Narrative:

This incident occurred on feb/mon/03, at approximately XA00 in cyyz. However, since I was not notified that an incident had occurred until the afternoon of mar/wed/03 at approximately XA15, I am submitting this form in an attempt to explain the event. Our report time that morning was XA00, and it was very cold. When we reported to the gate, we found out that the aircraft had several unusual MEL'ed items that would effect our usual preflight duties. We wouldn't be able to have power on the aircraft until we started the #2 engine. However, we wouldn't be able to start the engine until the aircraft was fueled. So, we weren't able to start our usual preflight duties and security inspections until 25 mins prior to departure, which is not enough time. However, we hurried as quickly as we could to not have a delayed departure. As I received the ATIS, it stated that cyyz was landing ILS runway 5. Our IFR clearance was -- pearson 9 departure as filed, and, of course, they gave us an altitude, departure frequency and squawk code, but I don't remember them. The captain entered this information into the FMS while I finished our load manifest. The captain then asked if the FMS looked all right. I then quickly checked the flight plan in the FMS. The pearson 9 departure was in it, off runway 5 (I think), along with the rest of our flight plan. It was now departure time, so I quickly briefed the departure, since it was my leg to fly. I said the standard brief, adding that I would fly the pearson 9 using the FMS for navigation, and that I would use the vnap B climb profile for noise abatement. The captain had no questions. Pushback and taxi were all normal. However, our departure runway was now runway 33R. I noted that, on the pearson 9 SID, it was runway heading 327 degrees to 1100 ft MSL then heading 320 degrees to intercept the 343 degree radial off toronto VOR. The captain then entered something into the FMS. I was busy doing the first flight of the day 'before takeoff' checklist and did not really pay attention to him. I assumed he was entering the departure runway change. Takeoff, run, and rotation were all standard. When we got to 1100 ft, I made the slight left turn to 320 degrees and asked for 'flaps up, climb thrust, and climb checklist.' at this point, I realized that the course displayed on the mfd screen was not the correct course. I said 'it's not in there.' the captain, busy doing the climb checklist said 'what isn't?' I said 'we are supposed to intercept a radial, it's not in the FMS.' we then both quickly started looking for the cyyz VOR frequency and radial. The captain got it first, tuned it into my #2 navigation radio, and I switched my pfd to show the information. It showed that we had just flown through the 343 degree radial. I immediately started a turn to the right to re-intercept the radial. At that point, the departure controller gave us a heading of 240 degrees to fly. I immediately turned the aircraft to that heading and switched the pfd back over to FMS navigation. The rest of the flight was completely standard. The toronto controllers gave us no indication that we had deviated far enough off course to break noise abatement procedures. It turns out that we missed the 343 degree radial by 10-15 seconds. That was how long it took us to tune in the VOR and radial and start the turn before being issued the 240 degree heading. There are several things that contributed to this incident. The biggest one being that we rushed things. The departure brief was not thorough enough. I should have either flown the departure using the VOR and radial or made sure that the FMS was properly programmed. I'm not sure which runway the FMS had in it, runway 5 or runway 33R. One important step that I don't think happened was that the 'runway update' on the FMS was not pushed when we got onto the runway for departure. If that is not done, the FMS will still think that you are at the geographic center of the airport, and therefore will not display the appropriate navigational information in it for the initial turns on a SID. I hope that this information can be used to keep this from happening again. The most important thing I learned from it is to not be rushed through preflight duties. Safety of flight is far more important than an on-time departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 FLT CREW DEPARTS WITH WRONG RWY AND DEP PROGRAMMED IN THE FMC AND FAILS TO INTERCEPT THE CORRECT RADIAL.

