Narrative:

I was first officer on a widebody transport crew scheduled to fly lax-msp. Our #1 fuel gauge was placarded inoperative. The aircraft was fueled, as far as we could tell, by using our company's approved 'alternate fueling method' which involves defueling to empty the tank then filling it to the required level by pumping a known quantity. I was flying the aircraft during takeoff from runway 24L at lax. During the initial rotation I had to use an unusual amount of left aileron input as the main wheels broke ground. It was unusual because the surface winds were only 160 degrees at 7 KTS. Also, as the nose passed about 10 degrees nose-up during rotation, I noticed that the fuel system warning 'que' light illuminated. The so then stated he had a #1 tank boost pump low pressure light illuminated on the flight engineer panel. Then, after the flaps were retracted, the aircraft required about 45 degrees left control wheel deflection to maintain a wings level condition. Considering the aircraft's strange handling characteristics and the fact that the #1 tank fuel gauge was inoperative, I concluded that there might be considerably less fuel in the left wing than in the right wing. I pointed this out to the captain who then sampled the aircraft's handling characteristics and he agreed that the possibility of under-fueling the #1 fuel tank did exist. After consultation with our company's maintenance and dispatch and considering the aircraft might only have had 3 hours fuel for a 2 hour plus 46 min flight, all parties agreed that the aircraft divert to las which was only 20 mins away. In conclusion, all lax personnel should be refamiliarized with the company's approved gauge inoperative fueling procedure. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter could not add much or any new information reference the findings in the post-flight inspection or ongoing investigation that he said was underway by the air carrier and the FAA. He felt that time was a factor in a schedule pressure situation. Supplemental information from acn 243061: maintenance assured my so that 'everything had been taken care of.' the fuel slip indicated 28100 pounds in #1, 32200 pounds in #2, and 28900 pounds in #3 tanks. However, the gauge showed only 6800 pounds in #1, but it was placarded inoperative. I believed we were misfueled at lax and that we were 20000 pounds short of dispatch fuel. I believe a possible change might be that an abnormal fueling form be required. The responsible person would oversee the fueling and sign the form. This would be given to the captain, just as the hazardous material form is done now. Supplemental information from acn 242479: the #1 tank was refueled first and continued the correct amount of fuel. During the rest of the refueling process excess fuel was unintentionally pumped into the center auxiliary tank. While the refuelers were transferring fuel out of the center auxiliary tank, they accidentally also removed fuel from the #1 tank. We had no way of knowing because the gauge was inoperative and the inoperative gauge procedures had already been accomplished.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB DEPARTS LAX WITH LESS THAN FUEL REQUIRED, DIVERTS TO ALTERNATE ARPT, PRECAUTIONARY LNDG. ACFT EQUIP PROB MALFUNCTION.

Narrative: I WAS FO ON A WDB CREW SCHEDULED TO FLY LAX-MSP. OUR #1 FUEL GAUGE WAS PLACARDED INOP. THE ACFT WAS FUELED, AS FAR AS WE COULD TELL, BY USING OUR COMPANY'S APPROVED 'ALTERNATE FUELING METHOD' WHICH INVOLVES DEFUELING TO EMPTY THE TANK THEN FILLING IT TO THE REQUIRED LEVEL BY PUMPING A KNOWN QUANTITY. I WAS FLYING THE ACFT DURING TKOF FROM RWY 24L AT LAX. DURING THE INITIAL ROTATION I HAD TO USE AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF L AILERON INPUT AS THE MAIN WHEELS BROKE GND. IT WAS UNUSUAL BECAUSE THE SURFACE WINDS WERE ONLY 160 DEGS AT 7 KTS. ALSO, AS THE NOSE PASSED ABOUT 10 DEGS NOSE-UP DURING ROTATION, I NOTICED THAT THE FUEL SYS WARNING 'QUE' LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE SO THEN STATED HE HAD A #1 TANK BOOST PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON THE FE PANEL. THEN, AFTER THE FLAPS WERE RETRACTED, THE ACFT REQUIRED ABOUT 45 DEGS L CTL WHEEL DEFLECTION TO MAINTAIN A WINGS LEVEL CONDITION. CONSIDERING THE ACFT'S STRANGE HANDLING CHARACTERISTICS AND THE FACT THAT THE #1 TANK FUEL GAUGE WAS INOP, I CONCLUDED THAT THERE MIGHT BE CONSIDERABLY LESS FUEL IN THE L WING THAN IN THE R WING. I POINTED THIS OUT TO THE CAPT WHO THEN SAMPLED THE ACFT'S HANDLING CHARACTERISTICS AND HE AGREED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF UNDER-FUELING THE #1 FUEL TANK DID EXIST. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OUR COMPANY'S MAINT AND DISPATCH AND CONSIDERING THE ACFT MIGHT ONLY HAVE HAD 3 HRS FUEL FOR A 2 HR PLUS 46 MIN FLT, ALL PARTIES AGREED THAT THE ACFT DIVERT TO LAS WHICH WAS ONLY 20 MINS AWAY. IN CONCLUSION, ALL LAX PERSONNEL SHOULD BE REFAMILIARIZED WITH THE COMPANY'S APPROVED GAUGE INOP FUELING PROC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR COULD NOT ADD MUCH OR ANY NEW INFO REF THE FINDINGS IN THE POST-FLT INSPECTION OR ONGOING INVESTIGATION THAT HE SAID WAS UNDERWAY BY THE ACR AND THE FAA. HE FELT THAT TIME WAS A FACTOR IN A SCHEDULE PRESSURE SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 243061: MAINT ASSURED MY SO THAT 'EVERYTHING HAD BEEN TAKEN CARE OF.' THE FUEL SLIP INDICATED 28100 LBS IN #1, 32200 LBS IN #2, AND 28900 LBS IN #3 TANKS. HOWEVER, THE GAUGE SHOWED ONLY 6800 LBS IN #1, BUT IT WAS PLACARDED INOP. I BELIEVED WE WERE MISFUELED AT LAX AND THAT WE WERE 20000 LBS SHORT OF DISPATCH FUEL. I BELIEVE A POSSIBLE CHANGE MIGHT BE THAT AN ABNORMAL FUELING FORM BE REQUIRED. THE RESPONSIBLE PERSON WOULD OVERSEE THE FUELING AND SIGN THE FORM. THIS WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE CAPT, JUST AS THE HAZARDOUS MATERIAL FORM IS DONE NOW. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 242479: THE #1 TANK WAS REFUELED FIRST AND CONTINUED THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF FUEL. DURING THE REST OF THE REFUELING PROCESS EXCESS FUEL WAS UNINTENTIONALLY PUMPED INTO THE CTR AUX TANK. WHILE THE REFUELERS WERE TRANSFERRING FUEL OUT OF THE CTR AUX TANK, THEY ACCIDENTALLY ALSO REMOVED FUEL FROM THE #1 TANK. WE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING BECAUSE THE GAUGE WAS INOP AND THE INOP GAUGE PROCS HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.