Narrative:

During the post flight; the first officer brought to my attention unusual tire damage which prompted me to inspect for myself. The #1 (left outboard) tire was damaged and showed very unusual evidence in that the tire looked rather new; but was split around the circumference of the tire in between the tread ribs and broken chord could be seen. I called out maintenance to inspect the tire. Of the 3 mechanics who looked at or worked on the tire; none of them had seen that kind of tire damage before. Of [all my] years on the aircraft; I'd seen similar but not as severe tire damage only a couple of times. The mechanics asked if I wanted to change the tire there or wait until we arrived in base. I said that I wanted the tire changed now; so we deplaned the passenger and waited for the #1 tire to be changed. Following the tire change I sent my first officer outside to make sure that the new tire looked good and that no tools were left behind. When he returned I also asked him if any of the other tires looked bad. He said no; that was the only one that looked bad. The mechanics also confirmed this for me. Once the log book was returned to me we received our closeout and departed.it was the first officer's leg. The takeoff roll was normal and without incident through V1 and rotation. Shortly after rotation; but just prior to V2; the aircraft felt as though the brakes had been lightly tapped twice; and then the wheels were off the ground. My first officer is new; has just barely over 100 hours; and I thought he might have tapped the brakes inadvertently. No other indications seemed amiss nor was there any vibration on the rudder pedals. So with a positive rate I retracted the landing gear. Once the gear was retracted; we began to smell burnt rubber. The first officer and I both smelled it and then it dissipated. We continued to fly the aircraft and were now with departure. While talking with departure I switched off to call tower on communication #2. I asked them if they had seen any smoke or anything unusual around the point of rotation. They replied that they didn't notice anything unusual. Once we were high enough away from the ground and the work load was reduced I asked the first officer if he had accidentally tapped the brakes after he'd rotated. He said he had not. Because he is new; I asked him to show me how he keeps his feet on the rudder pedals. He showed me that he keeps his toes on the bottoms of the pedals which drastically reduces the chance of an inadvertent brake application; his technique can't be faulted. I then began to become convinced that we must have had a tire malfunction of some kind. I then noticed that the right inboard brake temperate indicator was no longer displayed and felt that if it was a damaged tire that we'd experienced that perhaps it could have damaged the brake temperature indicator. I opened my aom and turned to the appropriate checklist for a damaged tire. I read the procedure in its entirety and read it again to the first officer. I wrote dispatch an ACARS message to call the tower and ask them to check for any tire debris around the runway intersection. Dispatch said they'd do it and get back to me as soon as possible. I called the flight attendant and informed her of the potential issue we were dealing with and that once we received confirmation either way that we'd let her know what would happen next. After about 10-15 minutes; dispatch confirmed that a lot of tire debris was found on the runway and that we should continue to destination. I then read the damaged tire procedure again and advised ATC. We did not require any special assistance at the time. We had about 2 hours of fuel remaining. I then called the flight attendant; and told her I'd let the passengers know what was going on. I then told the first officer that I would take the aircraft from him for landing. I then briefed the approach. Following that briefing I became the pilot flying. I told the first officer I was going to configure for landing early and that I intended on using flaps 45 so as to touch down at as slow a speed as possible and so that the flaps might act as a shield for the engine in case any remaining tire debris was kicked back. Upon gear extension we received 3 green indication. Nothing was abnormal. On landing I touched down softly and was able to maintain centerline control. There was a definite vibration in the wheels as we rolled out and I followed the aom landing procedures exactly. I waited to apply brakes until the nose wheel was firmly on the ground. I then applied a smooth consistent brake pressure and deployed the thrust reversers. I began in idle reverse and then evaluated the need for max reverse. The airplane decelerated quite well so I maintained idle reverse until 80 knots and then stowed the reversers. While we were decelerating; tower asked us if we were going to stay on the runway or planned on exiting at the end. I told the first officer that we'd exit as the aircraft felt as though I had adequate control. Then the tower called that sparks were seen coming from our aircraft. I decided promptly to remain on the runway and have crash fire rescue equipment inspect the aircraft and the first officer relayed this to the tower. Once stopped; I set the parking brake and waited for crash fire rescue equipment to encircle the aircraft. We received word from crash fire rescue equipment that there was no fire. I then wanted to know what the damage was and requested that crash fire rescue equipment circle the aircraft and report what they saw. It was my belief that at this time we had a # 3 tire down. They told me that the #2 tire was missing its tread. I asked about the # 3 tire on the other side and they took another lap around the aircraft and told me that it looked like it might be flat too. I decided that it would be safer to arrange for bus transportation from the aircraft to the terminal as operations had informed us that stairs and busses were being dispatched to us. I kept the passengers informed the entire time as to what was going on; what to expect and that any new info we'd pass along. Once the busses arrived