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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1291240 |
Time | |
Date | 201508 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SFO.Airport |
State Reference | CA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 119.95 Flight Crew Total 7246.40 Flight Crew Type 7246.40 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
This is an informational [safety report]. Coming into [airport]; on a charted visual approach. ATC called out traffic to us; a company aircraft about 5-6 miles ahead of us for the same runway. We saw an airplane disappearing into the ground clutter; but it did not look like the type of the traffic issued; and it did not look clearly like [company] colors. The second time ATC asked us if we could see the traffic; I told him exactly that: we could see an airplane but we weren't certain it matched his description; but we had the airport in sight. ATC cleared us the for the charted visual approach. Shortly thereafter; ATC called out more traffic at our 9 o'clock high; turning on to the parallel. At this point we were high and fast as is typical; trying to fly the airplane into a favorable energy state for a stabilized approach. We saw an airplane at our 9 o'clock; but again it was too small to be certain of the type. It wasn't for our runway; and then it too disappeared into the ground clutter of the hills. ATC then made repeated calls basically demanding we call the parallel traffic in sight; while we were busy trying to fly the approach. It was very distracting. I would actually call it harassment since we were already cleared for the approach; and acquiring the traffic is not a mandatory thing. Finally the traffic descended low enough that we reacquired it visually. ATC called us again and said if you don't have the traffic; I'm going to have to send you around. It sounded distinctly like a threat; as if we were lying to him about being able to see the traffic earlier; and deliberately didn't call it. Basically; I spent several minutes not helping the captain fly the approach; and not monitoring well; because I was too busy talking continuously to ATC about the traffic.a couple things come to mind here. The most important one is that from the cockpit; we are not equipped to make positive identification on traffic that is called out to us. The airplanes are just specks; and our TCAS does not give us a data block on the targets. I feel like ATC is not aware of how little we can see; and how hard it is to make a positive identification that I would stake my separation on as a pilot. I feel like there is a major trend within ATC to push visuals; and shunt their separation responsibilities onto us; leaving them free from liability. But again; from the cockpit we are not equipped to make good identification's by eye. Also; the timing; flow; and separation of the approach tracks into sfo are ATC's responsibility. They are not the pilots; and I do not think it is right for ATC to make my approach clearance contingent on sighting traffic (that he placed next to us) retroactively. In other words; he already cleared us for the approach; and then he was going to take the clearance away and send us around; costing the company thousands; because he placed traffic next to us; unless we were able to acquire the traffic visually. We were established on the approach routing; and the parallel traffic was not yet. ATC should not be threatening to send us around when it was his responsibility to space the traffic properly in the first place. This amounts to financially punishing my company for his errors.this era of jamming more and more airplanes into airports is reducing our margins for error; and causing distractions and too much chatter and pilot pushing during critical phases of flight.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: The reporter was on a Visual Approach. There was traffic landing on the parallel runway. ATC was attempting to have the reporter visually sight the adjacent traffic and report it in sight. The reporter states this was distracting him from his Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties. The reporter felt that he should not have to visually sight traffic landing on a parallel runway. When parallel runways are closely spaced and Visual Approaches are in use ATC is required to aircraft sight the aircraft landing on the parallel runway.
Narrative: This is an informational [safety report]. Coming into [airport]; on a Charted Visual Approach. ATC called out traffic to us; a company aircraft about 5-6 miles ahead of us for the same runway. We saw an airplane disappearing into the ground clutter; but it did not look like the type of the traffic issued; and it did not look clearly like [Company] colors. The second time ATC asked us if we could see the traffic; I told him exactly that: we could see an airplane but we weren't certain it matched his description; but we had the airport in sight. ATC cleared us the for the Charted Visual Approach. Shortly thereafter; ATC called out more traffic at our 9 o'clock high; turning on to the parallel. At this point we were high and fast as is typical; trying to fly the airplane into a favorable energy state for a stabilized approach. We saw an airplane at our 9 o'clock; but again it was too small to be certain of the type. It wasn't for our runway; and then it too disappeared into the ground clutter of the hills. ATC then made repeated calls basically demanding we call the parallel traffic in sight; while we were busy trying to fly the approach. It was very distracting. I would actually call it harassment since we were already cleared for the approach; and acquiring the traffic is not a mandatory thing. Finally the traffic descended low enough that we reacquired it visually. ATC called us again and said if you don't have the traffic; I'm going to have to send you around. It sounded distinctly like a threat; as if we were lying to him about being able to see the traffic earlier; and deliberately didn't call it. Basically; I spent several minutes not helping the captain fly the approach; and not monitoring well; because I was too busy talking continuously to ATC about the traffic.A couple things come to mind here. The most important one is that from the cockpit; we are not equipped to make positive ID on traffic that is called out to us. The airplanes are just specks; and our TCAS does not give us a data block on the targets. I feel like ATC is not aware of how little we can see; and how hard it is to make a positive ID that I would stake my separation on as a pilot. I feel like there is a major trend within ATC to push visuals; and shunt their separation responsibilities onto us; leaving them free from liability. But again; from the cockpit we are not equipped to make good ID's by eye. Also; the timing; flow; and separation of the approach tracks into SFO are ATC's responsibility. They are not the pilots; and I do not think it is right for ATC to make my approach clearance contingent on sighting traffic (that he placed next to us) retroactively. In other words; he already cleared us for the approach; and then he was going to take the clearance away and send us around; costing the company thousands; because he placed traffic next to us; unless we were able to acquire the traffic visually. We were established on the approach routing; and the parallel traffic was not yet. ATC should not be threatening to send us around when it was his responsibility to space the traffic properly in the first place. This amounts to financially punishing my Company for his errors.This era of jamming more and more airplanes into airports is reducing our margins for error; and causing distractions and too much chatter and pilot pushing during critical phases of flight.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.