Narrative: THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED ON FEB/MON/03, AT APPROX XA00 IN CYYZ. HOWEVER, SINCE I WAS NOT NOTIFIED THAT AN INCIDENT HAD OCCURRED UNTIL THE AFTERNOON OF MAR/WED/03 AT APPROX XA15, I AM SUBMITTING THIS FORM IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THE EVENT. OUR RPT TIME THAT MORNING WAS XA00, AND IT WAS VERY COLD. WHEN WE RPTED TO THE GATE, WE FOUND OUT THAT THE ACFT HAD SEVERAL UNUSUAL MEL'ED ITEMS THAT WOULD EFFECT OUR USUAL PREFLT DUTIES. WE WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO HAVE PWR ON THE ACFT UNTIL WE STARTED THE #2 ENG. HOWEVER, WE WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO START THE ENG UNTIL THE ACFT WAS FUELED. SO, WE WEREN'T ABLE TO START OUR USUAL PREFLT DUTIES AND SECURITY INSPECTIONS UNTIL 25 MINS PRIOR TO DEP, WHICH IS NOT ENOUGH TIME. HOWEVER, WE HURRIED AS QUICKLY AS WE COULD TO NOT HAVE A DELAYED DEP. AS I RECEIVED THE ATIS, IT STATED THAT CYYZ WAS LNDG ILS RWY 5. OUR IFR CLRNC WAS -- PEARSON 9 DEP AS FILED, AND, OF COURSE, THEY GAVE US AN ALT, DEP FREQ AND SQUAWK CODE, BUT I DON'T REMEMBER THEM. THE CAPT ENTERED THIS INFO INTO THE FMS WHILE I FINISHED OUR LOAD MANIFEST. THE CAPT THEN ASKED IF THE FMS LOOKED ALL RIGHT. I THEN QUICKLY CHKED THE FLT PLAN IN THE FMS. THE PEARSON 9 DEP WAS IN IT, OFF RWY 5 (I THINK), ALONG WITH THE REST OF OUR FLT PLAN. IT WAS NOW DEP TIME, SO I QUICKLY BRIEFED THE DEP, SINCE IT WAS MY LEG TO FLY. I SAID THE STANDARD BRIEF, ADDING THAT I WOULD FLY THE PEARSON 9 USING THE FMS FOR NAV, AND THAT I WOULD USE THE VNAP B CLB PROFILE FOR NOISE ABATEMENT. THE CAPT HAD NO QUESTIONS. PUSHBACK AND TAXI WERE ALL NORMAL. HOWEVER, OUR DEP RWY WAS NOW RWY 33R. I NOTED THAT, ON THE PEARSON 9 SID, IT WAS RWY HDG 327 DEGS TO 1100 FT MSL THEN HDG 320 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE 343 DEG RADIAL OFF TORONTO VOR. THE CAPT THEN ENTERED SOMETHING INTO THE FMS. I WAS BUSY DOING THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY 'BEFORE TKOF' CHKLIST AND DID NOT REALLY PAY ATTN TO HIM. I ASSUMED HE WAS ENTERING THE DEP RWY CHANGE. TKOF, RUN, AND ROTATION WERE ALL STANDARD. WHEN WE GOT TO 1100 FT, I MADE THE SLIGHT L TURN TO 320 DEGS AND ASKED FOR 'FLAPS UP, CLB THRUST, AND CLB CHKLIST.' AT THIS POINT, I REALIZED THAT THE COURSE DISPLAYED ON THE MFD SCREEN WAS NOT THE CORRECT COURSE. I SAID 'IT'S NOT IN THERE.' THE CAPT, BUSY DOING THE CLB CHKLIST SAID 'WHAT ISN'T?' I SAID 'WE ARE SUPPOSED TO INTERCEPT A RADIAL, IT'S NOT IN THE FMS.' WE THEN BOTH QUICKLY STARTED LOOKING FOR THE CYYZ VOR FREQ AND RADIAL. THE CAPT GOT IT FIRST, TUNED IT INTO MY #2 NAV RADIO, AND I SWITCHED MY PFD TO SHOW THE INFO. IT SHOWED THAT WE HAD JUST FLOWN THROUGH THE 343 DEG RADIAL. I IMMEDIATELY STARTED A TURN TO THE R TO RE-INTERCEPT THE RADIAL. AT THAT POINT, THE DEP CTLR GAVE US A HDG OF 240 DEGS TO FLY. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED THE ACFT TO THAT HDG AND SWITCHED THE PFD BACK OVER TO FMS NAV. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS COMPLETELY STANDARD. THE TORONTO CTLRS GAVE US NO INDICATION THAT WE HAD DEVIATED FAR ENOUGH OFF COURSE TO BREAK NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS. IT TURNS OUT THAT WE MISSED THE 343 DEG RADIAL BY 10-15 SECONDS. THAT WAS HOW LONG IT TOOK US TO TUNE IN THE VOR AND RADIAL AND START THE TURN BEFORE BEING ISSUED THE 240 DEG HDG. THERE ARE SEVERAL THINGS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. THE BIGGEST ONE BEING THAT WE RUSHED THINGS. THE DEP BRIEF WAS NOT THOROUGH ENOUGH. I SHOULD HAVE EITHER FLOWN THE DEP USING THE VOR AND RADIAL OR MADE SURE THAT THE FMS WAS PROPERLY PROGRAMMED. I'M NOT SURE WHICH RWY THE FMS HAD IN IT, RWY 5 OR RWY 33R. ONE IMPORTANT STEP THAT I DON'T THINK HAPPENED WAS THAT THE 'RWY UPDATE' ON THE FMS WAS NOT PUSHED WHEN WE GOT ONTO THE RWY FOR DEP. IF THAT IS NOT DONE, THE FMS WILL STILL THINK THAT YOU ARE AT THE GEOGRAPHIC CTR OF THE ARPT, AND THEREFORE WILL NOT DISPLAY THE APPROPRIATE NAVIGATIONAL INFO IN IT FOR THE INITIAL TURNS ON A SID. I HOPE THAT THIS INFO CAN BE USED TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING I LEARNED FROM IT IS TO NOT BE RUSHED THROUGH PREFLT DUTIES. SAFETY OF FLT IS FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN AN ON-TIME DEP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.