Narrative:

A80 was running triple precision runway monitor approaches landing east. A 30 mile long area of moderate precip was preventing aircraft from getting from the ZTL dalas sector to the runway 9R final approach coarse. These aircraft were being offloaded to the tar left position; therefore tar left's aircraft were being flowed to the tar H position; which I was working. No speed control had been assigned to these aircraft as we were running time based flow management (tbfm). Simultaneously; I was being fed aircraft from ZTL husky sector with no speed control 7 miles in trail. This would necessitate me having to vector these aircraft to create space in which to place the flowed aircraft from left. After doing this with the first couple of sets of aircraft; I informed the supervisor in charge of the approach wall that I needed some speed control 'on the long side'; meaning both the H and left feeds in order to have gaps in which to place subsequent flowed aircraft. The supervisor in a rather condescending tone; said; 'we're working on it'. Volume was heavy and every controller had a very high workload. Communication from the supervisor was minimal to non-existent. A controller plugged in to relieve me; but I could not complete the briefing due to the workload. Then; another flowed aircraft checked on with a speed assigned of 280 knots; followed by another aircraft from ZTL husky at 310 knots or greater assigned! At this point; I turned around to the supervisor to inform him of this and asked him what was going on. He responded by instructing the controller who came to relieve me to plug in and work my handoff. This was ineffective because the controller had never worked handoff before; and certainly not in this type of situation. By now I was saturated with aircraft and was slowing them to between 180 knots and 210 knots on the departure side of the airport; and was using all the airspace I had to vector them in trail; to the point of being on the edge of departure radar airspace. The left controller continued to try and hand off flowed aircraft to me; so then I informed the supervisor that I could not take handoffs on any more flowed aircraft; as I had no place to put them. At this point I could literally feel my heart pounding inside my chest and felt if I took the flowed aircraft that control of the situation would slip away. I have never had a feeling like this in all my years of ATC. In response to that; the supervisor abruptly replied; 'well then; get up.' then he sent another controller to relieve me. Again; I was unable to give a proper relief briefing and the new controller eventually assumed the position as I listened. He inherited a situation that I was unwilling to work; and should not have been asked to. Within minutes; the supervisor and traffic management coordinators had transitioned to arriving two runways and reduced the arrival rate. I was unable to complete my assigned 10 hour shift due to extreme anxiety; spiked blood pressure; and elevated heart rate; as witnessed by several of my colleagues; brought on by the effects of the aforementioned events.the supervisor had a minimal response to the changing; dynamic situation. There seemed to be no plan of how to manage the aircraft into our airspace; or how to meter them once they got there. Tbfm should have been suspended in light of the unusual flow of traffic due to the effects of weather. Speed control and miles in trail should have been assigned to aircraft coming in from adjacent sectors to provide the controllers the space needed to blend aircraft from the different feeds. Once the impact of the weather on the flow of traffic became apparent; it might have been best to start transitioning immediately to a two operation final and reduced arrival rate. There seemed to be little to no concern for the stress; health; and welfare of the controllers involved. They are expected to just suck it up and accept whatever is thrust upon them. Controllers at A80 having been working mostly mandatory 6 day work weeks for several years now due to low staffing. This was my second 2 hour overtime holdover shift in 3 days. The cumulative effect of these conditions over time most likely adds to the level of stress and anxiety being experienced by all those involved in these situations. It was unreasonable of management to expect a single controller to work a feed from three different sectors with no assistance and no flow management. Ultimately; operations and traffic management failed to properly manage the situation and mitigate the negative effects on the personnel involved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Finals sector at Atlanta Approach became extremely busy. Due to weather deviations this sector was being fed more aircraft than planned for by the Traffic Management Program and controllers. The sector was receiving aircraft at high speeds and insufficiently sequenced. The controller advised the supervisor of the situation. The controller was to be relieved from the sector but felt they were too busy to take the time to give a new controller a briefing. The controller felt the supervisor was not responding to his requests for spacing from the sectors feeding him. The controller advised the supervisor he would not accept any more aircraft handoffs to his sector. Another controller was sent to relieve him but he felt too busy to give a complete briefing. The relieving controller assumed the position after observing for a while.

