Narrative:

Shortly after push; and prior to engine start; received EICAS message hydraulic pump demand C-2. Called local maintenance and was told to come back to gate. Was eventually given a MEL for this failed hydraulic pump that did not involve crew action or performance penalty. When I investigated this MEL; and talked to local mechanics; I then discovered that it was not the correct MEL for the air driven pump we had issues with. ..And that mechanics had also pulled circuit breaker on electric pump C2 in same center system. Upon a discussion with maintenance control; and local maintenance; we discovered that wrong MEL was being applied. I began to doubt if maintenance control or local maintenance understood the problem; let alone how to fix or properly secure broken pump. I have also had several prior MEL issues in the preceding weeks that have given me concern that I was not getting the real information I needed to make a good decision about accepting this aircraft on a 10 hour flight. In all three of these cases I was given false information from maintenance control about the history and condition of the airplane. Based on these prior MEL's incidences and deferral; as well as the constantly changing MEL's of this flight; I did not feel comfortable with accepting the airplane. I told this to duty manager and dispatcher. The duty manager then connected me to the B-777 tech department who told me that he believed aircraft was safe to accept with the MEL that he was given (29-11-B). I continued to debate this with my crew; as well as the duty manager about taking airplane; but just when we began to feel more comfortable with the idea of taking aircraft; with this MEL; the mechanics would do a test and find something else. Up to 4 different MEL's were issued to us in the course of the evening. I explained to the duty manager and the B-777 tech department that this was more of issue to me than just the original EICAS message and this one MEL. They kept telling me that this was the only issue. I also explained that I was sitting in the cockpit and hearing and seeing a lot of things that caused me to doubt if this was merely a single bad pump; or possibly several bad pumps; or even a pump that may not turn off and possibly overheat. But the cell phone connection was very poor; and there was a lot of talking in the cockpit as the mechanics performed all their checks; which I was watching very closely; and not liking what I was seeing. This coupled with these prior recent MEL issues that resulted in multiple systems failing once in flight; on several prior flights; gave me pause for accepting airplane. But the duty manager and the B-777 tech department did not agree with this. There were constant calls and ACARS coming in from crew scheduling; the duty manager and dispatch as well. The gate agent also was asking me to 'make a decision and or to cancel the flight' which I told her was not appropriate at this time. All of these people constantly badgering and arm twisting me and my crew; played a role in our fatigue. But the core issue was that I did not feel comfortable taking airplanes knowing the potential for other pumps and systems failing or overheating on such a long flight; especially given my recent history with maintenance control and local maintenance in the last few weeks. Eventually; since local maintenance could not fix the pump by the time we hit our crew critical off-time (cco) time; and had told me they would not be able to do so within next hour or so; we agreed that we would be too tired to waive. As we came closer to the cco; the dispatcher asked us if we would waive; and we all agreed that we were too tired to safely begin a 10 hour flight this late.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 flight crew receives an EICAS status message during push back indicating the C2 Demand Hyd-pump had failed; and returns to the gate. The pump is deferred using the wrong MEL; which the crew detects; requiring a great deal of extra time and effort on the part of maintenance and eventually resulting in flight cancellation due to crew fatigue.

Narrative: Shortly after push; and prior to engine start; received EICAS message HYD PUMP DEMAND C-2. Called local maintenance and was told to come back to gate. Was eventually given a MEL for this failed Hydraulic Pump that did not involve crew action or performance penalty. When I investigated this MEL; and talked to local mechanics; I then discovered that it was not the correct MEL for the air driven pump we had issues with. ..and that mechanics had also pulled circuit breaker on electric pump C2 in same center system. Upon a discussion with Maintenance Control; and local Maintenance; we discovered that wrong MEL was being applied. I began to doubt if Maintenance Control or local maintenance understood the problem; let alone how to fix or properly secure broken pump. I have also had several prior MEL issues in the preceding weeks that have given me concern that I was not getting the real information I needed to make a good decision about accepting this aircraft on a 10 hour flight. In all three of these cases I was given false information from Maintenance Control about the history and condition of the airplane. Based on these prior MEL's incidences and deferral; as well as the constantly changing MEL's of this flight; I did not feel comfortable with accepting the airplane. I told this to Duty Manager and Dispatcher. The Duty Manager then connected me to the B-777 Tech Department who told me that he believed aircraft was safe to accept with the MEL that he was given (29-11-B). I continued to debate this with my crew; as well as the Duty Manager about taking airplane; but just when we began to feel more comfortable with the idea of taking aircraft; with this MEL; the mechanics would do a test and find something else. Up to 4 different MEL's were issued to us in the course of the evening. I explained to the Duty Manager and the B-777 Tech Department that this was more of issue to me than just the original EICAS message and this one MEL. They kept telling me that this was the only issue. I also explained that I was sitting in the cockpit and hearing and seeing a lot of things that caused me to doubt if this was merely a single bad pump; or possibly several bad pumps; or even a pump that may not turn off and possibly overheat. But the cell phone connection was very poor; and there was a lot of talking in the cockpit as the mechanics performed all their checks; which I was watching very closely; and not liking what I was seeing. This coupled with these prior recent MEL issues that resulted in multiple systems failing once in flight; on several prior flights; gave me pause for accepting airplane. But the Duty Manager and the B-777 Tech Department did not agree with this. There were constant calls and ACARS coming in from crew scheduling; the Duty Manager and dispatch as well. The gate agent also was asking me to 'make a decision and or to cancel the flight' which I told her was NOT appropriate at this time. All of these people constantly badgering and arm twisting me and my crew; played a role in our fatigue. But the core issue was that I did NOT feel comfortable taking airplanes knowing the potential for other pumps and systems failing or overheating on such a long flight; especially given my recent history with Maintenance Control and local maintenance in the last few weeks. Eventually; since local maintenance could not fix the pump by the time we hit our Crew Critical Off-Time (CCO) time; and had told me they would not be able to do so within next hour or so; we agreed that we would be too tired to waive. As we came closer to the CCO; the dispatcher asked us if we would waive; and we all agreed that we were too tired to safely begin a 10 hour flight this late.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.