Narrative:

At cruise at FL430 and 1:10 minutes into flight a red doors warning light illuminated. Abnormal checklist was accomplished and a diversion was conducted. While descending through FL290 the red doors light extinguished. Cabin pressurization functioned normally but passenger and flight attendant commented that they felt a rapid pressure change in their ears which was more than likely associated with a 4000 fpm descent rate and the cabin controller rating higher due to the descent. This is the fourth known event for the same issue. The company indicated they have an agreement with dassault to MEL the door warning light system which is totally bogus. The system can be MEL'ed if the doors light does not illuminate with a door open. The MEL is poorly worded and is subject to interpretation and needs to be revised. In our situation the system was functioning as designed. In the past the issue was MEL'ed; a switch cleaned signoff only for the issue to be repeated. A trend has been established here to inappropriately MEL the system solely to keep the aircraft generating revenue. I received push back from maintenance control as well as the assistant chief pilot and was able to reach an agreement to down the aircraft.due to the fact this was a passenger leg with a recovery aircraft enroute and a crew swap compounded by company pushback; there was unnecessary tremendous operation pressures placed on myself and my crew. This is a paramount safety issue both with maintenance and scheduling; and is an indication of the management dysfunction currently residing within our operation.the FAA needs to conduct a thorough investigation regarding the unsafe practices currently exercised within the company. Although the company boast an industry leading sms level 4 certification the bottom line is the decisions are dictated by cost. Moral is at an all-time low; the entire company is overworked; the empowerment the employees once had has been stripped and controlled by the few that have shown a propensity to push the limits.as a crew member the operational pressures placed on me on a daily basis are extreme. Something has to give before the final link in the error chain is completed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DA2000 flight crew reports diverting for a door warning light at FL430 in an aircraft that had a history of apparently false door warnings. The crew does not believe that MEL 52-1-0; used to defer an inoperative warning light; is applicable.

Narrative: At cruise at FL430 and 1:10 minutes into flight a red doors warning light illuminated. Abnormal checklist was accomplished and a diversion was conducted. While descending through FL290 the red doors light extinguished. Cabin pressurization functioned normally but passenger and Flight Attendant commented that they felt a rapid pressure change in their ears which was more than likely associated with a 4000 fpm descent rate and the cabin controller rating higher due to the descent. This is the fourth known event for the same issue. The company indicated they have an agreement with Dassault to MEL the door warning light system which is totally bogus. The system can be MEL'ed IF the doors light does not illuminate with a door open. The MEL is poorly worded and is subject to interpretation and needs to be revised. In our situation the system was functioning as designed. In the past the issue was MEL'ed; a switch cleaned signoff only for the issue to be repeated. A trend has been established here to inappropriately MEL the system solely to keep the aircraft generating revenue. I received push back from Maintenance Control as well as the Assistant Chief Pilot and was able to reach an agreement to down the aircraft.Due to the fact this was a passenger leg with a recovery aircraft enroute and a crew swap compounded by company pushback; there was unnecessary tremendous operation pressures placed on myself and my crew. This is a paramount safety issue both with maintenance and scheduling; and is an indication of the management dysfunction currently residing within our operation.The FAA needs to conduct a thorough investigation regarding the unsafe practices currently exercised within the company. Although the company boast an industry leading SMS level 4 certification the bottom line is the decisions are dictated by cost. Moral is at an all-time low; the entire company is overworked; the empowerment the employees once had has been stripped and controlled by the few that have shown a propensity to push the limits.As a crew member the operational pressures placed on me on a daily basis are extreme. Something has to give before the final link in the error chain is completed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.