Narrative:

The first officer was flying the aircraft a. I returned from the lavatory, he stated that we were given a clearance to cross 40 west of allentown at 18,000'. It was instantly apparent to me that we were not going to make the restriction. I brought this to the attention of the first officer. He said he was waiting for the pms to roll the nose over and 'we should make it'. I told him that if he was flying the aircraft he needed to make it do what he wanted it to do. It was too late. We crossed 40 west of allentown 1000' too high. After landing at lga, we discussed the incident at some length. Among his responses to me were that his crossing was 'close enough for government work', and 'their radar can't ell our position within a couple of miles'. I said to him, 'you don't even care, do you?' his response was 'no. Not really'. To prevent this kind of situation is difficult in that when one comes to work one expects a certain level of competence and attitude from his first officer. He did not display this lackadaisical attitude before the incident. I would not have left the cockpit if he had. Not because of his lack of ability, but because of his attitude. There is no doubt in my mind that this incident was deliberate. To correct the situation, I will deliver a copy of this report to our chief pilot.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG ALT DEVIATION CROSSING RESTRICTION NOT MET.

Narrative: THE F/O WAS FLYING THE ACFT A. I RETURNED FROM THE LAVATORY, HE STATED THAT WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO CROSS 40 W OF ALLENTOWN AT 18,000'. IT WAS INSTANTLY APPARENT TO ME THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE THE RESTRICTION. I BROUGHT THIS TO THE ATTN OF THE F/O. HE SAID HE WAS WAITING FOR THE PMS TO ROLL THE NOSE OVER AND 'WE SHOULD MAKE IT'. I TOLD HIM THAT IF HE WAS FLYING THE ACFT HE NEEDED TO MAKE IT DO WHAT HE WANTED IT TO DO. IT WAS TOO LATE. WE CROSSED 40 W OF ALLENTOWN 1000' TOO HIGH. AFTER LNDG AT LGA, WE DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT AT SOME LENGTH. AMONG HIS RESPONSES TO ME WERE THAT HIS XING WAS 'CLOSE ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT WORK', AND 'THEIR RADAR CAN'T ELL OUR POSITION WITHIN A COUPLE OF MILES'. I SAID TO HIM, 'YOU DON'T EVEN CARE, DO YOU?' HIS RESPONSE WAS 'NO. NOT REALLY'. TO PREVENT THIS KIND OF SITUATION IS DIFFICULT IN THAT WHEN ONE COMES TO WORK ONE EXPECTS A CERTAIN LEVEL OF COMPETENCE AND ATTITUDE FROM HIS F/O. HE DID NOT DISPLAY THIS LACKADAISICAL ATTITUDE BEFORE THE INCIDENT. I WOULD NOT HAVE LEFT THE COCKPIT IF HE HAD. NOT BECAUSE OF HIS LACK OF ABILITY, BUT BECAUSE OF HIS ATTITUDE. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS DELIBERATE. TO CORRECT THE SITUATION, I WILL DELIVER A COPY OF THIS REPORT TO OUR CHIEF PLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.