it was made known to me that there were no stairs but rather a ramp that crash fire rescue equipment would use to help people down to the ground and escort them to the busses. I also at this time learned from a crash fire rescue equipment official who had plugged into the aircraft via headset that only the #2 tire was missing its tread and that he never saw any sparks. At this point however I decided to continue with the orderly deplaning while crash fire rescue equipment personnel assisted each passenger off the aircraft. Once all the passengers were off; the flight attendant deplaned with an unaccompanied minor and escorted him to the terminal on the bus with the passengers. I was met by the head of maintenance and stepped off the aircraft. I was congratulated; and told of the tire's status as well as some damage to the flaps. I was told however that the aircraft was safe to taxi back to the terminal but operating on the #2 engine only; and we were reassured more than once that we were to do that. I got back in the aircraft and waited until everyone was clear to start the #2 engine. The crash fire rescue equipment personnel who was on a headset indicated verbally to me when the area behind the right engine was clear and we started the engine. Once all checklist items were completed we called our discrete ground frequency controller and asked for clearance to taxi to our gate. Once cleared to taxi; we taxied slowly and arrived at our gate. We completed the parking checklist. I told the first officer he still had to do a walk around. I put the damaged tire in the logbook. The first officer reported no additional damage other than what we already knew about. I called the tower; and then my phone received several calls from safety and elsewhere. I forgot at that point in time to write up the damage to the flaps as well as the brake temperature indication for the right inboard brake which ended up being intermittent in nature; so while on my way home I called dispatch; and had her patch me through to maintenance control so I could make sure that it would be added to the log book. I received reassurance from maintenance control that it was being addressed and that it would not be missedand that they had received my report for the brake temperature indication of the right inboard brake and that he'd call the guys and let them know to add that to the logbook.it has been brought to my attention that the tires may have been retread tires. Please tell me this is not happening. It is my opinion that utilizing retread tires which spin up to over 150 mph for every takeoff and landing is extremely unsafe; and the practice should be discontinued immediately. If of course what I was told is actually true; which I have no way of knowing for sure. Based upon the damage seen on the first tire that was changed and then again the damage that occurred to the #2 tire; it looked like what you'd expect to see on the highway when following a semi-truck with retread tires.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 First Officer discovered a damaged #1 main tire during post flight and it is changed prior to the next departure. After takeoff; burnt rubber is smelled in the cockpit and the #3 brake temperature gauge is inoperative; leading the crew to believe a tire has failed. The departure airport Tower confirms rubber on the runway and the crew prepares for landing with a failed tire. The landing is uneventful and post flight reveals it is the #2 tire that has failed.

Narrative: During the post flight; the First Officer brought to my attention unusual tire damage which prompted me to inspect for myself. The #1 (left outboard) tire was damaged and showed very unusual evidence in that the tire looked rather new; but was split around the circumference of the tire in between the tread ribs and broken chord could be seen. I called out maintenance to inspect the tire. Of the 3 mechanics who looked at or worked on the tire; none of them had seen that kind of tire damage before. Of [all my] years on the aircraft; I'd seen similar but not as severe tire damage only a couple of times. The mechanics asked if I wanted to change the tire there or wait until we arrived in base. I said that I wanted the tire changed now; so we deplaned the PAX and waited for the #1 tire to be changed. Following the tire change I sent my FO outside to make sure that the new tire looked good and that no tools were left behind. When he returned I also asked him if any of the other tires looked bad. He said no; that was the only one that looked bad. The mechanics also confirmed this for me. Once the log book was returned to me we received our closeout and departed.It was the FO's leg. The takeoff roll was normal and without incident through V1 and rotation. Shortly after rotation; but just prior to V2; the aircraft felt as though the brakes had been lightly tapped twice; and then the wheels were off the ground. My FO is new; has just barely over 100 hours; and I thought he might have tapped the brakes inadvertently. No other indications seemed amiss nor was there any vibration on the rudder pedals. So with a positive rate I retracted the landing gear. Once the gear was retracted; we began to smell burnt rubber. The FO and I both smelled it and then it dissipated. We continued to fly the aircraft and were now with departure. While talking with departure I switched off to call tower on COM #2. I asked them if they had seen any smoke or anything unusual around the point of rotation. They replied that they didn't notice anything unusual. Once we were high enough away from the ground and the work load was reduced I asked the FO if he had accidentally tapped the brakes after he'd rotated. He said he had not. Because he is new; I asked him to show me how he keeps his feet on the rudder pedals. He showed me that he keeps his toes on the bottoms of the pedals which drastically reduces the chance of an inadvertent brake application; his technique can't be faulted. I then began to become convinced that we must have had a tire malfunction of some kind. I then noticed that the right inboard brake temperate indicator was