Narrative:

Uneventful evening leading up to pushback for departure. We noted that the left engine started a little slower than the right but auto start was never interrupted and it came up on speed a few seconds after the right engine.the capt was flying as it was his leg; I was in the right seat and first officer (first officer). No anomalies were noted during taxi out or upon advancing the throttles to takeoff power. We were climbing via the SID talking to dep and had just passed FL200. We had used max cont climb earlier on the departure to ensure climb restrictions but had selected normal at least 5 mins before the engine event.at approximately FL210; we heard and felt a loud bang and the aircraft yawed left. It was obvious that we had lost the left engine. Capt continued to maintain aircraft control and fly the aircraft. The capt directed myself and the international relief officer (international relief officer) to run the checklist. We started with the eng fail left checklist which took us immediately to the eng severe damage/sep checklist as we noted high egt (red line) very low oil press; zero oil qty; N2 zero; and engine vibration of 5 on the engine instruments. We were experiencing noticeable vibrations in the cockpit. Capt slowed to 250 kts and began a descent to help control the vibration. We requested vectors to the departure airport as our nearest suitable airport.once we had the engine shutdown; capt directed me to fly as he and the international relief officer made company contact; talked to the fas (flight attendants) and ran the fuel dumping checklist. I handled the radios and flying duties as they coordinated with ground and fas.ATC directed us to descend us to 5000 feet. I told them we needed to level at FL80 for fuel dumping and would like vectors or holding for the next 20 mins or so. They vectored us for a while then cleared us present position hold for fuel dumping. There was a little communication barrier as we told me we wanted the ILS and would let them know when we were ready for the approach. They kept trying to turn us to intercept final. We dumped all the fuel from the center tanks which left us ~45;000 lbs over weight for a landing weight of ~505;000 lbs. We decided that we would accept an overweight landing. I flew as capt briefed the single engine flaps 20 approach and missed approach. Capt took the airplane back and we then took vectors to final. Capt flew a flawless single engine approach and landing. We elected to clear the runway; leave the flaps extended; shut down and get towed to parking as we did not know the extent of the damage to the engine and related structures on the left side of the airplane. Capt had me go the gear page to check the brakes and we noted them heating to 5 on two of the left outboard wheels. We had not been directed to the checklist but we referred to it anyway. The hot brakes checklist annunciated as we were looking at it. Capt related the hot brakes to the ground crew. They hooked up the tug and we were towed to the hard stand. All brakes had cooled to the white zone by the time we arrived.we debriefed with entire crew; fas included; on the airplane after the passengers had deplaned. Extensive damage was noted to the engine on visual inspection to include shrapnel in the nacelle and burn marks on the tail cone. Visible fluid leakage could be seen when the engine cowlings were opened. We proceeded to station operations where calls were made to the company.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 Flight Crew experiences a catastrophic engine failure climbing through FL210. The engine is shut down and after dumping fuel the flight returns to the departure airport for an overweight landing. A fuel jettison pump failure during dumping caused some confusion due to its nearly identical title to the jettison checklist on the electronic checklist. HYD QTY LOW L was also annunciated on the EICAS during approach.

Narrative: Uneventful evening leading up to pushback for departure. We noted that the left engine started a little slower than the right but auto start was never interrupted and it came up on speed a few seconds after the right engine.The capt was flying as it was his leg; I was in the right seat and FO (First Officer). No anomalies were noted during taxi out or upon advancing the throttles to takeoff power. We were climbing via the SID talking to Dep and had just passed FL200. We had used max cont climb earlier on the departure to ensure climb restrictions but had selected normal at least 5 mins before the engine event.At approximately FL210; we heard and felt a loud bang and the aircraft yawed left. It was obvious that we had lost the left engine. Capt continued to maintain aircraft control and fly the aircraft. The Capt directed myself and the IRO (International Relief Officer) to run the checklist. We started with the Eng Fail L checklist which took us immediately to the Eng Severe Damage/Sep checklist as we noted high EGT (red Line) very low oil press; zero oil qty; N2 zero; and engine vibration of 5 on the engine instruments. We were experiencing noticeable vibrations in the cockpit. Capt slowed to 250 kts and began a descent to help control the vibration. We requested vectors to the departure airport as our nearest suitable airport.Once we had the engine shutdown; Capt directed me to fly as he and the IRO made company contact; talked to the FAs (Flight Attendants) and ran the fuel dumping checklist. I handled the radios and flying duties as they coordinated with ground and FAs.ATC directed us to descend us to 5000 feet. I told them we needed to level at FL80 for fuel dumping and would like vectors or holding for the next 20 mins or so. They vectored us for a while then cleared us present position hold for fuel dumping. There was a little communication barrier as we told me we wanted the ILS and would let them know when we were ready for the approach. They kept trying to turn us to intercept final. We dumped all the fuel from the center tanks which left us ~45;000 lbs over weight for a landing weight of ~505;000 lbs. We decided that we would accept an overweight landing. I flew as Capt briefed the single engine flaps 20 approach and missed approach. Capt took the airplane back and we then took vectors to final. Capt flew a flawless single engine approach and landing. We elected to clear the runway; leave the flaps extended; shut down and get towed to parking as we did not know the extent of the damage to the engine and related structures on the left side of the airplane. Capt had me go the gear page to check the brakes and we noted them heating to 5 on two of the left outboard wheels. We had not been directed to the checklist but we referred to it anyway. The Hot Brakes checklist annunciated as we were looking at it. Capt related the hot brakes to the ground crew. They hooked up the tug and we were towed to the hard stand. All brakes had cooled to the white zone by the time we arrived.We debriefed with entire crew; FAs included; on the airplane after the passengers had deplaned. Extensive damage was noted to the engine on visual inspection to include shrapnel in the nacelle and burn marks on the tail cone. Visible fluid leakage could be seen when the engine cowlings were opened. We proceeded to station operations where calls were made to the company.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.