Narrative:

While planning our descent into ZZZ we found that our requests for a lower altitudes were consistently denied from center; 'due to traffic'. Although this turned out to be a mere annoyance compared to the weather that was seemingly trying to box us in.during this time we were deviating to the west of a line of weather between us and the airport. The weather at the field during our arrival was being reported as heavy rain; thunderstorms with a broken ceiling at 4;700 feet. The landing runway at the time was runway 11. The winds were being reported at 150 degrees at 4 knots. With that report (ATIS information alpha at the time) and using a hole in the weather that was located off an extended centerline from runway 11; we planned to make our arrival from the west.we are now tracking south still planning for runway 11. At the last minute center told us to plan for runway 28 and a turn back to the northeast to heading 030. A left turn to heading 030 would have put us directly into the storm. I told center the only way we could take that heading is if it was a right turn to circle us away from the now growing rapidly thunderstorm. I indicated to center that our radar was only showing a hole in the weather for runway 11. We were then given a frequency change to approach. Approach then made multiple attempts to get us to take a turn to directly enter the downwind for runway 29. After telling him we were unable to do so with the weather we received a very long drawn out response that '[another carrier] did it'; 'a cherokee did it'; 'everybody else has been going that way'. He then made an attempt to contact [another] flight and get a 'ride report' seemingly to further entice us to accept his clearance. Approach was now applying a significant amount of pressure to us to fly directly into in very large thunderstorm. Not only [did] this storm visually appear to be in the dissipating stage; but our radar showed multiple textbook radar shadows. Analysis of the storm showed an extreme level of precipitation and a very large risk of hail directly in the area that approach wanted us to fly. I told approach that his delaying our arrival has put us in a minimum fuel situation should we need to divert to our alternate. I then told approach that we would need to go back to center and divert back to the north to go around the now very large storm between us and the airport. After that it further seemed like approach was trying again to get a report of this storm from a [other] aircraft who was in the area; seemingly ignoring the nature of our situation. This back and forth increased my anxiety level significantly as my experience is telling me that we need to either get on the ground now or divert.finally approach gave up on trying to debate with us and allowed us to return to center and head back north around the storm. We then went back to center and approach had misinformed him that we wanted to go hold somewhere. There was also another comment about other aircraft not doing what we wanted to do. At this point I reiterated to center that we are in a minimum fuel state and there will be no flying through thunderstorms today for us; and we are not to be further delayed. He became very chatty on the radio to us at this point which for us is wasting precious time and fuel. The only way I was able to draw a clearance out of him was to ask him for his supervisor's number.we finally now got the clearance to fly away from the storm to the north which we did and then to the east and then south to enter a right base for runway 29. During this time we were able to see the storm better visually and while maneuvering for the base and final make another analysis of the storm with the aircraft's radar. The storm was producing large amounts of precipitation; with severe lightning.while making our turn back to the north I sent two ACARS messages to dispatch to inform him of our situation. I received a response of'the airport is clear'. This response made me feel that dispatch did not understand the severity or that just because it's clear at the field doesn't mean we might [not] be dealing with weather between us and the field. Due to his response I did not feel any further communication to dispatch would have generated any worthwhile information and assistance. In short his one line response made me lose complete confidence in his ability to provide worthwhile timely information. While on final to runway 29 we observed a wall of rain being produced by the storm with frequently in cloud and cloud to ground lightning. Had we flown through that storm I am confident that we would had either been struck by lightning; severe risk of hail damage to the aircraft; and the turbulence risk was out of the question. During our deviating we consistently evaluated our fuel situation and made the decision that only one attempt would be made to land at. Although we landed with slightly less fuel than what we would have needed to fly to [our alternate] and land with the full 45 minutes of fuel; the risk of the divert with weather building rapidly around us; lost confidence of the dispatcher to support us.the risk taking by [another] flight; the cherokee and [other] aircraft mentioned to us by the approach controller does not automatically mean that I am going to accept those same risks when from my vantage point there is a much less risk option available. The pressure applied to us by the two controllers was unacceptable. It is now been almost a full day since the incident and I have monday morning quarterbacked myself to death over this. One thing comes to mind and that is as we all know weather is ever changing. In these situations usually more than not; rapidly. I will not ever know what the [other carrier] flight and the other general aviation folks saw on their weather resources as I was not in the flight deck with them.however...I was able to pull up the radar history [from a website] when I got to the hotel. I sure you can imagine it was the absolute first thing I did. I was questioning myself to see what ATC and dispatch would/should have been able to see; and now wonder why on earth would they think we would fly through a storm that big? The storm is very clearly identified and if you picture our route you can see our reason for not wanting to fly through/under the storm. The 'hole' that we had planned to go through closed; ATC no longer accepting the 11 arrivals and dealing with two controls that seemed to be inconvenienced by our weather deviations were the threats of the day.back to monday morning quarterbacking myself...although not mentioned above we landed with 200lbs less than the fuel needed to divert; and then fly for 45 minutes. Not the worst but; this could have been better. I should have used my emergency authority 200lbs sooner.I should have been more direct with the approach controller and not let him talk up a storm (pun intended). The miscommunication from the approach controller when we went back to the center controller that we 'wanted to go hold somewhere'; further wasted time and precious fuel. The dispatcher seemingly ignoring the fact that we are in a minimum fuel state and still diverting around severe weather by responding that everything is fine at ZZZ made me prioritize were I spent my time. Because of his response I did not feel anytime spent re-conveying the message would have not helped our situation and my time was better focused continuing to deviate away from and around the weather.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145LR Captain reported being pressured by ATC to accept a clearance through severe weather at his destination.

