Narrative:

We were at FL320 and got a hydraulic B lo pr ECAM with no [blue advisory] items but got the chime. Since we were stabilized at cruise altitude and I was already the PF I continued to fly and took the radios as the first officer began to search the quick reference handbook (QRH) for the procedure. As I followed him through the index we both soon realized that there was no such procedure listed in the QRH. We then checked the flight manual (FM) and found the same - no procedure for the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) we showed. I then had the first officer send a dispatch call me so we could talk to maintenance control (mc). The airbus controller spoke as I monitored at low volume as to maintain ATC watch. The controller was 'dumbfounded' as to why there was no direct procedure as he had us check the status of the electric blue pump (had no fault light indication); hydraulic page (amber arrow and amber 'blue' shown); blue system pressure was 2850 psi; and F/control page (amber B indications). He finally decided that it would be prudent for us to run the hydraulic B elec pump lo pr (QRH 130.1) as it was the closest procedure - which we accomplished. After fully following 130.1 we signed off with mc and dispatch as he could not think of any other options to work from. Upon clearing the pages - when the first officer arrived at the status page the first step showed to turn the blue elec pump back to auto for approach which was not part of the 130.1 procedure. We once again contacted mc for clarification and he recommended doing this - just in case the pump 'failure' was erroneous and we re-established blue system pressure for approach and landing. After leaving him once again; within two minutes (approx) we received a F/control ELEC1 fault and followed the QRH procedure which called for a reset of elec 1. When we turned it off the aircraft began a slight (less than 5 degree) roll to the right and stayed that way throughout the remainder of the flight. We reset elevator/aileron computer (elac) 1 after 5 seconds to no avail - as the message remained. I elected not to call mc for a third time as we believed this to be a related failure (which was in fact mc's opinion as well after we called to debrief them after landing). After finishing all procedures and calls I elected to call the purser to inform her that the aircraft was flying normally but we did have a hydraulic issue. I asked her to review procedures for evacuation with her partners just in case the situation deteriorated and gave her an estimated time until landing (test). As we quickly approached the top of descent I began to quickly brief the RNAV arrival to transition to a visual approach. In our haste; the first officer and I failed to confirm this in the multipurpose control display units (mcdu); and had the ILS in instead. I didn't catch it until shortly after the final fix and had him quickly enter the FMS visual procedure - we were slightly southwest of course and corrected back to the FMS course expeditiously. I then asked the first officer to turn the blue elec pump back on and the aircraft 'jerked' momentarily; which signified to me that in fact there was some pressure provided of course - although the 5 degree right bank continued. I elected not to declare an emergency based on the green and yellow systems being normal; a 'return' of blue system; no fault lights or overheats noted on any hydraulic pumps or systems; and positive aircraft control. By the way; I had been hand flying (auto thrust still on) since around 12;000 feet as to get a feel for aircraft control relatively early. Again; except for the bank the aircraft flew relatively normally - under the circumstances. I also made sure to configure early as we were expecting slow slat movement as per QRH 130.1. We were soon cleared for the approach; configured the aircraft; stabilized the approach early; and landed normally. Upon reaching the gate and completing all checklists I then called maintenance control via dispatch to debrief him fully. By the time we landed mc had alreadysent email(s) to various departments documenting the issue(s) and said they would follow up with us if need be. Lastly I would be remiss if I failed to mention the exemplary work displayed by my new hire first officer. All crewmembers and mc displayed true skill and professionalism which ultimately contributed to a safe outcome.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain reported a 'B' Hydraulic System Low Pressure warning appeared on ECAM. There was no procedure in the QRH to resolve the issue. Pressure indicated normal; but the aircraft tended to roll to the right for the remainder of the flight. They reset MCDU 1; to no avail. Turning the hydraulic pump back on the aircraft 'jerked' indicating pressure; but the tendency to roll remained.

Narrative: We were at FL320 and got a HYD B LO PR ECAM with no [Blue Advisory] items but got the chime. Since we were stabilized at cruise altitude and I was already the PF I continued to fly and took the radios as the FO began to search the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) for the procedure. As I followed him through the index we both soon realized that there was no such procedure listed in the QRH. We then checked the Flight Manual (FM) and found the same - no procedure for the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) we showed. I then had the FO send a Dispatch CALL ME so we could talk to Maintenance Control (MC). The Airbus controller spoke as I monitored at low volume as to maintain ATC watch. The controller was 'dumbfounded' as to why there was no direct procedure as he had us check the status of the Electric Blue pump (had no fault light indication); HYD page (amber arrow and amber 'BLUE' shown); BLUE system pressure was 2850 PSI; and F/CTL page (amber B indications). He finally decided that it would be prudent for us to run the HYD B ELEC PUMP LO PR (QRH 130.1) as it was the closest procedure - which we accomplished. After fully following 130.1 we signed off with MC and Dispatch as he could not think of any other options to work from. Upon clearing the pages - when the FO arrived at the Status page the first step showed to turn the BLUE ELEC pump back to auto for approach which was NOT part of the 130.1 procedure. We once again contacted MC for clarification and he recommended doing this - just in case the pump 'failure' was erroneous and we re-established Blue system pressure for approach and landing. After leaving him once again; within two minutes (approx) we received a F/CTL ELEC1 FAULT and followed the QRH procedure which called for a reset of ELEC 1. When we turned it off the aircraft began a slight (less than 5 degree) roll to the right and stayed that way throughout the remainder of the flight. We reset Elevator/Aileron Computer (ELAC) 1 after 5 seconds to no avail - as the message remained. I elected not to call MC for a third time as we believed this to be a related failure (which was in fact MC's opinion as well after we called to debrief them after landing). After finishing all procedures and calls I elected to call the Purser to inform her that the aircraft was flying normally but we did have a hydraulic issue. I asked her to review procedures for evacuation with her partners just in case the situation deteriorated and gave her an estimated time until landing (TEST). As we quickly approached the Top of Descent I began to quickly brief the RNAV arrival to transition to a visual approach. In our haste; the FO and I failed to confirm this in the Multipurpose Control Display Units (MCDU); and had the ILS in instead. I didn't catch it until shortly after the final fix and had him quickly enter the FMS visual procedure - we were slightly SW of course and corrected back to the FMS course expeditiously. I then asked the FO to turn the BLUE ELEC pump back on and the aircraft 'jerked' momentarily; which signified to me that in fact there was some pressure provided of course - although the 5 degree right bank continued. I elected NOT to declare an emergency based on the GREEN and YELLOW systems being normal; a 'return' of BLUE system; no fault lights or overheats noted on any HYD pumps or systems; and positive aircraft control. By the way; I had been hand flying (auto thrust still on) since around 12;000 feet as to get a feel for aircraft control relatively early. Again; except for the bank the aircraft flew relatively normally - under the circumstances. I also made sure to configure early as we were expecting slow slat movement as per QRH 130.1. We were soon cleared for the approach; configured the aircraft; stabilized the approach early; and landed normally. Upon reaching the Gate and completing all checklists I then called Maintenance Control via Dispatch to debrief him fully. By the time we landed MC had alreadysent email(s) to various departments documenting the issue(s) and said they would follow up with us if need be. Lastly I would be remiss if I failed to mention the exemplary work displayed by my New Hire FO. All crewmembers and MC displayed true skill and professionalism which ultimately contributed to a safe outcome.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.