Narrative: A80 was running triple Precision Runway Monitor approaches landing east. A 30 mile long area of moderate precip was preventing aircraft from getting from the ZTL Dalas sector to the Runway 9R final approach coarse. These aircraft were being offloaded to the TAR L position; therefore TAR L's aircraft were being flowed to the TAR H position; which I was working. No speed control had been assigned to these aircraft as we were running Time Based Flow Management (TBFM). Simultaneously; I was being fed aircraft from ZTL Husky sector with no speed control 7 miles in trail. This would necessitate me having to vector these aircraft to create space in which to place the flowed aircraft from L. After doing this with the first couple of sets of aircraft; I informed the Supervisor in charge of the Approach wall that I needed some speed control 'on the long side'; meaning both the H and L feeds in order to have gaps in which to place subsequent flowed aircraft. The Supervisor in a rather condescending tone; said; 'We're working on it'. Volume was heavy and every controller had a very high workload. Communication from the Supervisor was minimal to non-existent. A controller plugged in to relieve me; but I could not complete the briefing due to the workload. Then; another flowed aircraft checked on with a speed assigned of 280 knots; followed by another aircraft from ZTL Husky at 310 knots or greater assigned! At this point; I turned around to the Supervisor to inform him of this and asked him what was going on. He responded by instructing the Controller who came to relieve me to plug in and work my handoff. This was ineffective because the Controller had never worked handoff before; and certainly not in this type of situation. By now I was saturated with aircraft and was slowing them to between 180 knots and 210 knots on the departure side of the airport; and was using all the airspace I had to vector them in trail; to the point of being on the edge of Departure Radar airspace. The L controller continued to try and hand off flowed aircraft to me; so then I informed the Supervisor that I could not take handoffs on any more flowed aircraft; as I had no place to put them. At this point I could literally feel my heart pounding inside my chest and felt if I took the flowed aircraft that control of the situation would slip away. I have never had a feeling like this in all my years of ATC. In response to that; the Supervisor abruptly replied; 'Well then; get up.' Then he sent another Controller to relieve me. Again; I was unable to give a proper relief briefing and the new Controller eventually assumed the position as I listened. He inherited a situation that I was unwilling to work; and should not have been asked to. Within minutes; the Supervisor and Traffic Management Coordinators had transitioned to arriving two runways and reduced the arrival rate. I was unable to complete my assigned 10 hour shift due to extreme anxiety; spiked blood pressure; and elevated heart rate; as witnessed by several of my colleagues; brought on by the effects of the aforementioned events.The Supervisor had a minimal response to the changing; dynamic situation. There seemed to be no plan of how to manage the aircraft into our airspace; or how to meter them once they got there. TBFM should have been suspended in light of the unusual flow of traffic due to the effects of weather. Speed control and miles in trail should have been assigned to aircraft coming in from adjacent sectors to provide the controllers the space needed to blend aircraft from the different feeds. Once the impact of the weather on the flow of traffic became apparent; it might have been best to start transitioning immediately to a two operation final and reduced arrival rate. There seemed to be little to no concern for the stress; health; and welfare of the controllers involved. They are expected to just suck it up and accept whatever is thrust upon them. Controllers at A80 having been working mostly mandatory 6 day work weeks for several years now due to low staffing. This was my second 2 hour overtime holdover shift in 3 days. The cumulative effect of these conditions over time most likely adds to the level of stress and anxiety being experienced by all those involved in these situations. It was unreasonable of management to expect a single Controller to work a feed from three different sectors with no assistance and no flow management. Ultimately; operations and traffic management failed to properly manage the situation and mitigate the negative effects on the personnel involved.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.