Narrative: While planning our descent into ZZZ we found that our requests for a lower altitudes were consistently denied from center; 'due to traffic'. Although this turned out to be a mere annoyance compared to the weather that was seemingly trying to box us in.During this time we were deviating to the west of a line of weather between us and the airport. The weather at the field during our arrival was being reported as heavy rain; thunderstorms with a broken ceiling at 4;700 feet. The landing runway at the time was runway 11. The winds were being reported at 150 degrees at 4 knots. With that report (ATIS information alpha at the time) and using a hole in the weather that was located off an extended centerline from runway 11; we planned to make our arrival from the west.We are now tracking south still planning for runway 11. At the last minute center told us to plan for runway 28 and a turn back to the northeast to heading 030. A left turn to heading 030 would have put us directly into the storm. I told center the only way we could take that heading is if it was a right turn to circle us away from the now growing rapidly thunderstorm. I indicated to center that our radar was only showing a hole in the weather for runway 11. We were then given a frequency change to approach. Approach then made multiple attempts to get us to take a turn to directly enter the downwind for runway 29. After telling him we were unable to do so with the weather we received a very long drawn out response that '[another carrier] did it'; 'a Cherokee did it'; 'everybody else has been going that way'. He then made an attempt to contact [another] flight and get a 'ride report' seemingly to further entice us to accept his clearance. Approach was now applying a significant amount of pressure to us to fly directly into in very large thunderstorm. Not only [did] this storm visually appear to be in the dissipating stage; but our radar showed multiple textbook radar shadows. Analysis of the storm showed an extreme level of precipitation and a very large risk of hail directly in the area that approach wanted us to fly. I told approach that his delaying our arrival has put us in a minimum fuel situation should we need to divert to our alternate. I then told approach that we would need to go back to center and divert back to the north to go around the now very large storm between us and the airport. After that it further seemed like approach was trying again to get a report of this storm from a [other] aircraft who was in the area; seemingly ignoring the nature of our situation. This back and forth increased my anxiety level significantly as my experience is telling me that we need to either get on the ground NOW or divert.Finally approach gave up on trying to debate with us and allowed us to return to center and head back north around the storm. We then went back to Center and approach had misinformed him that we wanted to go hold somewhere. There was also another comment about other aircraft not doing what we wanted to do. At this point I reiterated to center that we are in a minimum fuel state and there will be no flying through thunderstorms today for us; and we are not to be further delayed. He became very chatty on the radio to us at this point which for us is wasting precious time and fuel. The only way I was able to draw a clearance out of him was to ask him for his supervisor's number.We finally now got the clearance to fly away from the storm to the north which we did and then to the east and then south to enter a right base for runway 29. During this time we were able to see the storm better visually and while maneuvering for the base and final make another analysis of the storm with the aircraft's radar. The storm was producing large amounts of precipitation; with severe lightning.While making our turn back to the north I sent two ACARS messages to dispatch to inform him of our situation. I received a response of'the airport is clear'. This response made me feel that dispatch did not understand the severity or that just because it's clear at the field doesn't mean we might [not] be dealing with weather between us and the field. Due to his response I did not feel any further communication to dispatch would have generated any worthwhile information and assistance. In short his one line response made me lose complete confidence in his ability to provide worthwhile timely information. While on final to runway 29 we observed a wall of rain being produced by the storm with frequently in cloud and cloud to ground lightning. Had we flown through that storm I am confident that we would had either been struck by lightning; severe risk of hail damage to the aircraft; and the turbulence risk was out of the question. During our deviating we consistently evaluated our fuel situation and made the decision that only one attempt would be made to land at. Although we landed with slightly less fuel than what we would have needed to fly to [our alternate] and land with the full 45 minutes of fuel; the risk of the divert with weather building rapidly around us; lost confidence of the dispatcher to support us.The risk taking by [another] flight; the Cherokee and [other] aircraft mentioned to us by the approach controller does not automatically mean that I am going to accept those same risks when from my vantage point there is a MUCH less risk option available. The pressure applied to us by the two controllers was unacceptable. It is now been almost a full day since the incident and I have Monday morning quarterbacked myself to death over this. One thing comes to mind and that is as we all know weather is ever changing. In these situations usually more than not; rapidly. I will not ever know what the [other carrier] flight and the other general aviation folks saw on their weather resources as I was not in the flight deck with them.However...I was able to pull up the radar history [from a website] when I got to the hotel. I sure you can imagine it was the absolute first thing I did. I was questioning myself to see what ATC and Dispatch would/should have been able to see; and now wonder why on earth would they think we would fly through a storm that big? The storm is very clearly identified and if you picture our route you can see our reason for not wanting to fly through/under the storm. The 'hole' that we had planned to go through closed; ATC no longer accepting the 11 arrivals and dealing with two controls that seemed to be inconvenienced by our weather deviations were the threats of the day.Back to Monday morning quarterbacking myself...Although not mentioned above we landed with 200lbs less than the fuel needed to divert; and then fly for 45 minutes. Not the worst BUT; this could have been better. I should have used my emergency authority 200lbs sooner.I should have been more direct with the approach controller and not let him talk up a storm (pun intended). The miscommunication from the approach controller when we went back to the center controller that we 'wanted to go hold somewhere'; further wasted time and precious fuel. The dispatcher seemingly ignoring the fact that we are in a minimum fuel state and still diverting around severe weather by responding that everything is fine at ZZZ made me prioritize were I spent my time. Because of his response I did not feel anytime spent re-conveying the message would have not helped our situation and my time was better focused continuing to deviate away from and around the weather.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.