Narrative:

While climbing through approximately 10;000 ft MSL; we experienced a torque surge from the #1 engine. This was accompanied by the following engine indications and cautions: torque on #1 engine went to approximately 110% (red indication on ed (electronic display)); #1 pec (propeller electronic control) caution; #1 prop overspeed (apx. 1060 rpm; yellow indication on ed); 'powerplant' message.the #1 engine torque stabilized at approximately 65-68%. We ran the appropriate emergency checklists; which resulted in an engine shutdown. I advised dispatch that we would be returning; and declared an emergency with ATC. I also made a quick PA to the passengers; and asked the flight attendants to prepare the cabin for a normal landing. The approach and landing was uneventful. I talked to maintenance control after deplaning. They asked if we had inadvertently bumped or moved the #1 condition lever. I had already considered this possibility. The first officer (first officer) had completed his 'after takeoff' flow and checklist at around 2500 ft MSL; and I had verified that he had correctly set the condition levers at 850 (i.e.; he had not moved the condition levers below the detent). The time between the completion of the 'after takeoff' checklist and the #1 pec caution was approximately 5 minutes. There were several interesting 'human factors' in play during this event. I initially mis-judged the severity of this problem: I assumed that we were dealing with nothing worse than a minor Q400 malfunction. As a result; I walked right into a couple of classic operational pitfalls (the same stuff that they warn us about in CRM class). I will discuss these blunders in the form of 'lessons learned': run the checklist; then call dispatch. After years of dealing with minor Q400 problems and nuisance cautions; my initial reaction was to... Contact dispatch (as in; where do you want this airplane to land?). After starting in on the '#1 pec' caution checklist; I realized that we were dealing with a much more serious situation - an impending engine shutdown. I discontinued the call to dispatch and focused on assisting the pm (pilot monitoring) with the emergency checklists. Figure out who will be talking to ATC. It's probably safe to say that most in-flight emergencies start out as normal flights; with well-defined roles for the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. In this case; I was the flying the airplane and my first officer was handling ATC communications. This division of labor works great for normal operations; but may result in a work overload for the pm during abnormal operations. After a couple of minutes; I told the first officer that I would handle all the radio communications while he worked through the checklists. Despite these difficulties; there were plenty of things we did right. In particular: training matters: my first officer was brand-new; still on high minimums. The three weeks that he spent in the simulator was worth every dime: he stayed calm and helped me work through the emergency checklists in an organized and timely manner. Experience matters: I realized that time and workload management would be critically important; due to the potentially short flight time (although I was prepared to ask ATC for 'delay' vectors if necessary). I decided to take a very conservative course of action: I slowed to 200 KIAS and requested vectors to the [runway]. This reduced my workload and allowed me to concentrate on flying the airplane; managing the emergency; and assisting the first officer with the emergency checklists. We were able to make a good stabilized approach and a normal landing. Propeller malfunction (cause unknown) caused an in-flight engine shutdown and a return to the departure airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Q400 flight crew reported a precautionary shutdown of #1 engine due to a propeller malfunction. Flight returned to departure airport.

Narrative: While climbing through approximately 10;000 ft MSL; we experienced a torque surge from the #1 engine. This was accompanied by the following engine indications and cautions: Torque on #1 engine went to approximately 110% (red indication on ED (Electronic Display)); #1 PEC (Propeller Electronic Control) caution; #1 Prop overspeed (apx. 1060 rpm; yellow indication on ED); 'POWERPLANT' message.The #1 engine torque stabilized at approximately 65-68%. We ran the appropriate emergency checklists; which resulted in an engine shutdown. I advised Dispatch that we would be returning; and declared an emergency with ATC. I also made a quick PA to the passengers; and asked the Flight Attendants to prepare the cabin for a normal landing. The approach and landing was uneventful. I talked to Maintenance Control after deplaning. They asked if we had inadvertently bumped or moved the #1 condition lever. I had already considered this possibility. The FO (First Officer) had completed his 'After Takeoff' flow and checklist at around 2500 ft MSL; and I had verified that he had correctly set the condition levers at 850 (i.e.; he had NOT moved the condition levers below the detent). The time between the completion of the 'After Takeoff' checklist and the #1 PEC caution was approximately 5 minutes. There were several interesting 'human factors' in play during this event. I initially mis-judged the severity of this problem: I assumed that we were dealing with nothing worse than a minor Q400 malfunction. As a result; I walked right into a couple of classic operational pitfalls (the same stuff that they warn us about in CRM class). I will discuss these blunders in the form of 'Lessons learned': Run the checklist; THEN call Dispatch. After years of dealing with minor Q400 problems and nuisance cautions; my initial reaction was to... contact Dispatch (as in; where do you want this airplane to land?). After starting in on the '#1 PEC' caution checklist; I realized that we were dealing with a much more serious situation - an impending engine shutdown. I discontinued the call to Dispatch and focused on assisting the PM (Pilot Monitoring) with the emergency checklists. Figure out who will be talking to ATC. It's probably safe to say that most in-flight emergencies start out as normal flights; with well-defined roles for the Pilot Flying and the Pilot Monitoring. In this case; I was the flying the airplane and my FO was handling ATC communications. This division of labor works great for normal operations; but may result in a work overload for the PM during abnormal operations. After a couple of minutes; I told the FO that I would handle all the radio communications while he worked through the checklists. Despite these difficulties; there were plenty of things we did right. In particular: Training matters: My FO was brand-new; still on high minimums. The three weeks that he spent in the simulator was worth every dime: He stayed calm and helped me work through the emergency checklists in an organized and timely manner. Experience matters: I realized that time and workload management would be critically important; due to the potentially short flight time (although I was prepared to ask ATC for 'delay' vectors if necessary). I decided to take a very conservative course of action: I slowed to 200 KIAS and requested vectors to the [runway]. This reduced my workload and allowed me to concentrate on flying the airplane; managing the emergency; and assisting the FO with the emergency checklists. We were able to make a good stabilized approach and a normal landing. Propeller malfunction (cause unknown) caused an in-flight engine shutdown and a return to the departure airport.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.