Narrative:

Departing ord we had a medical emergency approximately 80 miles [from] ord. I was the PF so I transferred the controls to the first officer so I could manage the situation and return to ord. The task of collecting information and communicating to others created a distraction which led to a less than ideal approach briefing for 28R. The FMS was loaded correctly and the proper localizer frequency was set in both of our radio tuning units (rtus). We established a clear plan that the first officer would be the PF until base leg then I would land since we were landing overweight. Early on in the process; ATC asked our preferred runway and I requested 28R for its proximity to the terminal and its long length since we were overweight. We were vectored for left traffic to 28R. At the beginning of the base leg; the first officer was the PF and descending to a lower altitude as requested by ATC. We transferred the controls at this point.we had the field in sight and we were cleared for the visual to 28R. It was slightly hazy but we could see the entire airport. It seems that the desire to land with our medical emergency caused some tunnel vision on my part. I was focused on the new runway being built that is south of the south cargo area. I mistakenly confused the not yet finished 28L with our intended runway of 28R. I interpreted the south cargo area as the terminal area which led me to think that 28L was 28R. As we got closer on final; it was becoming obvious to us at the same time that tower saw the problem and told us to go around. We did go around and set up for a successful approach and landing to 28R. Even on the second approach; my desire to see 28L was still present but ignored early on during the visual approach.over the course of the last 10 years; I have been based at ord for more than four years so a lack familiarity was not the problem. The problem was rooted in a preconceived idea of looking for a runway on the south side of a developed area; the terminal. Unfortunately; I confused the south cargo area with the terminal area. Even though the haze was not severely limiting visibility; it was just enough to allow my brain to focus on the wrong area with buildings - south cargo area versus terminal area.secondary root cause: not relying on my instruments as a backup. The FMS was programmed correctly and the localizer was showing the proper left of course guidance. My desire to rely on the visuals should have been suppressed by the instruments.rely on a strong approach briefing and the properly setup instruments to discourage visual illusions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-700 Captain reported deviating from cleared track to ORD Runway 28R; lining up instead with 28L. Distractions and haze contributed to the incident.

Narrative: Departing ORD we had a medical emergency approximately 80 miles [from] ORD. I was the PF so I transferred the controls to the FO so I could manage the situation and return to ORD. The task of collecting information and communicating to others created a distraction which led to a less than ideal approach briefing for 28R. The FMS was loaded correctly and the proper localizer frequency was set in both of our Radio Tuning Units (RTUs). We established a clear plan that the FO would be the PF until base leg then I would land since we were landing overweight. Early on in the process; ATC asked our preferred runway and I requested 28R for its proximity to the terminal and its long length since we were overweight. We were vectored for left traffic to 28R. At the beginning of the base leg; the FO was the PF and descending to a lower altitude as requested by ATC. We transferred the controls at this point.We had the field in sight and we were cleared for the visual to 28R. It was slightly hazy but we could see the entire airport. It seems that the desire to land with our medical emergency caused some tunnel vision on my part. I was focused on the new runway being built that is south of the south cargo area. I mistakenly confused the not yet finished 28L with our intended runway of 28R. I interpreted the south cargo area as the terminal area which led me to think that 28L was 28R. As we got closer on final; it was becoming obvious to us at the same time that tower saw the problem and told us to go around. We did go around and set up for a successful approach and landing to 28R. Even on the second approach; my desire to see 28L was still present but ignored early on during the visual approach.Over the course of the last 10 years; I have been based at ORD for more than four years so a lack familiarity was not the problem. The problem was rooted in a preconceived idea of looking for a runway on the south side of a developed area; the terminal. Unfortunately; I confused the south cargo area with the terminal area. Even though the haze was not severely limiting visibility; it was just enough to allow my brain to focus on the wrong area with buildings - south cargo area versus terminal area.Secondary Root Cause: Not relying on my instruments as a backup. The FMS was programmed correctly and the localizer was showing the proper left of course guidance. My desire to rely on the visuals should have been suppressed by the instruments.Rely on a strong approach briefing and the properly setup instruments to discourage visual illusions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.