Narrative:

Enroute to mwa was unable to receive mwa ASOS due to pontiac's (pnt) ASOS overpowering the transmission. Well into the descent mwa ASOS was finally understandable with significant bleed over of pontiac ASOS. Based on ASOS information the crew set up for and briefed the RNAV runway 2 approach to mwa. The descent and in-range checklist which was delayed due to the lack of usable ASOS was completed. At this point we were approx. 10 minutes from touchdown. We received a handoff to a new kansas city center (kc) controller and on initial contact were told to 'descend to (unsure of exact altitude); expect ILS 20 at mwa and report when you have mwa weather'. Controller did not ask us which runway or approach we wanted but simply told us to expect the ILS 20. The crew quickly discussed whether to accept the ILS 20 or not and after calculating the crosswind/tailwind with the FMS decided to continue for the ILS 20. The crew began to set up for the ILS 20. Upon informing kc that we had the weather at mwa we were cleared direct to jonny; we had been proceeding direct to the field per our flight plan clearance. This created a shallow intercept angle to the final approach course. The next clearance was to descend to 2700 cleared ILS 20 mwa. Both pilots remarked that 2700 was the MSA and too high to cross jonny inbound on the ILS as the glideslope (GS) intercept altitude at jonny was 1990. We quickly discussed querying the controller about the altitude; assuming controller had misspoke; and then finished setting up and briefing the approach. The ILS 20 has a holding pattern in lieu of procedure turn at the LOM/IAF; this is also the missed approach holding pattern. We briefed the approach as a straight-in ILS with a missed approach back to the LOM to hold. (This was incorrect) the next transmission from kc was 'contact mwa tower on 128.4 cleared ILS 20 radar services terminated'. Rather than read back the clearance the first officer (first officer) requested 'we need a lower altitude to make the ILS 20'; expecting to be cleared to 2000. Kc cleared us to 2200 and repeated the instruction to contact tower cleared for the ILS 20. We contacted mwa tower stating we were 7 miles north inbound for the ILS 20; tower requested we report crossing jonny. We were approximately 2 miles from jonny and leveling off at 2200. The GS and localizer were both 'alive.' the aircraft was fully configured and on speed at 2200 approaching jonny. Just outside jonny the flight director and autopilot 'captured' the localizer and GS. A pitch down was commanded due to the GS being between 1-1.5 dots low. Due to the abruptness of the pitch down the pilot flying (PF) disengaged the autopilot. At this time we crossed jonny and the non pilot flying (npf) called the runway in sight. The PF requested the npf to re-engage the autopilot and continued the approach. The npf informed mwa tower that we were inside jonny on the ILS 20 and we were cleared to land. The rest of the approach and landing were uneventful. As tower cleared us into the ramp the controller requested we call him on the phone. We disembarked our passengers and began the process of 'turning' the airplane. Upon re-entering the flight deck to depart the captain informed a conversation with the tower controller who had been monitoring our transmissions with kc center [revealed] that we had not been cleared for a straight in ILS as we both believed and briefed and; therefore; had neglected to perform the required procedure turn on the approach. The tower controller had informed the captain that this is a common problem at this airport on that approach and that they have been trying to find a solution for quite some time.the crew had been flying together for five days and had performed four arrivals into non-towered airports and three arrivals into towered airports. Each non-towered airport was served by an approach control or center facility that allowed for vectoring onto final. The towered airports were radar equipped. Mwa was towered but had neither radar nor did ks have the ability to vector us onto final; a factor missed by the crew. We expected to fly a straight-in ILS and due to several factors including compressed workload and phrasing from center we failed to recognize that we weren't on vectors to final and therefore needed to perform the entire approach procedure complete with procedure turn.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reports bleed through to MWA ASOS from PNT ASOS even though it is far away and on a different frequency. Also reported was the omission of the mandatory procedure turn at JONNY on the ILS 20 at MWA.

Narrative: Enroute to MWA was unable to receive MWA ASOS due to Pontiac's (PNT) ASOS overpowering the transmission. Well into the descent MWA ASOS was finally understandable with significant bleed over of Pontiac ASOS. Based on ASOS information the crew set up for and briefed the RNAV RWY 2 approach to MWA. The Descent and In-Range checklist which was delayed due to the lack of usable ASOS was completed. At this point we were approx. 10 minutes from touchdown. We received a handoff to a new Kansas City Center (KC) controller and on initial contact were told to 'descend to (unsure of exact altitude); expect ILS 20 at MWA and report when you have MWA weather'. Controller did not ask us which runway or approach we wanted but simply told us to expect the ILS 20. The crew quickly discussed whether to accept the ILS 20 or not and after calculating the crosswind/tailwind with the FMS decided to continue for the ILS 20. The crew began to set up for the ILS 20. Upon informing KC that we had the weather at MWA we were cleared direct to JONNY; we had been proceeding direct to the field per our flight plan clearance. This created a shallow intercept angle to the final approach course. The next clearance was to descend to 2700 cleared ILS 20 MWA. Both pilots remarked that 2700 was the MSA and too high to cross JONNY inbound on the ILS as the glideslope (GS) intercept altitude at JONNY was 1990. We quickly discussed querying the controller about the altitude; assuming controller had misspoke; and then finished setting up and briefing the approach. The ILS 20 has a holding pattern in lieu of procedure turn at the LOM/IAF; this is also the missed approach holding pattern. We briefed the approach as a straight-in ILS with a missed approach back to the LOM to hold. (This was incorrect) The next transmission from KC was 'contact MWA tower on 128.4 cleared ILS 20 radar services terminated'. Rather than read back the clearance the First Officer (FO) requested 'we need a lower altitude to make the ILS 20'; expecting to be cleared to 2000. KC cleared us to 2200 and repeated the instruction to contact tower cleared for the ILS 20. We contacted MWA tower stating we were 7 miles north inbound for the ILS 20; tower requested we report crossing JONNY. We were approximately 2 miles from JONNY and leveling off at 2200. The GS and localizer were both 'alive.' The aircraft was fully configured and on speed at 2200 approaching JONNY. Just outside JONNY the Flight director and autopilot 'captured' the localizer and GS. A pitch down was commanded due to the GS being between 1-1.5 dots low. Due to the abruptness of the pitch down the pilot flying (PF) disengaged the autopilot. At this time we crossed JONNY and the non pilot flying (NPF) called the runway in sight. The PF requested the NPF to re-engage the autopilot and continued the approach. The NPF informed MWA tower that we were inside JONNY on the ILS 20 and we were cleared to land. The rest of the approach and landing were uneventful. As tower cleared us into the ramp the controller requested we call him on the phone. We disembarked our passengers and began the process of 'turning' the airplane. Upon re-entering the flight deck to depart the Captain informed a conversation with the tower controller who had been monitoring our transmissions with KC Center [revealed] that we had not been cleared for a straight in ILS as we both believed and briefed and; therefore; had neglected to perform the required procedure turn on the approach. The tower controller had informed the Captain that this is a common problem at this airport on that approach and that they have been trying to find a solution for quite some time.The crew had been flying together for five days and had performed four arrivals into non-towered airports and three arrivals into towered airports. Each non-towered airport was served by an approach control or center facility that allowed for vectoring onto final. The towered airports were radar equipped. MWA was towered but had neither radar nor did KS have the ability to vector us onto final; a factor missed by the crew. We expected to fly a straight-in ILS and due to several factors including compressed workload and phrasing from center we failed to recognize that we weren't on vectors to final and therefore needed to perform the entire approach procedure complete with procedure turn.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.