Narrative:

[This] was my second flight since the implementation of the new before takeoff checklist and the taxi before final weights. I thought maybe; I'd have a different reaction to this checklist after getting used to it which is why I did not write a report on the first leg. But instead; my thoughts about it only intensified. I have been a first officer on this plane [for years]; and I would consider myself above average with multi tasking. That being said; this checklist is a complete distraction! I felt out of the loop and very confused by this overly complicated checklist. With all the extra talking; instead of feeling like everything was set; it made me feel like I was missing things more important to the safety of flight. Fortunately; I did not miss anything; but I definitely felt uneasy. I have no issue getting final weights on taxi out. I believe that can be safely managed. I do have a problem with this overly complicated checklist with extraneous verbiage while taxiing out during sterile cockpit. Even in the computer based training (cbt) show casing this new procedure; the captain clearly isn't even listening to the first officer (first officer) reading all this stuff. He just responded 'set' and never even looked up. This is not what CRM is. It says something to me that they could not even make this look like a crew effort while they are in a simulator and probably did or could have done many 'takes' to make it look right. That was my experience in real life too. It is way too much talking and the captain; despite having done the required training; did not know the required response making it even more distracting. The fact that there isn't a prompt in the checklist to set flaps is crazy! I have read the amended flight manual; and realize the captain is supposed to call for it before the checklist; but if they don't; and won't if they aren't following this new procedure closely; then we are taxiing out without flaps even set at all. I just feel like this is a recipe to really mess things up. Having the incorrect flap setting is a real concern. I have read safety bulletins stating that tail strikes are on the rise; and I believe with this convoluted checklist we will see more mistakes rather than less. I'm not sure what the problem was the way it was (also changed fairly recently) just simply stating to the captain the takeoff weight; the planned; and the difference. We have already briefed the departure before running the preflight checklist. Rehashing that on the taxi out is totally unnecessary and distracting. We have always just briefed if there was a runway or departure change. It worked well; and far less distracting than having to read off of this big checklist which is physically larger than it ever was now that it's not folded and blocks the fos peripheral view of the taxi out. I'm sure this will fall on deaf ears; but I'm just throwing my experience out there and sincerely hope that this verbose checklist does not cause an incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 First Officer reported confusion and lack of confidence in a new before takeoff checklist procedure.

Narrative: [This] was my second flight since the implementation of the new before takeoff checklist and the taxi before final weights. I thought maybe; I'd have a different reaction to this checklist after getting used to it which is why I did not write a report on the first leg. But instead; my thoughts about it only intensified. I have been a first officer on this plane [for years]; and I would consider myself above average with multi tasking. That being said; this checklist is a complete distraction! I felt out of the loop and very confused by this overly complicated checklist. With all the extra talking; instead of feeling like everything was set; it made me feel like I was missing things more important to the safety of flight. Fortunately; I did not miss anything; but I definitely felt uneasy. I have no issue getting final weights on taxi out. I believe that can be safely managed. I do have a problem with this overly complicated checklist with extraneous verbiage while taxiing out during sterile cockpit. Even in the Computer Based Training (CBT) show casing this new procedure; the Captain clearly isn't even listening to the First Officer (FO) reading all this stuff. He just responded 'SET' and never even looked up. This is not what CRM is. It says something to me that they could not even make this look like a crew effort while they are in a simulator and probably did or could have done many 'takes' to make it look right. That was my experience in real life too. It is way too much talking and the Captain; despite having done the required training; did not know the required response making it even more distracting. The fact that there isn't a prompt in the checklist to set flaps is crazy! I have read the amended flight manual; and realize the Captain is supposed to call for it before the checklist; but if they don't; and won't if they aren't following this new procedure closely; then we are taxiing out without flaps even set at all. I just feel like this is a recipe to really mess things up. Having the incorrect flap setting is a real concern. I have read safety bulletins stating that tail strikes are on the rise; and I believe with this convoluted checklist we will see more mistakes rather than less. I'm not sure what the problem was the way it was (also changed fairly recently) just simply stating to the Captain the takeoff weight; the planned; and the difference. We have already briefed the departure before running the preflight checklist. Rehashing that on the taxi out is totally unnecessary and distracting. We have always just briefed if there was a runway or departure change. It worked well; and far less distracting than having to read off of this big checklist which is physically larger than it ever was now that it's not folded and blocks the FOs peripheral view of the taxi out. I'm sure this will fall on deaf ears; but I'm just throwing my experience out there and sincerely hope that this verbose checklist does not cause an incident.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.