Narrative:

On taxi out to runway 25L for departure; while approaching the 25L threshold; new runway assignment was issued along with crossing instructions and intersection takeoff clearance. Crew accepted the clearance; but failed to reload the proper runway 25R data into both FMS units for the associated departure. The result was an early turn on the loop seven departure.takeoff clearance and or 25L crossing clearance should have been rejected by crew. There was not adequate time to carefully load and brief the appropriate procedures. Additional factors include use of electronic charts; especially with single copies. With only one electronic copy available to crew; the copy may not be displayed to both crewmembers when necessary. Over reliance on FMS data then seems to create major risks.allowing the intersection takeoff clearance to be issued with a runway change and a runway crossing while near the runway thresholds should not have been accepted. Adequate time was not present to carefully execute checklists and briefings. Also; charted data should have been displayed to both crewmembers for all published procedures for proper crosscheck of data at all times.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: First Officer reported making an early turn on the LAX LOOP departure when the FMS was not programmed properly following a late runway change.

Narrative: On taxi out to runway 25L for departure; while approaching the 25L threshold; new runway assignment was issued along with crossing instructions and intersection takeoff clearance. Crew accepted the clearance; but failed to reload the proper runway 25R data into both FMS units for the associated departure. The result was an early turn on the LOOP SEVEN departure.Takeoff clearance and or 25L crossing clearance should have been rejected by crew. There was not adequate time to carefully load and brief the appropriate procedures. Additional factors include use of electronic charts; especially with single copies. With only one electronic copy available to crew; the copy may not be displayed to both crewmembers when necessary. Over reliance on FMS data then seems to create major risks.Allowing the intersection takeoff clearance to be issued with a runway change and a runway crossing while near the runway thresholds should not have been accepted. Adequate time was not present to carefully execute checklists and briefings. Also; charted data should have been displayed to both crewmembers for all published procedures for proper crosscheck of data at all times.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.