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Attributes | |
ACN | 1276539 |
Time | |
Date | 201507 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZLA.ARTCC |
State Reference | CA |
Environment | |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Large Transport |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Airspace Violation All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Aircraft X was climbing to FL350; I had to stop the aircraft at FL330 for incoming flights descending to FL340. I used an auto 'a' to handoff aircraft X to ZAB; and it auto handed off the plane to ZAB65 (owns FL340 and above). I had weather deviations going into phx and recently had combined up with another sector (ZLA12) with sector 31. Traffic management unit (tmu) had re-routed several lax landing planes into my sky for thunderstorms elsewhere. I switched the plane to ZAB65; and when I went to take the aircraft off my scope I realized it was in ZAB 91's sky. ZLA12 had to be re-opened for volume/complexity in ZLA31 sky.the reasoning for the combination was for training at ZLA09 d-side (which is where ZLA12 is normally combined). While staffing was on the low side; ZLA09 had zero planes when I was asked to combine ZLA12 at ZLA31. Training should not dictate taking safety risks. If the training is that important; then overtime should've been authorized.the auto hand off when a plane is temped at FL330 should go to the controller who owns FL330; not the controller who at some distant time in the future may or may not climb the aircraft into their sky. This would be like the approach auto directing to a high altitude sector in the center? Safety should be to protect the aircrafts current altitude; not to expedite a planes potential to climb at the risk violating airspace.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZLA Controller hands off an aircraft to another sector. The handoff; because of a Temporary Altitude in the scratch pad area; goes to another sector. The handoff should have went to the sector that the aircraft was 'temped' at; not one that is possibly a future scope.
Narrative: Aircraft X was climbing to FL350; I had to stop the aircraft at FL330 for incoming flights descending to FL340. I used an auto 'A' to handoff Aircraft X to ZAB; and it auto handed off the plane to ZAB65 (owns FL340 and above). I had weather deviations going into PHX and recently had combined up with another sector (ZLA12) with sector 31. Traffic Management Unit (TMU) had re-routed several LAX landing planes into my sky for thunderstorms elsewhere. I switched the plane to ZAB65; and when I went to take the aircraft off my scope I realized it was in ZAB 91's sky. ZLA12 had to be re-opened for volume/complexity in ZLA31 sky.The reasoning for the combination was for training at ZLA09 D-side (which is where ZLA12 is normally combined). While staffing was on the low side; ZLA09 had zero planes when I was asked to combine ZLA12 at ZLA31. Training should not dictate taking safety risks. If the training is that important; then overtime should've been authorized.The auto hand off when a plane is temped at FL330 should go to the controller who owns FL330; not the controller who at some distant time in the future may or may not climb the aircraft into their sky. This would be like the approach auto directing to a high altitude sector in the center? Safety should be to protect the aircrafts current altitude; not to expedite a planes potential to climb at the risk violating airspace.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.