Narrative:

This report describes the events that led us to miss the before taxi checklist and taxi the aircraft with the flaps up. The event occurred on the first flight of my second trip after a month long vacation. It was the first flight of the trip and the first flight with my first officer. The first officer (formally from another carrier in the 717) has been at company for over 16 months.we started the pairing in dallas on a dark; stormy and rainy morning. Ground operations and preflight were normal. We planned on a runway 31R departure to the emmtt two SID in accordance with our pre departure clearance. During pushback and engine start we realized the ATIS had changed and the airport was now on south flow. We started both engines during the pushback. I set the parking brake; cleared off the pushback crew and both the first officer and I completed our after start flows. With the parking brake set I elected to get the performance computer and FMC reprogrammed to depart on 13R in accordance with standard company policy. We then accomplished the departure plan checklist. At that time; ground control asked us if we could accept departure on 13L. We referenced the performance computer and informed ground we could accept a 13L departure. I notified ground control we needed a couple minutes to reprogram our FMC. The first officer and I accomplished the required changes and once again ran the departure plan checklist. Ground control notified us that eastbound departures had been ground stopped and to taxi into the runway 13L hold pad. I taxied the aircraft to the hold pad.these changes distracted us from our normal flow patterns. We failed to accomplish the before taxi checklist and never set the flaps prior to taxi. I realized the flaps were not set properly when we stopped the aircraft in the hold pad. I shut down both engines due to the delay. The first officer and I discussed how we missed the flaps. We briefed the departure; reviewed the performance computer and selected flaps to five. Once the ground stop was lifted; we started both engines; completed the before taxi checklist. We completed the before takeoff checklist and taxied into position for takeoff.we failed to complete the before taxi checklist due to the two runway changes we received at the completion of the pushback. My normal habit of completing the before taxi checklist immediately after clearing off the pushback crew was broken. Running the departure plan check list twice while sitting near the gate added to the sense the checklists were completed. I did catch the mistake prior to the before takeoff checklist; but only that checklist and the throttle check stood between us and serious error.one other item of note (not related) occurred when we were cleared for takeoff. The tower controller cleared us to takeoff RNAV drset. We informed the tower that drset was not on our departure. He asked us if we received the lndre two departure. We told him we had not received any routing changes and we were on the emmtt two SID. We taxied clear of the runway and contacted clearance delivery.the clearance delivery controller was adamant that we received the lndre two clearance via pre departure clearance. We checked our CDU which showed our pre departure clearance with the emmtt 2 SID (I have a picture of the CDU showing the pre departure clearance). The controller seemed shocked that we did not get the clearance and told us that it was there and we might have missed it. It was not there. I don't understand how the controller was reading from a pre departure clearance clearance that he claimed we received that did not match what we did receive.we clarified the new departure and our entire route with clearance delivery. We reprogramed the FMC; verified the performance computer and completed the departure plan checklist and the before takeoff checklist (again). Forty-eight minutes after pushback we departed. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. I bring up this last item because I am concerned that a last minute change to a pre departure clearance was not communicated to us even though ATC thought it had been.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 Captain reported taxiing without running the before taxi checklist when the flight crew was distracted by multiple runway changes. Reporter also stated his copy of the PDC differed from what ATC had.

Narrative: This report describes the events that led us to miss the before taxi checklist and taxi the aircraft with the flaps up. The event occurred on the first flight of my second trip after a month long vacation. It was the first flight of the trip and the first flight with my FO. The FO (formally from another carrier in the 717) has been at company for over 16 months.We started the pairing in Dallas on a dark; stormy and rainy morning. Ground operations and preflight were normal. We planned on a Runway 31R departure to the EMMTT TWO SID in accordance with our PDC. During pushback and engine start we realized the ATIS had changed and the airport was now on south flow. We started both engines during the pushback. I set the parking brake; cleared off the pushback crew and both the FO and I completed our after start flows. With the parking brake set I elected to get the performance computer and FMC reprogrammed to depart on 13R in accordance with standard company policy. We then accomplished the departure plan checklist. At that time; Ground Control asked us if we could accept departure on 13L. We referenced the performance computer and informed Ground we could accept a 13L departure. I notified Ground Control we needed a couple minutes to reprogram our FMC. The FO and I accomplished the required changes and once again ran the departure plan checklist. Ground Control notified us that eastbound departures had been ground stopped and to taxi into the Runway 13L hold pad. I taxied the aircraft to the hold pad.These changes distracted us from our normal flow patterns. We failed to accomplish the before taxi checklist and never set the flaps prior to taxi. I realized the flaps were not set properly when we stopped the aircraft in the hold pad. I shut down both engines due to the delay. The FO and I discussed how we missed the flaps. We briefed the departure; reviewed the performance computer and selected flaps to five. Once the ground stop was lifted; we started both engines; completed the before taxi checklist. We completed the before takeoff checklist and taxied into position for takeoff.We failed to complete the before taxi checklist due to the two runway changes we received at the completion of the pushback. My normal habit of completing the before taxi checklist immediately after clearing off the pushback crew was broken. Running the departure plan check list twice while sitting near the gate added to the sense the checklists were completed. I did catch the mistake prior to the before takeoff checklist; but only that checklist and the throttle check stood between us and serious error.One other item of note (not related) occurred when we were cleared for takeoff. The Tower Controller cleared us to takeoff RNAV DRSET. We informed the Tower that DRSET was not on our departure. He asked us if we received the LNDRE TWO Departure. We told him we had not received any routing changes and we were on the EMMTT TWO SID. We taxied clear of the runway and contacted Clearance Delivery.The Clearance Delivery Controller was adamant that we received the LNDRE TWO clearance via PDC. We checked our CDU which showed our PDC with the EMMTT 2 SID (I have a picture of the CDU showing the PDC). The Controller seemed shocked that we did not get the clearance and told us that it was there and we might have missed it. It was not there. I don't understand how the Controller was reading from a PDC clearance that he claimed we received that did not match what we did receive.We clarified the new departure and our entire route with Clearance Delivery. We reprogramed the FMC; verified the performance computer and completed the departure plan checklist and the before takeoff checklist (again). Forty-eight minutes after pushback we departed. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. I bring up this last item because I am concerned that a last minute change to a PDC was not communicated to us even though ATC thought it had been.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.