Narrative:

Approach into eug at night first officer was flying pilot. ATC cleared us for descent. First officer briefed a descent fix he put into the FMS. I noted that the fix appeared high but from his brief it appeared this was his technique to do it this way. I planned to query the first officer again about the descent point but became distracted by descent duties: AWOS; FMS perf; call to operations. Visually runway was in sight. I stated that we are going to be too high at this descent rate. First officer made corrections but still too high so we discussed 3 options: s-turns; 360; overfly airport and enter downwind. We decided a 360 turn. I told ATC approach control that we were high and requested a 360 deg turn to lose altitude. ATC stated; 'cleared approach to eug; maneuver at your discretion and change to advisory frequency'. The first officer commenced a 360 turn to lose altitude. During the turn at about the base leg to the rwy; PAPI indicated aircraft to be on glide path in the turn to the runway. I stated to the first officer 'shallow it out' 'this looks good'. The first officer continued to descend and I felt the first officer was attempting to shallow the descent rate but not enough to maintain the required path to the airport. I stated again to 'shallow it out'. Moments later audible GPWS caution. I told the first officer to go around; he complied and immediately executed a go around. We then configured for a stable approach and landed in eug uneventfully. As the captain and pilot monitoring the nature of my commands were not clear enough to elicit the required response from the pilot flying. I should have been more assertive as soon as I noticed the approaching undesired aircraft state. As the captain and pilot monitoring I should have queried the flying pilot about his descent planning so that we were both briefed for the descent prior to starting the descent duties and checklist. This would have allowed us both to clear any discrepancies about the approach plan. I could have better monitored the descent situation throughout and also have confirmed with the first officer his descent plan. The nature of my commands were not clear enough to elicit the required response from the pilot flying. If I had instead issued a 'go-around' command at the starting of the approach when I realized we were too high; we could have bought ourselves plenty of time to descend for the runway. Also I should have been more assertive as soon as I noticed the aircraft approaching the undesired aircraft state. Instead of saying; 'shallow it out' I should have been clear to the first officer so that there would be no question about the approaching undesirable aircraft state again; 'go-around' would have been best in this case. From this event I have learned (have been reminded why) trying to save a bad approach caused by poor descent planning is not a suitable solution. A go around at first notice will make sure that this does not happen again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a night visual approach to EUG.

Narrative: Approach into EUG at night FO was flying pilot. ATC cleared us for descent. FO briefed a descent fix he put into the FMS. I noted that the fix appeared high but from his brief it appeared this was his technique to do it this way. I planned to query the FO again about the descent point but became distracted by descent duties: AWOS; FMS PERF; call to operations. Visually Runway was in sight. I stated that we are going to be too high at this descent rate. FO made corrections but still too high so we discussed 3 options: S-Turns; 360; overfly airport and enter downwind. We decided a 360 turn. I told ATC Approach Control that we were high and requested a 360 deg turn to lose altitude. ATC stated; 'cleared approach to EUG; maneuver at your discretion and change to advisory frequency'. The FO commenced a 360 turn to lose altitude. During the turn at about the base leg to the rwy; PAPI indicated aircraft to be on glide path in the turn to the runway. I stated to the FO 'shallow it out' 'this looks good'. The FO continued to descend and I felt the FO was attempting to shallow the descent rate but not enough to maintain the required path to the airport. I stated again to 'shallow it out'. Moments later audible GPWS caution. I told the first officer to GO AROUND; He complied and immediately executed a go around. We then configured for a stable approach and landed in EUG uneventfully. As the Captain and Pilot Monitoring the nature of my commands were not clear enough to elicit the required response from the Pilot Flying. I should have been more assertive as soon as I noticed the approaching undesired aircraft state. As the Captain and Pilot Monitoring I should have queried the flying pilot about his descent planning so that we were both briefed for the descent prior to starting the descent duties and checklist. This would have allowed us both to clear any discrepancies about the approach plan. I could have better monitored the descent situation throughout and also have confirmed with the FO his descent plan. The nature of my commands were not clear enough to elicit the required response from the Pilot Flying. If I had instead issued a 'GO-AROUND' command at the starting of the approach when I realized we were too high; we could have bought ourselves plenty of time to descend for the runway. Also I should have been more assertive as soon as I noticed the aircraft approaching the undesired aircraft state. Instead of saying; 'Shallow it out' I should have been clear to the FO so that there would be no question about the approaching undesirable aircraft state Again; 'GO-AROUND' would have been best in this case. From this event I have learned (have been reminded why) trying to save a bad approach caused by poor descent planning is not a suitable solution. A go around at first notice will make sure that this does not happen again.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.