Narrative:

We took off and went out to the practice area to test student's commercial maneuvers. We went through the required maneuvers and the student performed average. There were no signs of nervousness, or any abnormal reactions. We returned to herbert smart to test the student's specialty lndgs and takeoffs. The active runway was 09. First approach was a short field. The student came in high and landed hard, one ballooning. I gave the student another chance to prove that he could do it. Second approach was also a short field. There was another airplane in front of us in the patter, which caused a go around. Gear worked, but no warning horn. Student performed the go around up to standards. Third approach was a soft field, and the student performed prelndg checklist by memory. Both approach and landing were good. The fourth time around the pattern I decided to check the student on emergency landing. Abeam the third stripe, measured from threshold of 09, I pulled the throttle back to simulate engine failure and emergency landing. The student pulled the gear override switch up to prevent the gear from free falling and creating drag. He also pulled the propeller lever back to low RPM, to try to stretch the glide. He turned to a tight base to make sure he could make the runway. No gear horn sounding. We came in a bit high, so he set 25 degrees of flaps. He turned final with about 35-40 degrees of bank. The student did not perform a gumps check. I was looking outside to judge the turn to final and landing, and did not confirm gear down and locked. He flared and sat the airplane softly down about mid-field. We slid about 100 yds along the runway centerline. After we came to a stop, I opened the door and told the student to secure the engine. I looked down and the gear switch was in the down position, but no gear indicator lights. The student said afterward that he had put the gear switch in the down position when we turned final, but he did not call it out while he did it. The corrective action for this type of incident must probably be to stress the importance of use of the checklist and proper procedure for emergency landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMPLEX SMA LANDS GEAR-UP WHILE STUDENT PLT PRACTICING EMERGENCY LNDG.

Narrative: WE TOOK OFF AND WENT OUT TO THE PRACTICE AREA TO TEST STUDENT'S COMMERCIAL MANEUVERS. WE WENT THROUGH THE REQUIRED MANEUVERS AND THE STUDENT PERFORMED AVERAGE. THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF NERVOUSNESS, OR ANY ABNORMAL REACTIONS. WE RETURNED TO HERBERT SMART TO TEST THE STUDENT'S SPECIALTY LNDGS AND TKOFS. THE ACTIVE RWY WAS 09. FIRST APCH WAS A SHORT FIELD. THE STUDENT CAME IN HIGH AND LANDED HARD, ONE BALLOONING. I GAVE THE STUDENT ANOTHER CHANCE TO PROVE THAT HE COULD DO IT. SECOND APCH WAS ALSO A SHORT FIELD. THERE WAS ANOTHER AIRPLANE IN FRONT OF US IN THE PATTER, WHICH CAUSED A GAR. GEAR WORKED, BUT NO WARNING HORN. STUDENT PERFORMED THE GAR UP TO STANDARDS. THIRD APCH WAS A SOFT FIELD, AND THE STUDENT PERFORMED PRELNDG CHKLIST BY MEMORY. BOTH APCH AND LNDG WERE GOOD. THE FOURTH TIME AROUND THE PATTERN I DECIDED TO CHK THE STUDENT ON EMER LNDG. ABEAM THE THIRD STRIPE, MEASURED FROM THRESHOLD OF 09, I PULLED THE THROTTLE BACK TO SIMULATE ENG FAILURE AND EMER LNDG. THE STUDENT PULLED THE GEAR OVERRIDE SWITCH UP TO PREVENT THE GEAR FROM FREE FALLING AND CREATING DRAG. HE ALSO PULLED THE PROP LEVER BACK TO LOW RPM, TO TRY TO STRETCH THE GLIDE. HE TURNED TO A TIGHT BASE TO MAKE SURE HE COULD MAKE THE RWY. NO GEAR HORN SOUNDING. WE CAME IN A BIT HIGH, SO HE SET 25 DEGS OF FLAPS. HE TURNED FINAL WITH ABOUT 35-40 DEGS OF BANK. THE STUDENT DID NOT PERFORM A GUMPS CHK. I WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE TO JUDGE THE TURN TO FINAL AND LNDG, AND DID NOT CONFIRM GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED. HE FLARED AND SAT THE AIRPLANE SOFTLY DOWN ABOUT MID-FIELD. WE SLID ABOUT 100 YDS ALONG THE RWY CENTERLINE. AFTER WE CAME TO A STOP, I OPENED THE DOOR AND TOLD THE STUDENT TO SECURE THE ENG. I LOOKED DOWN AND THE GEAR SWITCH WAS IN THE DOWN POS, BUT NO GEAR INDICATOR LIGHTS. THE STUDENT SAID AFTERWARD THAT HE HAD PUT THE GEAR SWITCH IN THE DOWN POS WHEN WE TURNED FINAL, BUT HE DID NOT CALL IT OUT WHILE HE DID IT. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT MUST PROBABLY BE TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF USE OF THE CHKLIST AND PROPER PROC FOR EMER LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.