Narrative:

Situation: failure to make crossing restriction on arrival route. The captain was flying and I was handling the radios and FMC work. After programming the ATC crossing restriction in the FMC we still had about 40 mi before reaching the fix. At this time, I told the captain that we were high on the profile and he acknowledged. I then began to prepared our landing data and complete the required company communications. The captain took over ATC until I could complete my other duties. At some point during this process, I noticed that we were still high and I again said 'we look high to me' and repeated the crossing restriction to the captain. He acknowledged and deployed the speed brakes. When I finished the leading data we had about 5 mi before reaching the restriction and I then realized there was no way we would make the crossing altitude. I told the captain and then informed ATC. One factor involved was the captain was new with only 35 hours on the large transport/widebody transport. I have over a year on the widebody transport, but this was my first large transport trip. While the large transport/widebody transport are considered to be one 'type' by the FAA and my company, they have many differences. One of these being performance, so when I thought we were high, we were really very high, and the action taken by the captain to correct the descent path, which I thought would be adequate, wasn't. Along with this, the training I received for the large transport was inadequate. Ground school consisted of 6 hours of large transport differences that was nothing more than 'filling the squares' for the FAA. We didn't even have all of the large transport revisions for our widebody transport manuals at the time, and there wasn't any required flight or simulator training for the first officer's. Other factors include my distraction away from the descent profile in the form of company communication, preparation of the landing data and informing the cabin crew of our position so they could prepare the cabin for landing. At the time I thought I was still in the 'loop' enough to be aware of what was going on, but obviously I wasn't. Also maybe if I had told the captain that it didn't look we would make the crossing restriction instead of saying we looked high he might have made a greater effort to get down. (Note: after years of operating widebody transport aircraft, my company has just started adding the large transport to the fleet).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALT DEVIATION. UNDERSHOOT ON DESCENT. CROSSING RESTRICTION NOT MET.

Narrative: SITUATION: FAILURE TO MAKE XING RESTRICTION ON ARR ROUTE. THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND I WAS HANDLING THE RADIOS AND FMC WORK. AFTER PROGRAMMING THE ATC XING RESTRICTION IN THE FMC WE STILL HAD ABOUT 40 MI BEFORE REACHING THE FIX. AT THIS TIME, I TOLD THE CAPT THAT WE WERE HIGH ON THE PROFILE AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED. I THEN BEGAN TO PREPARED OUR LNDG DATA AND COMPLETE THE REQUIRED COMPANY COMS. THE CAPT TOOK OVER ATC UNTIL I COULD COMPLETE MY OTHER DUTIES. AT SOME POINT DURING THIS PROCESS, I NOTICED THAT WE WERE STILL HIGH AND I AGAIN SAID 'WE LOOK HIGH TO ME' AND REPEATED THE XING RESTRICTION TO THE CAPT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED AND DEPLOYED THE SPEED BRAKES. WHEN I FINISHED THE LEADING DATA WE HAD ABOUT 5 MI BEFORE REACHING THE RESTRICTION AND I THEN REALIZED THERE WAS NO WAY WE WOULD MAKE THE XING ALT. I TOLD THE CAPT AND THEN INFORMED ATC. ONE FACTOR INVOLVED WAS THE CAPT WAS NEW WITH ONLY 35 HRS ON THE LGT/WDB. I HAVE OVER A YEAR ON THE WDB, BUT THIS WAS MY FIRST LGT TRIP. WHILE THE LGT/WDB ARE CONSIDERED TO BE ONE 'TYPE' BY THE FAA AND MY COMPANY, THEY HAVE MANY DIFFERENCES. ONE OF THESE BEING PERFORMANCE, SO WHEN I THOUGHT WE WERE HIGH, WE WERE REALLY VERY HIGH, AND THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE CAPT TO CORRECT THE DSCNT PATH, WHICH I THOUGHT WOULD BE ADEQUATE, WASN'T. ALONG WITH THIS, THE TRAINING I RECEIVED FOR THE LGT WAS INADEQUATE. GND SCHOOL CONSISTED OF 6 HRS OF LGT DIFFERENCES THAT WAS NOTHING MORE THAN 'FILLING THE SQUARES' FOR THE FAA. WE DIDN'T EVEN HAVE ALL OF THE LGT REVISIONS FOR OUR WDB MANUALS AT THE TIME, AND THERE WASN'T ANY REQUIRED FLT OR SIMULATOR TRAINING FOR THE F/O'S. OTHER FACTORS INCLUDE MY DISTR AWAY FROM THE DSCNT PROFILE IN THE FORM OF COMPANY COM, PREPARATION OF THE LNDG DATA AND INFORMING THE CABIN CREW OF OUR POSITION SO THEY COULD PREPARE THE CABIN FOR LNDG. AT THE TIME I THOUGHT I WAS STILL IN THE 'LOOP' ENOUGH TO BE AWARE OF WHAT WAS GOING ON, BUT OBVIOUSLY I WASN'T. ALSO MAYBE IF I HAD TOLD THE CAPT THAT IT DIDN'T LOOK WE WOULD MAKE THE XING RESTRICTION INSTEAD OF SAYING WE LOOKED HIGH HE MIGHT HAVE MADE A GREATER EFFORT TO GET DOWN. (NOTE: AFTER YEARS OF OPERATING WDB ACFT, MY COMPANY HAS JUST STARTED ADDING THE LGT TO THE FLEET).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.