Narrative:

On departure from ZZZZ we lost the C hydraulic system after the gear was retracted and the flaps were retracted to the flaps 5 position (a flex line to the nose gear retraction system failed/fractured). C hydraulic qty and C hydraulic system press lights and EICAS messages were displayed and the status page showed 0.00RF for the center hydraulic system. First officer was the PF and I was the pm. He called for the checklist and I completed it as we notified ATC we would be working the issue and slow to accelerate. I completed the checklist and was able to retract the flaps to the flaps 0/up position using the alternate (electric system). First officer noted that the aircraft was still not accelerating in VNAV or flch and an auto throttle FMA of flap lim was being intermittently displayed even though the aircraft was in the clean configuration limiting the speed to the flaps 5 limit of 220 KIAS. Knowing that this seemed to be an issue being caused by the primary flap handle position on the pedestal; I elected to move the flap handle to the flaps 1 position to see if this changed the AFDS system and how it was limiting us. The condition changed in that we still saw the flap lim message but it was now limiting us to the flaps 1 limit of 240 KIAS. We wanted to keep the automation level going with the auto throttle engaged and I then selected flap 0/up and the aircraft accelerated normally to the VNAV/FMC target speed. The boeing checklist is written for an extension scenario as opposed to a retraction scenario and there was no guidance to move the flap handle to keep what I thought was a much higher level of safety going on the aircraft. With the loss of just a single hydraulic system we discussed as a crew and decided to continue to our destination and notify the flight control office as soon as possible. This attempted by trying to establish a phone patch thru radio near ZZZZ; but the radio reception was terrible and we tried again as we flew northbound. Dispatch and mx control were notified of our condition and that we were planning to continue to our destination and land with coordination from the ZZZ ATC facility. We elected to remain at FL350 instead of our planned level due to the loss of the left yaw damper system with the loss of the C hydraulic system fluid. Due to a slightly lower than planned weight and stronger tailwinds we underburned on the flight coming to ZZZ. I did not feel that we were compromising safety by continuing and advised company people we would declare an emergency if we had any additional issues once we got into the ZZZ area and configured the aircraft for landing per the checklist. Coordination with ATC enroute was excellent and it was only on center that they inquired about any special handling we might need for our hydraulic problem. They obviously were notified by ZZZ ATC of our situation.once handed off to ZZZ approach they advised us we should plan an ILS to runway 36R and that they crash fire rescue equipment would be standing by. Weather was VFR and we had calm winds. I decided to keep first officer flying as I completed the deferred items portion of the checklist and that once fully configured I would take control and make the landing. The configuration of the aircraft went normally using the alternate system and checklist procedures other than when we selected the gear down; the nose gear with no residual pressure fell out with a significant bang. In my years of doing fcf I had never felt one like this because there was always some residual pressure in the system. We also discovered that the reserve steering and brakes valve was illuminated alerting us that we would not have any nose wheel steering on landing other than castering. We alerted ATC and company that we would need a tow off the runway once we had stopped.the landing was completed at a vref 20+5 knots speed of 136 knots due to our low weight. I elected to use minimal braking since I did not know if we had any lost hydraulic fluid on the main gear brakes and was concerned of a potential brake fire. Manual spoilers were used per the checklist. I touched down right at the 1000 ft marker on the PAPI and used max reverse thrust to slow us. As rudder effectiveness was decreased I checked to see if we had any nose wheel steering and found we did not. I was able to use a minimal amount of differential braking to exit the runway at the last high speed turn off and a low taxi speed and once clear of the runway came to a stop short of the [perpendicular] taxiway and set the parking brake and asked for the tug. We checked the brake temp indicators and advised crash fire rescue that nothing was over level 1 while we waited approximately 20 minutes for the tug to be escorted to our location on the airport. We completed an after landing checklist but elected to leave the aircrafts flaps in their current position. The APU was started and we shut down the aircraft engines and the crash fire team did an initial inspection of the aircraft to see that we were in no imminent danger.the aircraft was towed to the gate while escorted to the ramp by several fire department vehicles. We blocked in being 11 minutes behind schedule.I believe that I was motivated to complete the flight and get to the original destination to minimize any disruption to our customer. I felt that did not intentionally violate any company or QRH procedures by moving the flap handle once the system was disabled by selecting the alternate le/te flap switches; in that my systems knowledge confirmed that the hydraulic pdu's were disabled and moving the pedestal flap handle would only improve our level of safety and automation while completing the flight. From my many years in the flight standards and training department and attending operator symposiums; I knew that boeing did not offer much guidance on continuing the flight with a single system failure other than listing on how to retract or extend the flaps/slats as required to complete the flight. I discussed all of my thoughts and motivation with my flight deck partner and used all CRM skills making a point to ask him if he had any concerns and to not be afraid to raise any issues he thought necessary to complete the safe conclusion of our flight. I would request that the company and/or safety committee contact boeing and other operators to inquire about the use of the procedures I did and what checklist guidance or QRH modifications should be made to advise flight crews of recommended and/or approved procedures to complete the checklist while maintaining the highest level of safety possible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 Captain reported losing center hydraulic system shortly after takeoff. The flight continued to destination.