no longer displayed and felt that if it was a damaged tire that we'd experienced that perhaps it could have damaged the brake TEMP indicator. I opened my AOM and turned to the appropriate checklist for a damaged tire. I read the procedure in its entirety and read it again to the FO. I wrote dispatch an ACARS message to call the tower and ask them to check for any tire debris around the runway intersection. Dispatch said they'd do it and get back to me as soon as possible. I called the FA and informed her of the potential issue we were dealing with and that once we received confirmation either way that we'd let her know what would happen next. After about 10-15 minutes; dispatch confirmed that a lot of tire debris was found on the runway and that we should continue to destination. I then read the damaged tire procedure again and advised ATC. We did not require any special assistance at the time. We had about 2 hours of fuel remaining. I then called the FA; and told her I'd let the passengers know what was going on. I then told the FO that I would take the aircraft from him for landing. I then briefed the approach. Following that briefing I became the pilot flying. I told the FO I was going to configure for landing early and that I intended on using flaps 45 so as to touch down at as slow a speed as possible and so that the flaps might act as a shield for the engine in case any remaining tire debris was kicked back. Upon gear extension we received 3 green indication. Nothing was abnormal. On landing I touched down softly and was able to maintain centerline control. There was a definite vibration in the wheels as we rolled out and I followed the AOM landing procedures exactly. I waited to apply brakes until the nose wheel was firmly on the ground. I then applied a smooth consistent brake pressure and deployed the thrust reversers. I began in idle reverse and then evaluated the need for max reverse. The airplane decelerated quite well so I maintained idle reverse until 80 knots and then stowed the reversers. While we were decelerating; Tower asked us if we were going to stay on the runway or planned on exiting at the end. I told the FO that we'd exit as the aircraft felt as though I had adequate control. Then the Tower called that sparks were seen coming from our aircraft. I decided promptly to remain on the runway and have CFR inspect the aircraft and the FO relayed this to the tower. Once stopped; I set the parking brake and waited for CFR to encircle the aircraft. We received word from CFR that there was NO fire. I then wanted to know what the damage was and requested that CFR circle the aircraft and report what they saw. It was my belief that at this time we had a # 3 tire down. They told me that the #2 tire was missing its tread. I asked about the # 3 tire on the other side and they took another lap around the aircraft and told me that it looked like it might be flat too. I decided that it would be safer to arrange for bus transportation from the aircraft to the terminal as operations had informed us that stairs and busses were being dispatched to us. I kept the passengers informed the entire time as to what was going on; what to expect and that any new info we'd pass along. Once the busses arrived it was made known to me that there were no stairs but rather a ramp that CFR would use to help people down to the ground and escort them to the busses. I also at this time learned from a CFR official who had plugged into the aircraft via headset that only the #2 tire was missing its tread and that he never saw any sparks. At this point however I decided to continue with the orderly deplaning while CFR personnel assisted each passenger off the aircraft. Once all the passengers were off; the FA deplaned with an unaccompanied minor and escorted him to the terminal on the bus with the passengers. I was met by the head of maintenance and stepped off the aircraft. I was congratulated; and told of the tire's status as well as some damage to the flaps. I was told however that the aircraft was safe to taxi back to the terminal but operating on the #2 engine only; and we were reassured more than once that we were to do that. I got back in the aircraft and waited until everyone was clear to start the #2 engine. The CFR personnel who was on a headset indicated verbally to me when the area behind the right engine was clear and we started the engine. Once all checklist items were completed we called our discrete ground frequency controller and asked for clearance to taxi to our gate. Once cleared to taxi; we taxied slowly and arrived at our gate. We completed the parking checklist. I told the FO he still had to do a walk around. I put the damaged tire in the logbook. The FO reported no additional damage other than what we already knew about. I called the tower; and then my phone received several calls from Safety and elsewhere. I forgot at that point in time to write up the damage to the flaps as well as the brake TEMP indication for the right inboard brake which ended up being intermittent in nature; so while on my way home I called dispatch; and had her patch me through to Maintenance Control so I could make sure that it would be added to the log book. I received reassurance from Maintenance Control that it was being addressed and that it would not be missedand that they had received my report for the brake temperature indication of the right inboard brake and that he'd call the guys and let them know to add that to the logbook.It has been brought to my attention that the tires may have been retread tires. Please tell me this is not happening. It is my opinion that utilizing retread tires which spin up to over 150 mph for every takeoff and landing is EXTREMELY unsafe; and the practice should be discontinued immediately. If of course what I was told is actually true; which I have no way of knowing for sure. Based upon the damage seen on the first tire that was changed and then again the damage that occurred to the #2 tire; it looked like what you'd expect to see on the highway when following a semi-truck with retread tires.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.