for flight crews published by the OEM for ground operations of the aircraft). After I made this suggesting the crew's first response is 'do we have an approved procedure for that?' I once again referred the crew to their POH section 5-55 page 6. The crew refused to perform the OEM approved procedure to prevent a non issue from becoming an AOG event. The crew then called their Chief Pilot and reported this as a Safety issue. Once maintenance personnel arrived and performed a CMC download and submitted the data to the Embraer Contact Center for evaluation; they responded that it was some transient in the system; and that taking into consideration that all messages went away on the next power up; there was no need for any further troubleshooting on this matter. The technician then proceeded to perform the ops test on the Engine/Airframe unit with no faults found and the aircraft was returned to service. This situation has created a conflict in the tasks set for the Maintenance Control department. We are tasked with providing technical support and being a resource for the flight crews. When a Maintenance Controller offers a flight crew an OEM approved procedures from a Pilots Operating Handbook and is then accused of suggesting an unsafe procedure it creates unwanted stress in an already stressful work environment. Flight crews and Maintenance Controllers need to be notified if a crew is not allowed to follow a procedure listed in a Pilot Operating Handbook or other OEM published manuals for their specific aircraft or if maintenance control is not allowed to suggest these procedures. This should be addressed by the Heads of the maintenance and operations department to determine what the SOP should be for events similar to this in the future. As we are stressing aircraft availability during our Peak Period and now allowing aircraft to become AOG when an OEM approved procedure can keep an aircraft flying safely and prevent unneeded downtime for maintenance in remote locations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.