Narrative:

We shot the visual approach using the ILS as a backup in a flaps zero configuration after a flaps fail message en route. We performed a thorough review of the QRH; landing procedure and briefing for the configuration. The captain let the flight attendant know we would be landing fast but declined to make a PA to passengers feeling they wouldn't notice the difference. This proved to be true. Everything went as planned and the captain performed the landing. It was a surprise to the captain just how much faster the plane appeared to be moving in this configuration. It was a bigger difference than he expected. We crossed the threshold on speed and the engines were at idle. The captain overdid the flare and the plane floated briefly before being brought back down for landing. The captain applied heavy brakes; though not maximum; and full reversers after bring the nose down gently. This ended up heating the right inboard brake to a 12; however the left inboard was a 3 and the other two were in the white (though I don't remember the numbers).the reason I am writing this report is because I was unaware where the aircraft originally touched down. On taxi in I mentioned to the first officer (first officer) that I might have floated too far. He didn't believe so. It was very difficult to judge distance because the float time didn't seem alarming at face value unless you consider our extra speed. In my effort to get the aircraft down I did not take this into consideration at the moment it happened. I did look toward the end of the runway and felt comfortable with the remaining runway when we touched down. I; the captain; was probably too hard on the brakes due mainly to the fact that the aircraft was moving unusually fast and it was possibly an overreaction. But again; I am not certain where the aircraft touched down and for that reason should have executed a go around. We exited the runway and taxied to the gate without interruption. The first officer ran the QRH for brake temp during taxi in. Threats were many. A relatively inexperienced first officer; night time operations; zero flap landing (a first for both of us); long duty day for the first officer and long day including on call period for reserve captain. The most obvious error was I should have executed a go around. There were so many distractions in the landing process that I did not properly identify the extra float in our landing. I briefed that I would do my best to minimize float due to our zero flap configuration and should have briefed the first officer more thoroughly on identifying it and calling for a go around if need be. Undesired aircraft state was a longer than usual flare. Another error was looking at the remaining runway at touchdown to determine the safety of the landing. I should have been focused solely on the touchdown zone. In the future; I need to be more thorough in briefing non-standard landing procedures. Not just explaining what I was planning to do; but also mentioning the undesired aircraft states that are more likely to occur. I should have told the first officer if I float to please help me be aware of our location on the runway and call a go around if we float too far. The only brief I made on the go around was what we would do in the event we performed one. It was a surprise to me just how non-standard this landing was and how distracting the extra speed would be. Particularly at night. I need to be more aware of the extra distractions of non-standard operations and stress the importance in both pilots being vigilant in their scanning and awareness to the very end.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 Captain reported landing long following a Flap Fail message and subsequent zero-flap approach.

Narrative: We shot the visual approach using the ILS as a backup in a flaps zero configuration after a FLAPS FAIL message en route. We performed a thorough review of the QRH; landing procedure and briefing for the configuration. The Captain let the flight attendant know we would be landing fast but declined to make a PA to passengers feeling they wouldn't notice the difference. This proved to be true. Everything went as planned and the Captain performed the landing. It was a surprise to the Captain just how much faster the plane appeared to be moving in this configuration. It was a bigger difference than he expected. We crossed the threshold on speed and the engines were at idle. The Captain overdid the flare and the plane floated briefly before being brought back down for landing. The Captain applied heavy brakes; though not maximum; and full reversers after bring the nose down gently. This ended up heating the right inboard brake to a 12; however the left inboard was a 3 and the other two were in the white (though I don't remember the numbers).The reason I am writing this report is because I was unaware where the aircraft originally touched down. On taxi in I mentioned to the First Officer (FO) that I might have floated too far. He didn't believe so. It was very difficult to judge distance because the float time didn't seem alarming at face value unless you consider our extra speed. In my effort to get the aircraft down I did not take this into consideration at the moment it happened. I did look toward the end of the runway and felt comfortable with the remaining runway when we touched down. I; the Captain; was probably too hard on the brakes due mainly to the fact that the aircraft was moving unusually fast and it was possibly an overreaction. But again; I am not certain where the aircraft touched down and for that reason should have executed a go around. We exited the runway and taxied to the gate without interruption. The FO ran the QRH for brake temp during taxi in. Threats were many. A relatively inexperienced FO; night time operations; zero flap landing (a first for both of us); long duty day for the FO and long day including on call period for reserve Captain. The most obvious error was I should have executed a go around. There were so many distractions in the landing process that I did not properly identify the extra float in our landing. I briefed that I would do my best to minimize float due to our zero flap configuration and should have briefed the FO more thoroughly on identifying it and calling for a go around if need be. Undesired aircraft state was a longer than usual flare. Another error was looking at the remaining runway at touchdown to determine the safety of the landing. I should have been focused solely on the touchdown zone. In the future; I need to be more thorough in briefing non-standard landing procedures. Not just explaining what I was planning to do; but also mentioning the undesired aircraft states that are more likely to occur. I should have told the FO if I float to please help me be aware of our location on the runway and call a go around if we float too far. The only brief I made on the go around was what we would do in the event we performed one. It was a surprise to me just how non-standard this landing was and how distracting the extra speed would be. Particularly at night. I need to be more aware of the extra distractions of non-standard operations and stress the importance in both pilots being vigilant in their scanning and awareness to the very end.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.