Narrative:

Attempted takeoff without configuring aircraft for takeoff; leading to an aborted takeoff. ZZZZ was using the south runways for departure; so we taxied out of the ramp single engine; and upon initial contact with ground; we were told we would now depart on runway 09R. I had the first officer (first officer) immediately start the right engine; and slowed our taxi pace to a crawl. After engine start; the first officer did a great job of changing the FMS for the new runway and SID and recalculating takeoff data. We briefed the changes; which were few; and were at the runway. We checked to ensure we had five minutes of run time on the second engine; and the first officer and I looked at each other and asked if we had done everything we needed to; and decided we had. The tower gave us line up and wait; and we went into position. Soon; takeoff clearance came; and I set eprs to about 1.10; gave the jet to the first officer; and he called for standard power. Upon pushing the thrust tile; the auto throttles would not engage. I checked the auto throttle arm switch armed; pushed thrust once more to no avail; then took the jet to discontinue the takeoff. Max speed attained was maybe 25 knot (airspeed never came alive). The takeoff warning horn never sounded because the power levers never went high enough to complete the logic. Once clear of the runway with the brake set; we discussed the situation; and noticed the flaps were still up--we had failed to configure and run the before takeoff check. We configured; and confirmed the auto throttles would come on properly once configured; ran the checklist; and departed without further incident. At its root; this event was caused by human factors issues arising from the time compression associated with the sudden change from a very long taxi for takeoff to the shortest taxi route we can get when leaving ZZZ. We have standard procedures backed up by checklists to ensure we are properly prepared for each phase of flight. In executing these procedures; we become used to a certain flow of activity as the flight progresses. One such point in the flow of activity is arrival at the hold short point for takeoff. Normally; we would have little left to do at this point but receive takeoff clearance; do the below-the-line items on the checklist; and depart. On this occasion; there was an intense flurry of activity packed into the last couple of hundred meters of taxi to start an engine; recalculate performance data and put it in the FMS; change the runway and SID in the FMS; and re brief the SID. When it was all done; we were sitting at the hold short line; number one for takeoff; and to our tired minds [in the early am] local time; this meant the next thing was to go below the line and depart; which we attempted to do. Thankfully; the aircraft has design features to alert us to being improperly configured for takeoff; and we captured and corrected our error. The first officer and I were aware of the potential for missing something in this dynamic; time compressed situation; as evidenced by our talking about whether we had done everything before we accepted the lineup and wait clearance; yet we still missed crucial steps. The question is; what can we do in a future situation like this to capture the problem before aircraft systems come to our rescue? Next time I am in a time compressed situation; I will take a moment to take the checklist in hand and brief from it with the first officer whether we have done everything on it. Trying to do such a review from memory proved ineffective on this occasion; but if I had looked at the checklist itself; it would soon have dawned on us that we had never done the before takeoff checklist; and had not configured.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Captain reports forgetting to accomplish the before takeoff checklist after planning a very long single engine taxi for takeoff. Then; the crew is advised of a runway change and a very short taxi. The engine is started but the flaps are not set for takeoff and not detected until auto thrust will not engage when the button is pushed.

Narrative: Attempted takeoff without configuring aircraft for takeoff; leading to an aborted takeoff. ZZZZ was using the south runways for departure; so we taxied out of the ramp single engine; and upon initial contact with ground; we were told we would now depart on runway 09R. I had the First Officer (FO) immediately start the R engine; and slowed our taxi pace to a crawl. After engine start; the FO did a great job of changing the FMS for the new runway and SID and recalculating takeoff data. We briefed the changes; which were few; and were at the runway. We checked to ensure we had five minutes of run time on the second engine; and the FO and I looked at each other and asked if we had done everything we needed to; and decided we had. The tower gave us line up and wait; and we went into position. Soon; takeoff clearance came; and I set EPRs to about 1.10; gave the jet to the FO; and he called for standard power. Upon pushing the thrust tile; the auto throttles would not engage. I checked the auto throttle arm switch armed; pushed thrust once more to no avail; then took the jet to discontinue the takeoff. Max speed attained was maybe 25 knot (airspeed never came alive). The takeoff warning horn never sounded because the power levers never went high enough to complete the logic. Once clear of the runway with the brake set; we discussed the situation; and noticed the flaps were still up--we had failed to configure and run the before takeoff check. We configured; and confirmed the auto throttles would come on properly once configured; ran the checklist; and departed without further incident. At its root; this event was caused by human factors issues arising from the time compression associated with the sudden change from a very long taxi for takeoff to the shortest taxi route we can get when leaving ZZZ. We have standard procedures backed up by checklists to ensure we are properly prepared for each phase of flight. In executing these procedures; we become used to a certain flow of activity as the flight progresses. One such point in the flow of activity is arrival at the hold short point for takeoff. Normally; we would have little left to do at this point but receive takeoff clearance; do the below-the-line items on the checklist; and depart. On this occasion; there was an intense flurry of activity packed into the last couple of hundred meters of taxi to start an engine; recalculate performance data and put it in the FMS; change the runway and SID in the FMS; and re brief the SID. When it was all done; we were sitting at the hold short line; number one for takeoff; and to our tired minds [in the early AM] local time; this meant the next thing was to go below the line and depart; which we attempted to do. Thankfully; the aircraft has design features to alert us to being improperly configured for takeoff; and we captured and corrected our error. The FO and I were aware of the potential for missing something in this dynamic; time compressed situation; as evidenced by our talking about whether we had done everything before we accepted the lineup and wait clearance; yet we still missed crucial steps. The question is; what can we do in a future situation like this to capture the problem before aircraft systems come to our rescue? Next time I am in a time compressed situation; I will take a moment to take the checklist in hand and brief from it with the FO whether we have done everything on it. Trying to do such a review from memory proved ineffective on this occasion; but if I had looked at the checklist itself; it would soon have dawned on us that we had never done the before takeoff checklist; and had not configured.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.