Narrative: On Departure from ZZZZ we lost the C HYD System after the gear was retracted and the flaps were retracted to the Flaps 5 position (A Flex Line to the Nose Gear Retraction System Failed/Fractured). C HYD QTY and C HYD SYS PRESS lights and EICAS messages were displayed and the Status Page showed 0.00RF for the Center Hydraulic System. FO was the PF and I was the PM. He called for the Checklist and I completed it as we notified ATC we would be working the issue and slow to accelerate. I completed the Checklist and was able to retract the Flaps to the Flaps 0/UP position using the Alternate (Electric System). FO noted that the aircraft was still not accelerating in VNAV or FLCH and an Auto Throttle FMA of FLAP LIM was being intermittently displayed even though the aircraft was in the clean configuration limiting the speed to the Flaps 5 limit of 220 KIAS. Knowing that this seemed to be an issue being caused by the primary Flap Handle position on the pedestal; I elected to move the Flap Handle to the Flaps 1 position to see if this changed the AFDS system and how it was limiting us. The condition changed in that we still saw the FLAP LIM message but it was now limiting us to the Flaps 1 limit of 240 KIAS. We wanted to keep the Automation Level going with the Auto Throttle engaged and I then selected Flap 0/UP and the aircraft accelerated normally to the VNAV/FMC target speed. The Boeing Checklist is written for an Extension scenario as opposed to a retraction scenario and there was no guidance to move the Flap Handle to keep what I thought was a much higher level of safety going on the aircraft. With the loss of just a single hydraulic system we discussed as a crew and decided to continue to our destination and notify the Flight Control office as soon as possible. This attempted by trying to establish a phone patch thru Radio near ZZZZ; but the radio reception was terrible and we tried again as we flew northbound. Dispatch and MX Control were notified of our condition and that we were planning to continue to our destination and land with coordination from the ZZZ ATC facility. We elected to remain at FL350 instead of our planned level due to the loss of the LEFT Yaw Damper System with the loss of the C HYD SYS fluid. Due to a slightly lower than planned weight and stronger tailwinds we underburned on the flight coming to ZZZ. I did not feel that we were compromising safety by continuing and advised Company people we would declare an Emergency if we had any additional issues once we got into the ZZZ area and configured the aircraft for landing per the checklist. Coordination with ATC enroute was excellent and it was only on Center that they inquired about any special handling we might need for our Hydraulic Problem. They obviously were notified by ZZZ ATC of our situation.Once handed off to ZZZ Approach they advised us we should plan an ILS to Runway 36R and that they Crash Fire Rescue equipment would be standing by. Weather was VFR and we had calm winds. I decided to keep FO flying as I completed the Deferred Items portion of the Checklist and that once fully configured I would take control and make the landing. The configuration of the aircraft went normally using the Alternate System and Checklist procedures other than when we selected the Gear Down; the nose gear with no residual pressure fell out with a significant bang. In my years of doing FCF I had never felt one like this because there was always some residual pressure in the system. We also discovered that the Reserve Steering and Brakes Valve was illuminated alerting us that we would not have any nose wheel steering on landing other than castering. We alerted ATC and Company that we would need a tow off the runway once we had stopped.The landing was completed at a Vref 20+5 knots speed of 136 knots due to our low weight. I elected to use minimal braking since I did not know if we had any lost hydraulic fluid on the Main Gear Brakes and was concerned of a potential brake fire. Manual Spoilers were used per the Checklist. I touched down right at the 1000 ft marker on the PAPI and used Max Reverse thrust to slow us. As rudder effectiveness was decreased I checked to see if we had any Nose Wheel Steering and found we did not. I was able to use a minimal amount of differential braking to exit the runway at the last high speed turn off and a low taxi speed and once clear of the runway came to a stop short of the [perpendicular] Taxiway and set the Parking Brake and asked for the tug. We checked the Brake Temp indicators and advised Crash Fire Rescue that nothing was over level 1 while we waited approximately 20 minutes for the tug to be escorted to our location on the airport. We completed an after landing checklist but elected to leave the aircrafts flaps in their current position. The APU was started and we shut down the aircraft engines and the Crash Fire Team did an initial inspection of the aircraft to see that we were in no imminent danger.The aircraft was towed to the gate while escorted to the Ramp by several Fire Department vehicles. We blocked in being 11 minutes behind schedule.I believe that I was motivated to complete the flight and get to the original destination to minimize any disruption to our customer. I felt that did not intentionally violate any company or QRH procedures by moving the Flap Handle once the system was disabled by selecting the Alternate LE/TE Flap Switches; in that my systems knowledge confirmed that the Hydraulic PDU's were disabled and moving the Pedestal Flap Handle would only improve our level of safety and automation while completing the flight. From my many years in the Flight Standards and Training Department and attending Operator Symposiums; I knew that Boeing did not offer much guidance on continuing the flight with a single system failure other than listing on how to retract or extend the flaps/slats as required to complete the flight. I discussed all of my thoughts and motivation with my Flight Deck partner and used all CRM skills making a point to ask him if he had any concerns and to not be afraid to raise any issues he thought necessary to complete the safe conclusion of our flight. I would request that the Company and/or Safety Committee contact Boeing and other operators to inquire about the use of the procedures I did and what Checklist Guidance or QRH modifications should be made to advise flight crews of recommended and/or approved procedures to complete the checklist while maintaining the highest level of safety possible.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.